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CIVIL WAR HISTORY

Contents for September 1960

VOLUME SIX

NUMBER THREE

<i>Glory Road Began in the West</i> by Bruce Catton	229
<i>Henry Halleck and the Second Bull Run Campaign</i> by Stephen E. Ambrose	238
<i>Too Many Civil War Books?</i> by Otto Eisenschiml	250
<i>A Charge of Bare Necessity</i>	258
<i>The First Day's Battle of Gettysburg</i> by Warren W. Hassler, Jr.	259
<i>The Battle of Allatoona</i> by Fred E. Brown	277
<i>The Continuing War</i> by James I. Robertson, Jr.	298
<i>Notes and Queries</i> edited by Boyd B. Stutler	304
<i>Book Reviews</i>	315
<i>Book Notes</i>	338

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CIVIL WAR HISTORY

GLORY ROAD BEGAN IN THE WEST

Bruce Catton

ST. LOUIS IS NOT MERELY in the center of the great middle west, the heart of America itself; it is also in the middle of the great decisive theater of the Civil War, looking down the immense historic valley where the outcome of the war and the future of America were actually determined. No section of the United States has better reason than the middle west to look back on that terrible war with pride, with a feeling of direct personal involvement, almost with a feeling of personal possession. What Stephen A. Douglas used to call, with stout pride, "the great northwest," had a great deal to do with the way the war came out. It also had to pay a great part of the price for it.

In Missouri, as much as anywhere, the character of the war first began to take shape. The first, experimental, ineffective step toward emancipation of the slaves was taken in Missouri; there, too, unhappily, guerrilla warfare reached perhaps its worst and most costly development. If the whole country suffered tragically from divided loyalties during the war, that suffering was nowhere more poignant than it was in that area. From the great states of the Ohio and upper Mississippi valleys came the troops whose battles and campaigns finally meant victory for the Union; from the great states just to the south of them came the troops who opposed them so heroically and so long; and from the old northwest, too, came not merely the leaders who directed the nation's victorious effort but the unwavering response from plain citizens whose determination and endurance made that leadership effective. To understand truly why the war went the way it did go and what it finally meant there is no better vantage ground for one's study than in the Valley of the Mississippi.

As author of five best-sellers on the Civil War (including the recently published Grant Moves South), Editorial Advisory Board member BRUCE CATTON needs little introduction to students of the period. This article was adapted from a speech given at the National Civil War Centennial Assembly in St. Louis, May 5-6, 1960.

Ordinarily we tend to look on the Civil War as something that took place principally in Virginia. That was the center of the stage, with the brightest spotlights focused on it. The rival capitals lay only one hundred miles apart, and the country between them was fought over for four years. What happened there takes the eye and holds it. When Richmond fell, the end of the war was in sight; when Robert E. Lee at last was compelled to surrender the glamorous Army of Northern Virginia, both North and South agreed that the war was to all intents and purposes over.

But the real decision was not reached in Virginia; it was reached in the Mississippi valley. The final doom of the Confederacy was written in the west rather than in the east; that haunting scene at Appomattox—the ending of so much, the beginning of so much—was the last chapter in a story which began at Cairo and went down the great central river valley to Vicksburg. The enormous battle of Gettysburg was indeed one of the great events in our history, but the capture of Vicksburg was the wound which the Confederacy found truly mortal. Thus, a fresh look at the story of the conflict is justified.

Begin, if you like, on May 10, 1861, in St. Louis. On that date Captain Nathaniel Lyon of the United States Army led troops out to a militia camp on the edge of the city, disarmed some 700 state troops who had been put there by Governor Claiborne Jackson, and marched them off as prisoners, confiscating the arms and equipment which they possessed. On the way downtown crowds of civilians strongly sympathetic to the state troops surrounded Lyon's forces, jeering and shouting, jostling the soldiers, and perhaps throwing a few bricks. The thing developed into a full-dress riot, Lyon's soldiers opened fire, and twenty-four men were killed and a great many more wounded. Here, actually, was one of the first "engagements"—if it can be dignified by such a word—of the Civil War; certainly one of the first occasions of wholesale bloodshed. Notice that it involved men in uniform shooting at men not in uniform. Call the war by any name you like, but in St. Louis it certainly began as a civil war.

This mob scene is worth remembering because it helped to set a pattern—which left Missouri with bitter memories. Missouri contained Unionists and non-Unionists, perhaps in almost equal numbers. The heavy-handed sort of treatment symbolized by Captain Lyon's action meant that for four years Missouri knew all of the horrors of civil war. The formal battles that took place in Missouri are overshadowed by the unending series of skirmishes, raids, barn-burnings, assassinations, hangings, and general lawlessness. Looking at the record, one wonders how peace and good feelings were ever restored in the state.

The significance of all of this is that it shows how the government in

Washington, facing in secession what is considered a revolutionary situation, resolved at the outset to use revolutionary methods in handling it. If Missouri had gone solidly with the South and had become an integral unit in the Confederacy, the whole border area would have been lost to the Union, and the Confederacy would almost certainly have won the war before it was well begun. The Federal government demonstrated here that it would use any means to prevent this. The war was going to be fought to a finish; it would be the kind of struggle that could not end in a negotiated peace, a peace of compromise and adjustment—it would have to go on until one side or the other was incapable of fighting any more. All of that was foreshadowed clearly by what happened in Missouri in the very first months.

A war that is going to be fought to a finish can be a little slow in getting fully under way, especially when—as was the case in our Civil War—neither side is in the least prepared for war. The first six or eight months of the war did go slowly, and on the surface they went very unfavorably for the Union. At the end of 1861 any unbiased observer—if there were any such, at that time—could have been pardoned for suspecting that the North had bitten off a little more than it could chew. As far as anyone could see then it was not making a great deal of headway.

There had been a great battle at Bull Run, Virginia, and it had been an outright Union disaster. There had been a minor engagement at Ball's Bluff, on the upper Potomac, where a Union detachment suffered a costly and humiliating defeat. And in Missouri Lyon's little army was roundly beaten at Wilson's Creek, and Lyon himself was killed. Not long after that Confederate forces captured Lexington, Missouri, with its Union garrison. General Albert Sidney Johnston had a Confederate army posted on a long east-west line in Kentucky, and there seemed no immediate prospect that he could be driven out. Only in western Virginia had Union armies won anything, and even there what they had won opened no path for successful invasion. When 1862 began the Union forces had made very little progress anywhere.

Then things began to happen.

It would be easy to explain what happened by saying that the Federal army at Cairo, commanded by Brigadier General U. S. Grant, began at last to move south, but there was more to it than that. What really happened was that the people of the great northwest began at last to exert their own force. The Civil War had isolated them. By tradition and experience, they believed that their great channel to the outside world was the Mississippi River. They cared very little about slavery or about states' rights, but they did not want to be hemmed in. As far as they could see, the Southern Confederacy *was* hemming them in. It was

closing the Mississippi River, traditionally their outlet to the great world, and this they were not going to have. When you stop to think about it, it is an odd thing: The middle west is supposed to be the center of isolationist sentiment in this country—but try to isolate it and you get an explosion.

This explosion began to happen in the winter of 1862.

At Cairo, Grant had an army of perhaps 15,000 effective troops. Early in February, with Flag Officer Andrew H. Foote's gunboats for escort, he started up the Tennessee River to crack the Southern line. The Confederate Fort Henry, as it happened, was a very weak fort. It had been poorly designed and built, the Tennessee was in flood at the time, and Fort Henry was half under water. It was so weak, in fact, that it caved in after a brief bombardment by Foote's gunboats. It surrendered to Foote, and Grant—bringing his troops up by land, preparing for a difficult assault—got to the scene just in time to validate the surrender.

The fall of Fort Henry was one of the far-reaching events of the war. It made all of General Johnston's defensive line insecure. The right end of that line had already been broken by Thomas' victory at Mill Springs; now the loss of Fort Henry jarred the whole thing loose, and it led immediately to Johnston's order for a withdrawal. For with the Tennessee River now open to Union gunboats, all the way to northern Mississippi and Alabama, the Confederates in Kentucky could do nothing but retreat.

Fort Henry was quickly followed by Fort Donelson. Marching across the narrow neck of land between the Tennessee and the Cumberland, Grant had his army in line before this fort by February 13. It proved a much tougher nut to crack than Fort Henry had been. The gunboats were sharply repulsed, and a counterattack by the reinforced Confederate garrison drove Grant's troops back in temporary disorder. But the Confederate commanders were unable to build on their temporary advantage, Grant restored his lines, and on February 16 he enforced unconditional surrender on the fort and its 15,000 soldiers.

This success was the other half of the Fort Henry victory. Taken together the two meant that the Confederacy no longer had a defensive line in the west north of the southern border of Tennessee. Kentucky was lost, western Tennessee was lost, the whole Mississippi valley was well on the way to being lost, and it was now possible for the Federals to cut the vital east-west railway line that connected Virginia with the western part of the Confederacy. If the Federal government had followed up this triumph with vigor and energy—which is what Grant very much wanted to do—final Northern victory in the west could probably have been nailed down that spring.

As things worked out, the vigor and energy were not forthcoming.

The Federal commander in the west, General Henry W. Halleck, was another of those gifted but irresolute Federal officers who acted as if they had all the time in the world. He made General Johnston a free gift of seven weeks, which was just enough time to reassemble the broken Confederate army in Northern Mississippi; and when Grant, after many delays, was able to resume his advance up the Tennessee—while General Don Carlos Buell, commanding an independent army, marched overland, without undue haste, from Nashville, to join him—Johnston and his second in command, General P. G. T. Beauregard, launched a surprise counterattack at Shiloh, and came within inches of driving Grant's forces off in rout. In the end, Grant's lines held, Buell joined him, Johnston was killed in action, and the Confederates retreated to Corinth. Shiloh, a poorly directed battle from the Union standpoint, was nevertheless a decisive victory, because it made good the triumphs previously gained. This counterattack was a battle the Confederates simply had to win if they wanted to hold the west. Failing to win it, they lost more than they could afford to lose.

The story of the Vicksburg Campaign is a familiar one, and there is little need to emphasize the obvious. What does require emphasis, however, is the far-reaching nature of the Union victories in the west in the winter and spring of 1862. Among other things, they made possible Admiral David Farragut's spectacular seizure of New Orleans; the force that might have checked him had been sent north to meet the threat that was coming up the Tennessee. By the time General George McClellan had his Peninsular Campaign well under way, the Confederates in the west had been put at a permanent and a crippling disadvantage. None of Lee's dazzling victories in Virginia could quite redress the balance. New Madrid and Island No. 10 were taken, Memphis fell, Corinth had to be evacuated—and by the time McClellan had been driven away from Richmond the Confederates had already lost all of the Mississippi valley except the segment from Vicksburg to Baton Rouge. General Samuel Curtis' victory at Pea Ridge doomed the Southern hope of regaining control of Missouri; the whole trans-Mississippi area was beginning, by mid-summer of 1862, to come under the shadow of doom.

In the fall the Confederacy made its greatest effort to restore the balance. The famous high-water mark of the Confederate cause came in the fall of 1862 rather than at Gettysburg. Never before or after was the South so close to victory. The Northern threat to Richmond had been cancelled, Lee was invading Maryland—and here in the west Generals Braxton Bragg and E. Kirby Smith were invading Kentucky, while Generals Sterling Price and Earl Van Dorn were moving up into northern Mississippi to try their luck against Grant. Confederate victories that fall might very well have won the war.

But the Confederate victories were not forthcoming. Lee was checked at Antietam, Bragg retreated to central Tennessee after the indecisive battle of Perryville, and the attack on Grant was thwarted at Iuka and Corinth. After that, the Confederate chance of winning final victory in the field was constantly diminishing. In effect the war became a holding operation. The South might still win if the North could be induced to give up out of sheer war weariness and discouragement, but that was about its only chance.

Bear in mind that after this crisis the North gained no particular advantage in the east. It lost at Fredericksburg, and it lost again at Chancellorsville, and in July, 1863, the South gained its farthest point north by the move to Gettysburg. But although there was a deadlock in the east, the road to victory was steadily being opened in the west. The Mississippi campaign was resumed. Vicksburg fell, Port Hudson fell, the whole river was opened, the trans-Mississippi country was lost to the Confederacy forever, central and eastern Tennessee were occupied, and despite the bloody check at Chickamauga the way was open, by the end of 1863, for the Northern armies to strike down through Georgia into the very heart of the South.

Because attention is usually centered on the dramatic series of events in Virginia, the steady flow of Northern victories in the west is often overlooked. For instance, in Virginia the 1864 campaign began at just about the place where the 1862 campaign had begun. In July, 1864, after two months of desperate fighting, the Army of the Potomac was dug in before Richmond, unable to make any further gains, actually farther from the Confederate capital than McClellan had been two years earlier—and we assume that the Confederacy had been holding its own very well and that three years of warfare had accomplished little.

Actually, by the summer of 1864 the Confederacy had been reduced to truly desperate straits. All of the west was gone, Georgia was being bisected, the sea coast was largely sealed off, and the South's hope had been reduced to the chance that the peace party in the North might somehow win the fall election. By the end of 1864, the Army of the Potomac was still held firmly in its trench lines at Petersburg, apparently no nearer victory than it had been two and one-half years earlier—but the Confederacy by now consisted of little more than southern Virginia, the Carolinas, and a fringe of land along the Gulf Coast, together with Kirby Smith's enclave west of the Mississippi which was utterly powerless to have any effect on the outcome of the war. The end was inevitable, now, and it was inevitable because of what had been done in the west, by the western armies.

There is even more to it than that. The very character of the war

was determined by the western armies. Beyond any policies adopted in Washington, beyond any proclamations issued by the President, the doom of slavery as an institution was sealed by the things these western soldiers did.

This is an interesting point, because the western armies were by no means centers of abolitionist influence. Most of the devoutly anti-slavery regiments came from the east. There were some, to be sure, in the west—from the Western Reserve area of Ohio, from the region around Chicago, from frontier states like Michigan and Wisconsin—but by and large the westerner simply did not care very much about slavery one way or another. He was fighting to restore the Union, and that was about as far as his emotions carried him. Yet somehow, by the very way he made war, he doomed slavery forever—not merely because he insured Union victory, but because he casually dismantled slavery as he went along, not because he had anything in particular against it but simply because he believed in making hard war.

The western soldier very quickly got the idea that the way to win was to make the Confederacy incapable of carrying on the war. That sounds like a truism, but it is a point that escaped a good many Federal generals who saw the whole thing as an exercise in classical military strategy carried on according to the book. In the west, simply because the Federal armies got more deeply into Confederate territory than the armies in the east were able to do, and got there much faster, it became clear that the military target was not only the opposing army but the economic and social mechanism which kept that army in the field. To seize a commercial and industrial center like New Orleans or Nashville, to destroy a vital railroad line, to remove from Confederate use any means of supplying Confederate armies with food, livestock, munitions, or other war material—this could be a victory as important as a triumph on the field of battle.

The Civil War, in other words, was a modern war. Nowadays we use bombing planes to destroy the enemy's economic potential. In the 1860's we had no bombing planes, but we used armies to the same effect. Sherman's whole campaign from Atlanta to the Sea was simply a gigantic raid. It met no armed enemies of any consequence, but did ruin—at fearful human cost—a large part of the economic muscle which supported Confederate armies. From the moment of their advance up the Tennessee valley the western armies were taught that to destroy property which supported Southern armies was to win a military advantage.

The point of all of this is that in all the South the one kind of property which more than any other was important in keeping the Confederate economy in operation was the Negro slave. Slave labor

propped up the whole Southern nation. Wherever he went, the Western soldier detached the slave from his master—usually with the slave's most enthusiastic co-operation—not because he thought slavery wrong, but because he knew that this crippled the whole Southern war economy. Wherever the western armies went, slavery in effect went out of existence. General William T. Sherman, who was certainly as far from being an abolitionist as a Northern general could be, saw the effect of this very clearly. Before 1863 ended he was remarking contemptuously that all the powers of the earth could no more restore their slaves to the plantation owners "any more than they can restore their dead grandfathers." The western armies simply killed slavery. The peculiar institution died as a direct result of the war that was being fought to defend it. More than any other single factor, it died because of what the western armies did.

Now it is very pleasant for all of us middle westerners to pat ourselves—or, more accurately, our grandparents—on the shoulders and claim credit for the victory that was won nearly a century ago. But the approaching Centennial observances are not, after all, exercises in self-congratulation. They have two points of lasting value.

First, the Centennial will bring us a better understanding of the dazzling courage, the almost unimaginable endurance and fidelity, with which Americans of both North and South met the tragic challenge which the years of the 1860's brought to them. They were very, very good men, those people who fought on both sides in our Civil War. Simply by making ourselves familiar with what they did—with the valor they displayed, with their readiness to sacrifice everything they had for an ideal—we can derive inspiration to play our part when we meet the challenges and the difficulties of our own day. We become better Americans when we realize what magnificent Americans were the men who wore the blue and the gray. There is enough here to justify every bit of effort that goes into the manifold observances of the Centennial years.

The other point is equally important. We need to know why the Civil War ended the way it did end, and what that ending specifically meant.

In a way it is easy enough to see why the war ended as it did. The tide of history was simply flowing in that direction. By 1861 the continental destiny of the United States was fixed. There had to be one nation and not two between Canada and the Rio Grande. A decade or two earlier the country might indeed have broken into fragments; by the 1860's it was just a little too late. One of the reasons why it was too late was the fact that this great western heart-land of America had come of age. It was determined to be part of one united country; it

had, somehow, an abiding sense of the future greatness of the American nation, a sense of the mission that was America's of the enormous part America would yet play in the world at large.

And the deeper meaning of the war? We find it in the fact that the war settled two things for us here in America, settled them once and for all. It gave us the concept of the destined unity of the family of man, for one thing—the understanding that despite all our differences we are members one of another, and that the political union which was cemented on those bloody fields bespeaks a deeper human unity which gives democracy its power and its enduring significance. Beyond that, we struck down the concept of second-class citizenship, and committed ourselves to an attempt to solve the race problem. The mere fact that we have not yet reached a solution of it is secondary; between slavery and full brotherhood there is no halfway point, and we did take the irrevocable step away from slavery. The problem is still with us, but so is the responsibility for solving it. We can never rest until that responsibility is finally discharged.

You will not find, in all the history of the family of man, many wars that carry a deeper load of lasting significance than our own Civil War. It is something to brood over, something to respond to with the emotions, something to examine carefully year after year, with the intellect. It will repay us for every moment of attention we give it. Of all the great observances which this country has undertaken, none is so abundantly worthwhile or so permanently rewarding as this forthcoming observance of the Centennial of the American Civil War.

HENRY HALLECK AND THE SECOND BULL RUN CAMPAIGN

Stephen E. Ambrose

ON JULY 23, 1862, A BOLD, confident, almost arrogant-looking major general arrived by train in Washington; obviously this was a man prepared to solve the problems that had called him to the capital. Henry Wager Halleck relished his new position as General-in-Chief of the armies of the United States. He was the top-ranking officer in the country, and the country was engaged in the greatest war in her history. He had already reached a post as high as any Winfield Scott ever attained and he had every reason to expect higher achievements.

Halleck had been a success all his life. At West Point he was an honor student; after graduation he published volumes on international law, military art, and science. During and after the Mexican War he served as Secretary of State for the military government of California. In 1849 he instituted the movement for a constitutional convention and was a major force in drawing up the document. In the 1850's he resigned from the army, lived in San Francisco and amassed a fortune as a businessman, lawyer, and mine owner. He was quick to answer Abraham Lincoln's call to service after the Civil War began and he easily brought order to the chaos he found in his new headquarters at St. Louis. He directed, or convinced himself that he had, the victories at Forts Henry, Donelson, and Island No. 10; he cleared Missouri, Kentucky, and half of Tennessee of Confederate troops. Following Shiloh, in April, 1862, he personally took the field for the first time. He led the advance on Corinth, and, despite the howls which arose because he did not fight, he was content with his peaceful occupation of the Mississippi city in early June.¹

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¹ For a discussion of Halleck's early career, see William A. Ganoe's sketch in Dumas Malone, ed., *Dictionary of American Biography* (New York, 1932), VIII, 150-152; Milton H. Shutes, "Henry Wager Halleck, Lincoln's Chief-of-Staff," *California Historical Society Quarterly* (San Francisco, 1927), XVII,

Halleck looked more like a theorist than a great fighter. Standing about five feet, nine inches tall, and weighing 190 pounds, he had a double chin and bald forehead. One observer commented disparagingly on his "bulging eyes, flabby cheeks . . . slack-twisted figure and . . . slow and deliberate movements." Visitors noticed that when he spoke his words were "few, pithy, and to the point."

Halleck's eyes, like the man himself, impressed different observers in various ways. A fellow Californian thought he was a "close student of human nature" because his "large dark penetrating eyes looked through one with searching thoroughness." A friendly newspaper reporter thought his eyes were "of a hazel color, clear as a morning star, and of intense brilliancy."²

Halleck's ideas and principles on war were conservative. His successes in the West had strengthened his faith in the strategic doctrines he had learned at West Point. His teacher had been Dennis Hart Mahan, who in turn took his lesson from the Swiss theorist, Baron Henri Jomini. Jomini had witnessed Napoleon's battles, but unlike his contemporary, Karl von Clausewitz, he taught that Napoleon's success stemmed from the general's use of principles established by Frederick the Great rather than from the radical innovations which Clausewitz emphasized. Mahan lectured that the art of war began with the choice of a base of operations; the ideal was an interior line of communications which emanated from a strong base and lay between the two wings of the enemy. From an interior line a soldier could strike first one wing and then another before the enemy could join forces. Interior lines simplified supply and mobilization problems while facilitating concentration on the battlefield. And concentration, both strategically and tactically, was the basic element in the Jomini system.³

In 1846 Halleck had written *Elements of Military Art and Science*, which was later used as a text at West Point; in it he altered none of Jomini's theories.⁴ In the West he had modified some aspects of the

195-209; Stephen E. Ambrose, "Henry Wager Halleck as Lincoln's Chief-of-Staff," unpublished master's thesis, Louisiana State University. The writer wishes to thank the Carnegie Foundation and the National Security Study Group at the University of Wisconsin for the financial assistance which made this article possible.

² James Harrison Wilson, *Under the Old Flag* (New York, 1912), I, 98; William E. Doster, *Lincoln and the Episodes of the Civil War* (New York, 1915), p. 178; *New York Tribune*, January 3, 1862; Noah Brooks, *Washington in Lincoln's Time*, edited by Herbert Mitgang (New York, 1958), p. 42; *New York Herald*, July 21, 1862.

³ See Henri Jomini, *Traité des grandes opérations militaires . . .* (Paris, 1851).

⁴ Henry Wager Halleck, *Elements of Military Art and Science . . .* (2nd edition, New York, 1861).

European's system without changing its basic form. He was confident it would work in the East as it had in the West.

So was President Lincoln, who in July, 1862, had urged Halleck to come to the capital and assume his duties as General-in-Chief. There had been reason, indeed, for urging the western commander to hurry to Washington to assume the anomalous position to which he had been suddenly elevated. General George B. McClellan and his Army of the Potomac were on the James River, within a few miles of Richmond. McClellan was moaning that he was greatly outnumbered. General John Pope was south of Manassas Junction with his newly formed Army of Virginia. General Robert E. Lee, with the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, was between them. Halleck was horrified: Jomini's first principle was concentration on important points. The situation was a result of the fumbling, incoherent organization and system that had been prevailing in the East. Without the benefit of a philosophy of military affairs, such as proposed by Jomini and others, the Eastern leaders had been improvising. While Halleck had been applying the Jomini principles—modifying them as the exigencies of the situation demanded—and emerging with success in the West, the situation had steadily deteriorated in the East.

Once again Halleck found that he was expected to bring order to chaos. That meant, to him, eliminating the division between Pope's and McClellan's armies. One of the generals must abandon his position and transport his forces to the other commander. McClellan was closer to Richmond, and the popular cry to capture that city was strong. However, Halleck was displeased with McClellan's position. He was operating on exterior lines and his line of approach to Richmond was indirect rather than direct; "Old Brains" thought that supplying McClellan's army would be hazardous and difficult.

Halleck's handling of the problem posed by the division between McClellan and Pope indicated the strength of his belief in concentration. McClellan, who had been General-in-Chief from the summer of 1861 to the spring of 1862, wanted him to send more troops to the James. Pope thought McClellan's men should be sent to Manassas. Lincoln had worked hard but without notable success as both Commander-in-Chief and General-in-Chief, and he was glad Halleck had arrived to help make the decision. He told Old Brains that he could send 20,000 reinforcements to McClellan and no more. Halleck must visit the general, find out if McClellan thought he could take Richmond with that number, and make his own analysis of the situation. If McClellan thought that 20,000 men were not enough, Lincoln authorized Halleck to withdraw the Army of the Potomac from the James.

On July 24, 1862, the day after he arrived in Washington, Halleck

boarded a steamer for McClellan's headquarters at Harrison's Landing, where the army lay huddled along the banks of the James. Many aspects in the situation indicated that he should be removed from the position. The majority of the country felt it would never get action from "Little Mac." The dominant political party wanted him removed from command; the President, although he liked McClellan personally, doubted his abilities; the health of the army was poor and growing worse in an unhealthy climate. Most important, the military circumstances called for concentration.

After a day and a night on board ship Halleck landed in Virginia. McClellan was there to meet him. Halleck explained that he had come to ascertain McClellan's "views and wishes in regard to future operations." McClellan had a plan ready. He wanted to take the army south of the James and occupy Petersburg, a railroad junction below Richmond, and cut Lee's supply line. Then Lee would have to fight McClellan on ground of the Union general's choosing. Halleck did not approve the plan, since the operation would merely put more distance between McClellan and Pope. When McClellan finally relinquished the project, Halleck broached the real reason for his visit.

Feeling that it was a "military necessity" for the Army of the Potomac to join Pope, Halleck informed McClellan that the President had 20,000 troops available and that if the general thought he could capture Richmond with that number he could remain. When McClellan stated that 30,000 were necessary to insure "a good chance of success," Halleck reiterated that only 20,000 were on hand. McClellan then argued that shipping the troops north would have a demoralizing effect. Wouldn't it be better, he asked, to leave them where they were until more reinforcements could come to the James? Halleck, who was opposed to the James position because of its reliance on exterior lines, curtly replied that he had no authority to consider such a proposition. McClellan must choose between the two alternatives already presented; take the 20,000 and attack, or ship the army back to Pope.

Even with Halleck's ultimatum, McClellan would not give a definite answer. Halleck advised him to consult with his officers and give his reply in the morning.

McClellan held the conference and received a variety of conflicting views. Some of his corps commanders wanted to remain; others wished to withdraw. Evidently acting on the premise that anything was preferable to giving his beloved Army of the Potomac to Pope, McClellan determined to try with the 20,000 men. Informing the General-in-Chief of his decision, McClellan insisted that Halleck understand that prospects of success were not in his favor. The most he would say was that there was "a chance," and he was "willing to try it." After all, Mc-

Clellan reasoned, Halleck must realize that Lee had 200,000 men, while McClellan counted only 90,000.⁵

After Halleck left, "Little Mac" realized he had not placated his superiors: "I *know* that the rascals will get rid of me as soon as they dare," he complained bitterly to a friend. "Halleck remained but a few minutes (comparatively) here and saw *nothing* of the Army—departed just as wise as he came."⁶

When Halleck arrived in the capital the following day, he found a telegram from McClellan, who said that the "true defense of Washington consists in a rapid and heavy blow given by this army upon Richmond." He then asked: "Can you not possibly draw 15,000 or 20,000 men from the West to re-enforce me temporarily?"⁷ McClellan had once confided to a cohort: "I have seen Halleck and believe that he will act with me in good faith," but he was consequently stunned by a telegram Halleck sent in the wake of his letter. McClellan learned that he should send the sick in the army out of the Peninsula "in order to enable [you] to move in any direction."⁸

After giving the order, which was preliminary to a full withdrawal, Halleck explained the reasons to his wife. McClellan, he told her, "is in many respects a most excellent and valuable man, but he does not understand strategy and should never plan a campaign."⁹ Then he informed Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase that all McClellan's acts were deserving of unreserved condemnation, "especially the conduct of the engagement before Richmond and the subsequent retreat to the James."¹⁰ McClellan, in other words, was not well versed in Jomini, or rather, he favored concentration only under his own command.

The mistakes of another strategist also had to be rectified. Before Halleck's arrival in Washington, Lincoln had moved General Ambrose E. Burnside's army from the North Carolina coast to Newport News, Virginia, at the eastern tip of the Peninsula. Halleck himself ordered

⁵ U.S. War Dept., comp., *War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Washington, 1880-1901), Series I, XI, part 3, p. 337. Hereafter cited as O.R., with all references being to Series I.

⁶ McClellan to Francis Barlow, July 30, 1862, in George B. McClellan Papers, Library of Congress.

⁷ O.R., XI, pt. 3, 334. Halleck's later assertion that "immediately on my return to Washington he telegraphed that he would require 35,000," is untrue and persecutory to McClellan. *Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War*, Senate Report No. 8 (1863), I, 452.

⁸ McClellan to Alsop, July 27, 1862, McClellan Papers; O.R., XI, pt. 1, 76.

⁹ *Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States* (Governor's Island, 1905), XXXVI, 557. Hereafter cited as JMSI.

¹⁰ George B. McClellan, *McClellan's Own Story* (New York, 1887), p. 475.

Burnside to Harrison's Landing, ostensibly to advise McClellan but, in Chase's opinion, "to control him."¹¹ Then, to hasten the concentration of troops in northern Virginia, Halleck ordered Burnside—and his troops—back to Aquia Creek, near Washington.¹²

Meanwhile Lee had left Richmond and was moving his army northward. If McClellan's estimate of Lee's size was correct, or even if Lee had only 100,000, then Pope, stationed around Manassas, was badly outnumbered. His force did not total more than 40,000 men, and it was the only obstacle standing between Lee and the northern capital. The situation was not yet critical, but it was rapidly becoming so. Burnside reached Aquia Creek on Sunday, August 3; Halleck immediately sent the transports he had used back to the James River, and with them he sent a message to McClellan: "It is determined to withdraw your army from the Peninsula to Aquia Creek."¹³

In making the final decision Halleck had followed Jomini's doctrine of concentration on the vital point. McClellan had wanted to combine the principles of concentration, offensive movement, and maneuver by sending Pope's men to the army around Richmond, but Halleck felt that when McClellan's army was annexed to Pope's, Washington was secured from attack and the possibilities of a move on Richmond were improved.

McClellan argued frantically. The movement "will prove disastrous to our cause," he said "I fear it will be a fatal blow." He added: "Here, directly in front of this army, is the heart of the rebellion."¹⁴ This was the crux of their disagreement, and Halleck refused to weaken. To appease McClellan, Old Brains said he had "tried every means in [his] power to avoid withdrawing [the] army." He continued: "It was not a hasty and inconsiderate act, but one that caused me more anxious thought than any other of my life." Halleck ended by asserting that he did not know who had separated the Army of the Potomac, or why, but that he had found the forces divided and wished to unite them.¹⁵ And so the army fell back. It would be two years before it got that close to Richmond again.

McClellan would obey the order in his own time, in his own way. Halleck tried to hurry him by promising that all the troops in Virginia would be under McClellan's command as soon as they were concentrated, but it did little good.¹⁶

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *O.R.*, XII, pt. 3, 524.

¹³ *Ibid.*, XI, pt. 1, 80.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 81.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 82.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pt. 3, 359.

There was ample cause to urge more activity: "Stonewall" Jackson and his "foot-cavalry" were mobilizing. Pope had marched as far south as the Rappahannock River, but he did not know where Jackson was, and he seemed determined to blunder forward until he found the enemy. Glancing at a map, Halleck could see the obvious possibilities Pope was presenting to Jackson. If the Confederate leader chose, he could make a swift march through the Valley and come out on Pope's rear. Then Lee, moving from Richmond and attacking from the south with General James Longstreet's corps, would have Pope in a vise. Halleck expected such a move and warned Pope to watch the Valley; if he saw any sign of movement there he was to "attack them in flank and give no rest."¹⁷

Halleck was finding much in his multifarious duties that was irksome. Cautioning and withstraining Pope, prodding the procrastinating McClellan, arguing with some politicians, placating others, giving cursory glances to the West, all caused him to feel "broken down every night with the heat, labor, and responsibility." Although Old Brains admitted to his wife that Lincoln and his Cabinet approved "everything I have proposed," he felt there were ulterior motives behind their actions. "If any disaster happens," Halleck feared they would piously say: "We did for you all you asked." For instance, Lincoln and his advisers had urged him to remove McClellan from the Peninsula—"in other words they want[ed] me to do what they were afraid to attempt."¹⁸

On August 9 the tactical phase of the Second Bull Run campaign began. Jackson attacked part of Pope's army under Banks at Cedar Mountain, just north of the Rappahannock River. Halleck hurriedly ordered Burnside, at Falmouth, to move up and co-operate with Pope, but his men arrived too late to have any effect on the battle. While they marched forward Halleck told Pope to hold Jackson in check until reinforcements could reach him. Jackson, however, had already fallen back and was waiting hopefully for Pope to make his way into a well-prepared trap. Pope was about to enmesh himself when Halleck correctly divined Jackson's purpose and warned the general to "beware of a snare. Feigned retreats are secesh tactics."¹⁹ The next day, August 13, Halleck gave Pope definite orders not to cross the Rappahannock. He further instructed his bold subordinate to "guard well against a flank movement by the enemy."²⁰

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, XII, pt. 3, 523.

¹⁸ *JMSI*, XXXVI, 557.

¹⁹ *O.R.*, XII, pt. 3, 556, 564; Frank E. Vandiver, *Mighty Stonewall* (New York, 1956), p. 345.

²⁰ *O.R.*, XII, pt. 3, 569.

Pope's "victory" at Cedar Mountain gave Halleck "breathing time," and allowed him to inspect the situation on the James.²¹ Acidly he reminded McClellan that he had "nearly every available steam vessel in the country" under his control and asked if it were not too much to expect that 8,000 or 10,000 men could be sent north daily.²² McClellan felt persecuted. In his opinion, the General-in-Chief was not a gentleman and did not act in a "candid or friendly manner."²³

The propriety of his manners was not one of Halleck's great concerns. Pope was camped in the apex of a land triangle formed by the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, with Lee's army at the base. Halleck knew that if Lee could mount an offensive against the exposed force, which had no place to which it could retreat, the Confederate general could annihilate it. Lee proposed to do just that; on August 18, to forestall him, Halleck ordered Pope to fall back of the Rappahannock and again warned him to be wary of a flanking operation.²⁴

There was a limit to the distance the Army of Virginia could retreat; it was imperative that McClellan's men join up. But the commander of the Army of the Potomac had suddenly discovered that Richmond was almost barren of troops and wanted to force his way into the city.²⁵ Halleck decided against it, for unless the Army of the Potomac joined Pope immediately, Lee might overwhelm him and capture Washington. The fate of the capital rested on Little Mac's whims. In a brief message Halleck tried to create a sense of anxiety in McClellan: "Every moment is as important as an ordinary hour."²⁶ The telegram was not fervent enough to stir the cautious McClellan.

But Halleck was still the master in the gigantic chess game. He had twice been right about enemy plans, once after Cedar Mountain and again when he made Pope retreat across the Rappahannock. Studying the board he predicted Lee's new move: the enemy was trying to turn Pope's right. One of McClellan's corps, that of Fitz John Porter, had just arrived at Falmouth, and Halleck ordered Burnside to hurry it to Pope. Let nothing stop them, he said; if they lack supplies tell them to live off the land.²⁷ Then he wired Pope, telling him to watch for a concentration in his rear, probably at Manassas. "Do not let them separate you from Alexandria," Halleck told the thoroughly confused general.²⁸

²¹ *JMSI*, XXXVI, 557. Halleck used the word "victory" rather loosely, even though Jackson did withdraw from the field.

²² *O.R.*, XII, pt. 1, 87.

²³ McClellan, *McClellan's Own Story*, p. 467.

²⁴ *O.R.*, XII, pt. 3, 590.

²⁵ McClellan to Halleck, August 12, 1862, McClellan Papers.

²⁶ *O.R.*, XI, pt. 3, 620.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, XII, pt. 3, 620.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 625.

Old Brains was directing tactical operations in the field, predicting possible enemy moves, trying to accelerate McClellan, and organizing the troops from the Army of the Potomac who had begun to trickle into Alexandria. The trickle soon became a deluge and Halleck showed his ability to delegate responsibility by choosing a soldier capable of handling the flood of men coming into Alexandria.

The officer, Herman Haupt, was a West Point graduate who left the army after less than a year of service to become a director-engineer on civilian railroad lines. Rough and brusk, Haupt tolerated no nonsense. He was running troops from Alexandria to Manassas on a single-track road and was determined to adhere to the schedule Halleck had designed. When General John Sturgis attempted to get his troops on cars already allocated for another corps Haupt told him to get off. Sturgis countered by trying to arrest Haupt. The indignant Haupt appealed to Halleck, who sent a telegram giving him complete control over the roads. Haupt showed it to Sturgis, whose mental powers, impaired by whiskey, deluded him into thinking it came from Pope. "I don't care for John Pope a pinch of owl dung!" Sturgis exclaimed. Finally Haupt convinced the toper that the order came from the General-in-Chief. "What does he say?" stammered the befuddled and flushed Sturgis.

"He says if you interfere with the railroads he will put you in arrest."

"He does, does he? Well, then, take your d---d railroad!"²⁹

Haupt did take charge of the railroad and, with Halleck's backing, was able to get the troops moving. By August 24 he had sent Sturgis' division forward and was waiting for the rest of General Joseph Hooker's men to arrive. His job was not without obstacles. The capacity of the single-track line was only 12,000 men per day; a capacity which accidents greatly reduced. Since McClellan had at last launched a full-scale withdrawal, more men kept pouring into Alexandria. The problem of whom to transport first arose. At Haupt's suggestion and with Halleck's help they arranged a new system. Thereafter, when a body of men arrived in Alexandria, their commander reported to Haupt, who decided when to send them forward.³⁰ But despite Haupt's managerial abilities and Halleck's supervisory talents, one single-track road could not get many troops to Pope with any haste.

The strain was beginning to take its toll, but Halleck submerged the tension and emotion beneath the surface and presented a calm, cold front. When General Oliver O. Howard, who had been wounded on the Peninsula, went to see Halleck about rejoining his command, he waited a half-hour and was then greeted with a stern look and a gruff:

²⁹ Herman Haupt, *Reminiscences* (Milwaukee, 1901), pp. 80-81.

³⁰ O.R., XII, pt. 3, 569.

"Do you want to see me officially, sir?" Howard stuttered: "Partly officially and partly not." "Well, sir," Halleck snapped, "What is it?" Howard explained the purpose of his visit, and asked where he could find his command. "The adjutant general will tell you that, sir," Halleck said as he turned on his heel and walked out.³¹

Meanwhile Pope had failed to heed Halleck's warnings about his flank. On August 27 Jackson entered Manassas, where his "foot-cavalry" had a holiday burning stores and feasting on Yankee provisions. Halleck was in a frenzy. Jackson had cut Pope's communications with Washington and the General-in-Chief had no information. He was, in military parlance, completely blind. The situation was desperate but not yet hopeless. Undoubtedly Lee would attack with the rest of his army the next day. If McClellan's men could only get to Pope in time. . . .

August 28 and 29, 1862, were two of the most exasperating days of Halleck's career. He spent his entire waking hours trying to get McClellan, now at Alexandria with his army, to move. He pushed, pleaded, and prodded McClellan as hard as he could, but it was not enough. After endless delays, Old Brains stopped trying. He let McClellan's personality and wishes run rampant.

Halleck began with a message on August 27 predicting a great battle the next day and ordering McClellan to move General William B. Franklin's corps to the scene "by forced marches." He repeated the order in stronger terms later in the morning. At 10:20 a.m. McClellan replied that he had told Franklin to "prepare to march." Then McClellan decided that Franklin should not leave because Washington was not safe. At 2:30 in the afternoon Little Mac made a bid for power: "I am not responsible for the past and cannot be for the future, unless I receive authority to dispose of the available troops according to my judgment." At 6 p.m. he recommended that all troops around Alexandria remain where they were in order to protect Washington. The next morning Halleck telegraphed Franklin directly, ordering him to go to Manassas, but at one o'clock McClellan stated that Franklin would move only when he had enough artillery. At 4:10 Little Mac sent still another communication: "General Franklin is with me here. . . . We are not yet in condition to move; maybe by tomorrow morning." Halleck, struggling to keep calm in the face of the maddening inertia, waited for a response to a wire he had sent Franklin at 3:30, ordering him to move immediately. At 4:30 McClellan answered: "Your dispatch just received. Neither Franklin nor Sumner's corps is now in condition to move and fight a battle. It would be a sacrifice to

³¹ Oliver O. Howard, *Autobiography* (New York, 1908), I, 266.

send them out now. . . ."³² McClellan could have read with profit a statement in Halleck's *Elements of Military Art*: "In all military operations *time* is of vast importance. If a single division of an army can be retarded for a few hours only, it not unfrequently decides the fate of the campaign."³³

That night, August 28, Halleck told McClellan: "There must be no further delay in moving Franklin's corps toward Manassas. They must go to-morrow morning, ready or not ready. If we delay too long to get ready, there will be no necessity to go at all; for Pope will either be defeated or be victorious without our aid." McClellan replied that Franklin would march at six the next morning. That left him with 30,000 men, and he added, in a sentence which must have left Halleck quaking with wrath: "If you wish any of them to move towards Manassas, please inform me."

The next morning Lee began his attack on Pope. Little Mac spent the day requesting that Franklin should go no farther. Halleck's patience finally wore out. "I want Franklin's corps to go far enough to find out something about the enemy," he wrote McClellan. "I am tired of guesses." McClellan took offense at Halleck's tone. "He is not a refined person at all," he stated, but he "probably says rough things when he don't [sic] mean them."³⁴ Meanwhile, Pope was fighting his largest—and last—battle.

From Pope's dispatches the following morning, it appeared that he had won a great victory. "You have done nobly," Halleck wired him. "I am doing all in my power for you and your noble army. God bless you and it!" But then he added: "Don't yield another inch if you can avoid it."³⁵

By nightfall, however, it was evident that Pope had suffered a staggering defeat. Halleck was crushed. Pope had tipped over the chess board, and the pieces were scattered throughout the country. Until the last minute Halleck thought that he controlled the game. He had confidently assumed command and had quickly imposed Jomini's system on the Eastern scene. Following the principles elucidated in his own textbook he had concentrated the Union armies in a central position based on interior lines of communication. He fully expected the utter defeat of Lee's army to crown his efforts. But now there was Union defeat wrought by his own pieces. Pope had refused to follow direc-

³² See exchange of telegrams, August 27-28, 1862, in McClellan Papers.

³³ Halleck, *Elements of Military Art and Science*, p. 63.

³⁴ McClellan to Alsop, August 30, 1862, McClellan Papers. For an excellent summary of this controversy, see John G. Nicolay and John Hay, *Abraham Lincoln, a History* (New York, 1886), VI, 17-19.

³⁵ *O.R.*, XII, pt. 3, 769.

tions; McClellan failed to obey the simplest orders and, by withholding his men, managed to ruin Halleck's strategy. Old Brain's confidence was destroyed.

Before retiring that night, before sleep could blot out the horror of the upheaval, Halleck sent one more telegram. He placed McClellan in charge of all troops in the vicinity of Washington and told him to look after the capital's safety. "I beg of you to assist me in this crisis with your ability and experience," Halleck stated. "I am utterly tired out."³⁶

³⁶ Halleck to McClellan, August 31, 1862, McClellan Papers. Halleck's faltering handwriting substantiated his last statement.

TOO MANY CIVIL WAR BOOKS?

Otto Eisenschiml

IS THE PRESENT DELUGE of Civil War literature a blessing or an evil? Many a lover of history must be asking himself this question. The answer looks deceptively easy: Of good books there can never be too many, of bad books never too few. Unfortunately, this is only begging the question, for it leads inevitably to another: How good is good and how bad is bad? The two terms are relative; whether a pitcher is good or bad depends on the league in which he is pitching. Similarly, the proper adjective for books depends to a large extent on the category in which they belong. They, too, have their leagues, from bush to major, even though they are not generally recognized as such, and their dividing lines are not sharply defined.

Broadly speaking, the bush league of books is that of anthologies; this is especially true of books on history. With a few exceptions they impart to the reader nothing that has not been printed before, nor do they pretend to. The advanced student who hopes to expand his knowledge will be disappointed in them, which is not saying that they cannot provide good reading; often they do, and may attract wide circles of readers. Lack of new material does not diminish their popularity; on the contrary, it tips the scale in their favor, for originality is a liability, not an asset, as far as mass appeal is concerned. Only scholarly readers welcome the disclosure of new facts or fresh interpretations; the mind of the average person shies away from them.

A few years ago I was invited to make a Lincoln-day address in a town which prides itself on its high cultural level. I selected a theme, which, while not stereotyped as are the usual lectures for this occasion, was strictly non-controversial. When I had finished, the audience sat like wooden Indians; not a hand stirred. My impulse was to grab my hat and silently steal away, but I was so hemmed in that escape was a physical impossibility. I was casting about for a possible exit,

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when an elderly man approached me and held out his hand. "This was the best Lincoln talk I have ever listened to," he said. "Spare me the soothing syrup," I snapped back. "All I want is to get out." He shook his head reprovingly. "Let me tell you something. I have a five-year-old granddaughter, and for the last two years I have been telling her the story of Snow White until it came out of my ears. So the other day I offered to tell her the story of Cinderella. 'That will be fine,' she agreed. But I had not spoken for more than half a minute when she interrupted me: 'Grandad, I don't like this story. Please tell me Snow White again.'"

I got the point and have never forgotten it. By telling people something they had neither expected nor heard before, I had bewildered them. From now on I shall tell my Lincoln-day audiences the story of the six little pigs he picked up on the wayside, and the like. And if I ever should write a book for the sole purpose of making money, I shall repeat all the shop-worn tales and anecdotes everyone has read or heard dozens of times. The successful sale of history books apparently is based on the principle of repetition. Tell the people something they already know, and they will love you for it; tell them something new, and they will resent it, for to make yourself look superior is an unforgivable offense.

In their simplest form Civil War anthologies can be assembled by any high school pupil of moderate intelligence. The sources from which to draw are nearly inexhaustible. To prepare an anthology, all one has to do is pick out, let us say, "The Ten Best Eye Witness Accounts of Gettysburg," paste them together, and have them bound. To call the paster an author would be exaggeration; to call him an editor flattery. In reality he is a collector who puts other people's brain-children into a book the way a stamp collector puts stamps into an album. Even this kind of anthology, however, may be of value to beginners, provided it has continuity and holds the reader's interest.

The low literary rating of most anthologies notwithstanding, let no one look down his nose on them. If the compiler selects his components wisely, arranges them tastily, uses his skill and knowledge to supplement them with enlightening critical comments, and perhaps adds some unpublished material, his book will gain in stature, and become a worthwhile contribution to Civil War literature. Paul M. Angle's *The Lincoln Reader* was a Book-of-the-Month Club selection and, like Stanley F. Horn's *The Robert E. Lee Reader*, is an example of the highest type of book in this category.

Closely related to the league of anthologies, but on a higher level are letters or diaries of Civil War soldiers. It seems that every owner of

such a diary thinks he has found a historical gem in his garret. This is far from true; even the best diaries must be cast into intelligible and attractive form before they make desirable books. Furthermore, the soldier himself and the circumstances surrounding him must be made familiar to the reader, a task which may require more research than appears at first glance. The entire material must be screened, because much of it is dry and dreary: "April 10. It rained. April 11. The sun came out." The poor fellows spent most of their time in camp, and had little to write about. Yet after the dross has been removed, the remaining nuggets, deftly edited, may add up to an excellent volume. In exceptional cases editing of the text itself is unnecessary as, for instance, if one is lucky enough to get hold of literary masterpieces like those of F. A. Haskell, the poet-chronicler of Gettysburg. In such a case the editor has hitched his book to a star. Yet even ordinary letters, skillfully distilled, may yield a valuable essence, as Bell Irvin Wiley has demonstrated in his *The Life of Johnny Reb* and *The Life of Billy Yank*, both of which stand as high as any in this class.

The next higher category of Civil War books comprises straight narratives, such as biographies, the story of the war itself, or one of its campaigns and battles. Now a real author must take the wheel, for these books cannot merely be copied or edited; they must be written. Biographies always are popular, because almost everyone likes to read about other people's troubles and successes. As a whole, this category make no great demands on the author. Unlike a novelist, he need not strain his imaginative powers for a plot, for its framework lies ready-made before him; all he has to do is fill it out. But if he does so by presenting only statistical data, his work will fall flat. On the other hand, he can produce a great book by digging out facts not generally known, and by venturing into intelligent comments or speculations, thereby approaching creative writing, the highest category of all.

Examples of biographies at their best are Douglas S. Freeman's *R. E. Lee*, and its companion volumes *Lee's Lieutenants*. Robert S. Henry's "*First with the Most*" *Forrest* and Lloyd Lewis' *Sherman—Fighting Prophet* are other top-grade works in this classification. Aside from their beautiful style, they are thoroughly researched and documented, and offer a wealth of heretofore unpublished material. True, like most biographers, these authors are partial to their heroes; whether this enhances or reduces the value of their works is debatable. My opinion is that historical authors should adopt a strictly judicial attitude, so far as it is humanly possible.

Strangely, anthologies are not the greatest evil bedeviling our congested Civil War book market, in spite of their unlimited potentiality

for mass production. Maybe one of the reasons is that anthologies are seldom, perhaps never, duplicated by other writers. The greatest offenders in this respect are the writers of biographies and straight narratives. There seems to be no end of those who want to write about Lincoln, Grant, Lee, Gettysburg, Fort Sumter, and other outstanding personalities or events of that era. These subjects, already in oversupply on our shelves, offer so obvious a target that they have attracted and continue to attract hordes of professionals, amateurs, and dilettantes. They probably figure that, like on a crowded bus, there is always room for one more. Under these conditions it is not surprising that their books are almost carbon copies of each other. This seems the less excusable as there are still less-exploited secondary and tertiary Civil War figures and little-known campaigns or battles available. Those who devote their efforts to them, however, should be aware that, while they will have to sow much, they will reap little, both in money and in recognition. Their books probably will be reviewed in back-page corners, if at all, while every volume on Lincoln, Grant, Lee, or Gettysburg, no matter how wilted its contents, is born with a mortgage on or near a front-page spot in most literary supplements and journals.

Straight narratives of the Civil War or its episodes present no more difficult tasks for writers than biographies, hence offer a luscious field for Johnny-come-latelies who hardly have a speaking acquaintance with the War, but will joyfully jump on any band wagon which promises ready sales. Unable to think up a subject of their own, or to add anything to a known one, they simply pluck chunks out of standard books and ruminate them. Surprisingly, they have no trouble finding publishers for their cuds. So now we may expect to see books on what happened in the first or the last three days of the war, and during each April, or on the third Friday of each month. One wonders if the words "pride" and "shame" are missing in the dictionaries of these parasites, who apparently do not know that if anything is staler than the *bon mot* of yesterday, it is a warmed-up rehash of Snow White.

With the decline in quality of so many current Civil War books, there has come a corresponding decline in ethics. Outright copying, legal or otherwise, is running rampant, and one often wonders if literary shoplifting has become a popular pastime, or whether the copyright law still stands on our statute books.

A step above biographies and narratives are analytical studies, provided they are not written for the purpose of trying to prove a predetermined conclusion. Truly critical books require an unusually thorough knowledge of the subject, absolute impartiality, and close

reasoning, a rare combination indeed. Of these specifications impartiality is the prime *sine qua non*. When General Collin R. Ballard, for instance, titled his book *The Military Genius of Abraham Lincoln*, he tipped his hand as a partisan, and thereby put his findings to a discount; so did Kenneth P. Williams by his title *Lincoln Finds a General*. (This particular criticism is not directed at the contents of these two books.) Nevertheless, not all historical volumes should be condemned off-hand because they are partial. If the author openly admits that he is an advocate, not a judge, they are not objectionable. Hudson Strode in his recent *Jefferson Davis, Confederate President* stated in the introduction that he presented the South's point of view, and James H. Campbell called his study of McClellan *A Lawyer's Brief*. Such punctiliousness, however, is the exception, not the rule. More is the pity.

The big league of historical books is that of creative writers. Like novelists they seek their own plots, a difficult undertaking in the Civil War field, where new worthwhile plots are scarce. So are authors who can do them justice. Regrettably, their books almost never make the best-seller lists, for the cards are stacked against them. The reviewers do not like them because they have to read them; literary editors are afraid of them because they cannot gauge their importance; and booksellers sneer at them as "bastard books," because they do not fit into convenient pigeonholes.

An example of an excellent creative book—ladies first—is Mary Elizabeth Massey's *Ersatz in the Confederacy*, a charmingly written account of how the women in the seceded states managed to overcome the shortages of articles peculiar to their sex. Reviews of her book, at least in the North, were rare. I never saw one in any of the literary magazines which have come under my eyes. Equally high ratings should be accorded to Ella Lonn's brilliant *Salt as a Factor in the Confederacy*, to Frank Lawrence Owsley's exhaustive *King Cotton Diplomacy*, to its northern companion book, Jay Monaghan's *Diplomat in Carpet Slippers*, and David M. Potter's *Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis*. Then there is Robert Bruce's *Lincoln and the Tools of War*, an exceptionally fine search into the scientific and technological work which went on behind the Northern lines. It deserved much more enthusiastic reviews than it received. Frank E. Vandiver's *Ploughshares into Swords* is its splendid Southern counterpart. Allan Nevins's *Gateway to History* is an admirable excursion into off-the-beaten paths. *Victory Rode the Rails* by George Edgar Turner vividly relates the impact of railroading on the Civil War, another interesting subject too long neglected. Parallel to it in originality run *Doctors in Blue* by George Worthington Adams, and H. H. Cunningham's *Doctors in Grey*, two well-drawn portraits of how medical matters were handled

by both parties. R. G. Weigley's *M. C. Meigs, Quartermaster-General of the Union Army* and Frank Cunningham's *Confederate Indians* also bat high in this league. Lack of space forbids mentioning other fine books of this class which, while highly specialized, illuminate what had been obscure corners, and furnish the material from which a more complete knowledge of the Civil War will emerge.

Pioneering in Civil War history, like pioneering in other fields, usually brings to the pathfinder more spittle than handshakes. Mediocrities cry out in anguish against the invader and gang up on him, because he threatens to upset their sacrosanct beliefs. They do not care as much for the truth as they do for their self-awarded halos. Their attacks are seldom directed against the new evidence submitted, for it is much easier to vilify the person who has dared to do the submitting. As to the financial success of creative books, it is a sad fact that they ring up small sales compared to those which cash in on the thunder of guns and the shouts of embattled soldiers. Even historians with big names have met indifference, if not hostility, when they strayed from the orthodox line. No work presented a greater challenge to originality of thought and lucid presentation than James G. Randall's *Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln*, yet I venture to guess that it was greatly outsold by his *Lincoln, the President*, a work which, while not lacking in intelligent interpretations, in the main follows the standard pattern of Civil War histories, and therefore is necessarily repetitious.

History, like science and art, must either progress or deteriorate. Sooner or later the public will rebel at much of what they are now being offered in Civil War literature. It is then that creative writers may come into their own, and outshine some authors of best sellers who, to borrow the late Bert Taylor's simile, glide like brilliantly colored bugs over the surface of stagnant waters, but lack the will or the ability to dip beneath it. They are splendid writers, but not great historians, because they add virtually nothing worthwhile to the store of our knowledge. It is to their credit that they have attracted many new members of the Civil War family; on the other hand, by popularizing the conception of the Civil War as a succession of battles, they have erected roadblocks against those who strive to advance history by going beyond these narrow confines, and thereby hope to insure a broader and less fleeting lay interest in it.

History will never become an exact science, but could come closer to it by adopting some of its principles. Science does not march ahead by printing the same textbooks over and over. If any of its disciples were to put his name to a mere repetition of what has been published before, he would be thrown out of every scientific society, no matter how well he expressed himself. If Civil War history keeps on

trotting around in a circle, it will eventually forfeit popular support and be forced back into the ivory towers of learned institutions, where it will linger until the sins of the present period have been forgotten. Then the hard work of making it again attractive to the general public will have to be begun from scratch.

How far history has wandered from science is demonstrated by the awards which it offers to its followers. Science gives its prizes to those who open new fields, or discover truisms from which further new knowledge may be derived. Literary prizes for history are often not given for uncovering new material or offering novel interpretations, but for the most beautiful phrasing of known historical facts. Yet the judges would never bestow one of their trophies on a novelist who used a plot which was not his own. Judges may be bound by inviolable rules, but would it not be well if similar recognition were accorded to pioneers in historical research, whose work may lead to a complete revision of chapters which had been considered closed?

One reward which no one can withhold from historical researchers is the thrill of discovery, the kind of thrill Balboa must have experienced when he was the first man to see the Pacific Ocean, or like the one that came to Galileo, when he unearthed new physical and astronomical axioms. But inasmuch as Balboa was beheaded, and Galileo forced to recant under threat of torture, modern historical discoverers should not complain too bitterly. They may be abused, defamed, or ignored, but the majesty of the law, which cannot always protect them against piracy, at least shields them from physical violence.

Some twenty years ago, in a lecture I gave at the University of Michigan, I suggested, half in jest, half in earnest, that all books should be compelled by law to carry labels showing their contents, as is demanded of paints, pharmaceuticals, and other commercial products. Now I am more in earnest; either by this or some other method, the ingredients of Civil War books should be made known to the prospective buyer—into which category they belong, how much new material they contain, if any, and whether the author is impartial. An honest label would enable the prospective reader to determine if a book is good or bad according to his own definition. If he wants to spend his time and money on drivel, that is his privilege, but I believe that a strongly enforced label law would weed out undesirable Civil War books like magic, and prevent others from being written. There can be only one way in which buyers could react if they were to read a label like this:

New material	none
New viewpoints	none
New interpretations	none

Author biased in favor of

In print before 100%

I do not seriously expect a label law to be enacted, no more than I expect the millenium to arrive overnight, but public wrath, once stirred up, has accomplished surprising miracles in the past. Americans are noted for the patience with which they tolerate bad practices, but when they do rise, they strike hard. It would be well for the book world to remember this, and clean house voluntarily before compelled to do so by *vox populi*. Interest in our history is precious and should not be abused. The Civil War, one of our great historical landmarks, has already been cheapened by the recent flood of superfluous books, and unless something is done to dam it, the public may turn from the subject in disgust, even before the Centennial has arrived.

People who see far ahead are aware that there is much more at stake than the ambitions and financial interests of writers and publishers. Appreciation of one's national history is an effectual protection against subversive influences. If this be admitted—and who does not?—its correct and intelligent interpretation transcends in importance all other considerations. In the long run a clear understanding of our past may prove a stronger defense against outside aggression than the military weapons our scientists and technologists may design. To foster it by judicious selection and regulation of our historical literary output seems the most patriotic service the book world can render to America in this survival age.

A CHARGE OF BARE NECESSITY

Five volumes of the OFFICIAL RECORDS are filled with reports and correspondence relative to the Atlanta Campaign, May-September, 1864. Because of the large mass of this material, one of the oddest assaults of the Civil War has remained for years in oblivion. It is herein quoted as it appears in O.R., XXXVIII, pt. 2, pp. 760-761. The attacking unit was the First Tennessee (U.S.) Cavalry, commanded by Colonel James P. Brownlow (son of William G. "Parson" Brownlow), and attached to Colonel Joseph Door's First Brigade of General Edward McCook's division.

HDQRS. FIRST CAV. DIV., DEPT. OF THE CUMBERLAND
July 9, 1864

General: I have the honor to report that a detachment under Colonel Door crossed the pontoon this afternoon, and scouted the country in front of General [John M.] Schofield. They found the enemy's cavalry there in force. Brownlow performed one of his characteristic feats to-day. I had ordered a detachment to cross at Cochran's Ford. It was deep, and he took them over naked, nothing but guns, cartridge-boxes and hats. They drove the enemy out of their rifle-pits, captured a non-commissioned officer and 3 men, and the 2 boats on the other side. They would have got more, but the rebels had the advantage in running through the bushes with clothes on. It was certainly one of the funniest sights of the war, and a very successful raid for naked men to make. Everything is quiet along the line, and citizens on the other side say the enemy were totally unprepared for a crossing on this flank.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. M. McCook

Brigadier-General, Commanding Division

[BRIG. GEN. W. L. ELLIOTT
Chief of Cavalry]

THE FIRST DAY'S BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG

Warren W. Hassler, Jr.

IT HAS IN GENERAL BEEN CONCEDED that the Battle of Gettysburg, July 1-3, 1863, was, militarily, one of the most crucial and decisive combats waged during the American Civil War. Certainly, it was the greatest clash of arms that has ever been seen on the shores of the New World. So vast and so momentous were the consequences hinging on this memorable battle that Gettysburg is justly termed one of the mountain peaks of the American historical past.

Historians of this campaign have usually seen fit, however, to stress the second and third days' battles, while merely glossing over the sanguinary fighting on the first day. "Thus far, indeed," declares Jesse Bowman Young, "no historian has done justice to the devotion, steadfastness, and superior service rendered by the officers and men . . . in this part of the Battle of Gettysburg."¹ It is the present writer's contention that the first day's battle at Gettysburg was quite as important and significant as the succeeding two days of combat, which were of larger proportions though of less duration than the opening day's struggle. The casualties on the first day, in percentage of numbers engaged, were enormous in both the Union and Confederate armies.

On July 1, 1863, two Federal army corps were pitted against four Confederate divisions. The two Union corps totaled approximately one-fifth of Major General George G. Meade's Army of the Potomac, while the four Southern divisions comprised almost one-half of General Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. It will be seen that, by holding back almost twice their numbers of advancing gray soldiers for over eight hours, the Federal First and Eleventh Corps prevented the better-concentrated Confederate army from occupying the vital

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¹ Jesse B. Young, *The Battle of Gettysburg: A Comprehensive Narrative* (New York, 1913), p. 190.

and strategic Cemetery heights south of the town of Gettysburg until the scattered Union corps could concentrate on those elevations and thereby render the position impregnable to the ensuing Southern assaults on the following two days of battle. It will be noted that many of the Confederate brigades were so shattered by the terrible fighting on the first day that their crippled condition greatly weakened Lee's subsequent attacks on July 2-3.

Early in the Pennsylvania campaign, Lee had determined to defeat the blue army in detail, thus removing from serious contention the only effective Federal field army in the Eastern theater of operations, and thereby opening the way to Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington. "I shall," the great Southern chieftain asserted to Major General Isaac Trimble, "throw an overwhelming force on their advance, crush it, follow up the success, drive one corps back on another, and by successive repulses and surprises, *before they can concentrate*, create a panic and virtually destroy the army." Thus, perhaps, a peace based on the recognition of Southern independence could be won on the soil of the Keystone State. The morale of the grayclad troops was never higher than in these months after their spectacular victories at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville.²

Having contemplated occupying the line of Pipe Creek near the Mason and Dixon Line, Meade issued the following general circular to his corps commanders on June 30, 1863; "The commanding general has received information that the enemy are advancing, probably in strong force, on Gettysburg. . . . It is the intention to hold this army pretty nearly in the position it now occupies until the plans of the enemy shall have been more fully developed." General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck, in Washington, approved Meade's plan of action. However, at the same time, Meade ordered Brigadier General John Buford's cavalry division to Gettysburg on June 30, with Major General Abner Doubleday's First Corps and Major General Oliver O. Howard's Eleventh Corps to follow there a day later. The Third Corps, under Major General Daniel E. Sickles, was ordered to Emmitsburg. Major General John F. Reynolds was placed in command of the Federal Left Wing, comprising the First, Eleventh, and Third Corps. The Right Wing of the army, commanded by Major General Henry W. Slocum was composed of Brigadier General Alpheus S. Williams' Twelfth Corps and Major General George Sykes's Fifth Corps. Meade is open to some criticism in failing to support adequately the First and Eleventh Corps, in view of his own dispatch to Halleck, in which he had conceded that the Confederates were concentrating at Gettysburg.

² *Southern Historical Society Papers*, XXVI (1898), 121. Hereafter cited as S.H.S.P. Italics were inserted.

He should have realized that ordering Buford to Gettysburg, supported by the First and Eleventh Corps, under command of the aggressive and offensive-minded Reynolds, would bring on a major battle near that place.³

Buford's command of two Union cavalry brigades arrived at Gettysburg about noon on June 30. They were spotted by elements of Lieutenant General A. P. Hill's Confederate corps, approaching Gettysburg from the west along the Chambersburg pike. But the Southerners withdrew toward Cashtown, leaving the field, for the time being, to Buford.⁴

Upon entering Gettysburg, Buford had seen the strategic importance of this community from which ten roads radiate in all directions. His trained military eye also could not have escaped noting the splendid Cemetery heights just to the south of the town—a superb defensive position from which to fight a large-scale battle. He determined to make his dispositions to retain control of these heights, if possible.⁵ His headquarters were moved to the Lutheran Theological Seminary, which was situated about half a mile west of town, on Seminary Ridge between the Chambersburg and Hagerstown roads.⁶ The Seminary building was crowned with a cupola, and afforded the best observation point in the whole area. When one of his subordinate officers trumpeted that he would take care rather easily of any Confederates who would attack him the next day, July 1, Buford disagreed vehemently in a remarkably accurate prognostication of the developing situation:

On the eve of the battle which would inscribe the name of Gettysburg on the same scroll with Yorktown, New Orleans, and other memorable American struggles, the dispositions of the two armies indi-

No you won't. They will attack you in the morning; and they will come "booming"—skirmishers three deep. You will have to fight like the devil to hold your own until supports arrive. The enemy must know the importance of this position, and will strain every nerve to secure it, and if we are able to hold it we will do well.⁷

³ U.S. War Dept., comp., *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Washington, 1880-1901), Series I, XXVII, pt. 3, 414-417. Hereafter cited as O.R., with all references being to Series I. See also William F. Fox, *New York at Gettysburg* (Albany, 1900), I, 9; Abner Doubleday, *Chancellorsville and Gettysburg* (New York, 1882), p. 122.

⁴ William Swinton, *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac* (New York, 1866), p. 327; Hillman A. Hall, et al., *History of the Sixth New York Cavalry* (Worcester, Mass., 1908), pp. 133-134; O.R., XXVII, pt. 2, 317, 607, 637.

⁵ Matthew Forney Steele, *American Campaigns* (Washington, 1935), II, 364.

⁶ R. K. Beecham, *Gettysburg, the Pivotal Battle of the Civil War* (Chicago, 1911), p. 44.

⁷ Fox, *New York at Gettysburg*, I, 9.

cated that Lee had the advantage.⁸ The Army of the Potomac was still rather widely scattered over the region to the south and east of the road-hub of Gettysburg, while Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was rapidly concentrating near Cashtown and Gettysburg.⁹

Lee's units bivouacked on the evening of June 30 as follows: two divisions of Hill's Third Corps were at Cashtown, eight miles west of Gettysburg; another division of the same corps was at Fayetteville, between Cashtown and Chambersburg—the latter place being twenty-five miles west of Gettysburg; a division of Lieutenant General Richard S. Ewell's Second Corps was at Heidlersburg, nine miles northeast of Gettysburg; another division of the same corps was three miles from Heidlersburg; the other division of this command was at Scotland; two divisions of Lieutenant General James Longstreet's First Corps were at Fayetteville; the other division of the same corps was at Chambersburg; and Major General "Jeb" Stuart's cavalry command was at Jefferson.¹⁰

Turning to the Army of the Potomac, its disposition on the same evening was: Meade's army headquarters were at Taneytown, fourteen miles south of Gettysburg; Doubleday's First Corps was at Marsh Creek, five miles southwest of Gettysburg; Major General Winfield S. Hancock's Second Corps was at Uniontown, twenty-two miles south of Gettysburg; Sickles' Third Corps was at Bridgeport, twelve miles southwest of Gettysburg; Sykes's Fifth Corps was at Union Mills, fifteen miles south of Gettysburg; Major General John Sedgwick's Sixth Corps was at Manchester, twenty-two miles south of Gettysburg; Howard's Eleventh Corps was at Littlestown, nine miles south of Gettysburg; Buford's cavalry division was at Gettysburg; other cavalry divisions were at Manchester and at Hanover, thirteen miles east of Gettysburg; and the Artillery Reserve was at Taneytown.¹¹ Of the ten roads that fan out from Gettysburg like the spokes of a wheel, only the three that came in from the south—namely, the Baltimore pike, the Taneytown road, and the Emmitsburg road—were available to Meade to use for infantry concentration, if he so desired, at Gettysburg; while the other roads, leading into Gettysburg from west, north, and east, were available to Lee for a similar purpose.

Lee's orders for a uniting of the Army of Northern Virginia at Cashtown, soon switched to Gettysburg by reason of Hill's precipitateness, led to a fortuitous Confederate concentration at Gettysburg—a

⁸ R. U. Johnson and Clarence C. Buel, eds., *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War* (New York, 1884-1887), III, 273. Hereafter cited as *B. & L.*

⁹ Jennings C. Wise, *The Long Arm of Lee* (Lynchburg, Va., 1915), II, 615.

¹⁰ See James Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox* (Philadelphia, 1896), p. 349.

¹¹ *O.R.*, XXVII, pt. 1, 140-150; Fox, *New York at Gettysburg*, I, 117.

concentration "that has nothing to compare with it in the annals of modern war. . . . The time intervals were carefully adjusted as if the whole movement had been rehearsed."¹²

The momentous day of July 1, 1863, dawned rainy and misty. However, as the morning advanced, the weather was to clear, the sun to come out, and the heat and humidity to become intense. After the fog and clouds had lifted, a blood-red sunrise, like the famed sun of Austerlitz, was noted, while a gentle wind blew from south to north.¹³

At Union army headquarters at Taneytown, Meade telegraphed Halleck at 7:00 a.m. on July 1: "The point of Lee's concentration and the nature of the country, when ascertained, will determine whether I attack or not. Shall advise you today, when satisfied that the enemy are fully withdrawn from the Susquehanna." This dispatch of Meade's ignored his earlier message which had stated that Gettysburg was Lee's likely point of concentration. It is probable that Meade's circular of June 30 did not reach Reynolds before he left Marsh Creek with the First Corps for Gettysburg early on the morning of July 1. It is also not likely that Reynolds received the subsequent orders from Meade which allowed the Left Wing commander great leeway and discretion in deciding the manner of meeting the unfolding situation. As to Buford's activities on the evening of June 30, that cavalry chief reported that "the night of the 30th was a busy night for the division. . . . By daylight of July 1, I had gained positive information of the enemy's position and movements, and my arrangements were made for entertaining him until General Reynolds could reach the scene."¹⁴

The "arrangements" of which Buford spoke was the deploying, on the early morning of July 1, of his two cavalry brigades, facing westward, along the westernmost crest and slope of McPherson Ridge, which was washed by the waters of Willoughby Run, and was located one mile west of town. The ridge ran north and south, and, along the Chambersburg pike, was about half a mile west of Seminary Ridge. These two ridges converge slightly and join at the partially wooded Oak Hill—the key to the first day's field at Gettysburg. Buford's right flank was near this hill, his center was on the Chambersburg pike, and his left flank anchored on the Hagerstown road. The blueclad cavalrymen were dismounted, every fourth man holding his own horse and those of three of his fellow troopers at some distance in the rear. This reduced Buford's effective fighting force by one-fourth, or from about

¹² James K. P. Scott, *The Story of the Battles at Gettysburg* (Harrisburg, 1927), pp. 125, 130.

¹³ O.R., XXVII, pt. 1, 482; George A. Bruce, *The Twentieth Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry, 1861-1865* (Boston, 1906), pp. 269-270.

¹⁴ O.R., XXVII, pt. 1, 70, 927; pt. 3, 460; Comte de Paris, *History of the Civil War in America* (Philadelphia, 1883), III, 549-550.

3,200 to some 2,400 men. The Federal cavalymen were supported by six three-inch rifles.¹⁵

At 8:00 a.m., Brigadier General James S. Wadsworth's division of Doubleday's First Corps left Marsh Creek for Gettysburg. At the same hour, orders were received by Howard from Reynolds, directing the Eleventh Corps to march immediately from Littlestown to Gettysburg. At 9:30 a.m., Wadsworth was followed from Marsh Creek by Brigadier General Thomas Rowley's division of the First Corps. Meanwhile, on the Confederate side, Major General Henry Heth's division (some 7,500 strong) of Hill's corps commenced its march, early on the morning of July 1, eastward on the Chambersburg pike from Cashtown toward Gettysburg, followed within supporting distance by Major General William D. Pender's division of the same corps.¹⁶


Skirmishing began between the advanced pickets and vedettes of Buford's and Heth's divisions at about 5:30 a.m. near the point where Marsh Creek is crossed by the Chambersburg pike, some three miles west of Gettysburg. The Federal cavalymen managed to delay Heth's advance so that it was nearly 8 o'clock before the Confederates reached Herr Ridge, which formed the west bank of Willoughby Run, and saw Buford's main line of dismounted carbineers on the western slope and crest of McPherson Ridge, just east of the stream. In the meantime, the Southern advance along the Mummasburg road had been detected and opposed by the Union troopers near the J. Forney buildings just south of Oak Hill.¹⁷

Deploying two of his four infantry brigades along Herr Ridge facing eastward, on both sides of the pike, and supported eventually by five artillery batteries, Heth launched an attack shortly after 8:00 against Buford's men on the eastern bank of Willoughby Run. For nearly two hours the outnumbered Federals held their assailants in check, and then fell


¹⁵ Paris, *The Civil War*, III, 545; B. & L., III, 275; Scott, *Battles at Gettysburg*, p. 133, 136; the Calef Battery Government tablet on the Gettysburg battlefield. The detailed inscriptions on these markers were carefully drawn up by the chief historian of the Gettysburg National Military Park near the turn of the century and after conference with participants of the organizations in question. Despite a few minor flaws, these inscriptions are accurate and of inestimable value.

¹⁶ O.R., XXVII, pt. 1, 265; B. & L., III, 287; Thomas Chamberlin, *History of the One Hundred and Fiftieth Regiment, Pennsylvania Volunteers* (Philadelphia, 1895), p. 110; John P. Nicholson, ed., *Pennsylvania at Gettysburg* (Harrisburg, 1914), I, 28; Douglas Southall Freeman, R. E. Lee: *A Biography* (New York, 1934), III, 78.

¹⁷ Fox, *New York at Gettysburg*, I, 9-10; the Eighth Illinois Cavalry monument on the Gettysburg Battlefield, marker near Chambersburg pike bridge over Marsh Creek; John M. Vanderslice, *Gettysburg Then and Now* (New York, 1899), p. 68; B. & L., III, 274-275; Newel Cheney, *History of the Ninth New York Volunteer Cavalry* (Jamestown, N.Y., 1901), pp. 107-108.



Gettysburg, Pennsylvania



Field in which Gen. John F. Reynolds was killed

back grudgingly from the run to the crest of McPherson Ridge. The Southerners were appalled at the rapidity of fire produced by the eight-shot Spencer repeating carbines used by Buford's men, and noted that the Union artillery battery was managing to hold its own against the heavier weight of metal thrown by the Confederate pieces. Buford was staunchly adhering to an order received to "dispute every inch of ground." Only after two hours of tenacious fighting, when about to be relieved by Reynolds' infantry, were Buford's men "literally dragged back a few hundred yards to a position more secure and better sheltered."¹⁸

Reynolds left Doubleday's First Corps early on the morning of July 1, marched rapidly along the Emmitsburg road, and then rode ahead to see how Buford was faring. As he was riding along this road just south of Gettysburg, Reynolds' trained military eye could not have escaped noting the strong Cemetery Ridge heights extending southward from the town and terminating in the two bold Round Top knobs; and at this time he probably formulated plans to hold the Confederates away from those elevations until the remainder of the Army of the Potomac could arrive and concentrate thereon. After conferring briefly with Buford at the Seminary building at about 9:00, Reynolds secured from the cavalryman a pledge to hold his lines on McPherson Ridge until Doubleday's infantry corps could arrive. He then dispatched this significant message to Meade at Taneytown: "The enemy is advancing in strong force, and I fear he will get to the heights beyond the town before I can. I will fight him inch by inch, and if driven into the town I will barricade the streets, and hold him back as long as possible." Doubleday was urged to press forward to the front with all speed, and Howard was directed to do the same and to move into position in reserve of the First Corps, which would arrive on the field ahead of the Eleventh.¹⁹

Reynold's decision to fight west of town was a momentous one. For the Federals to have fallen back to the Cemetery heights just south of Gettysburg would, in all probability, have been disastrous. The Confederates, superior numerically to the Union troops present, and being augmented faster than the Federal forces, would have had the better part of the day to drive the Federals from the Cemetery heights, which would then have been occupied by the Southerners. In this position, the better-concentrated Army of Northern Virginia would

¹⁸ Vanderslice, *Gettysburg*, p. 68; Paris, *The Civil War*, III, 546; Scott, *Battles at Gettysburg*, p. 135; O.R., XXVII, pt. 1, 927, 1030; pt. 3, 470.

¹⁹ Paris, *The Civil War*, III, 550; Vanderslice, *Gettysburg*, p. 72; Hall, *Sixth New York Cavalry*, p. 139; J. H. Stine, *History of the Army of the Potomac* (Washington, 1893), p. 454; Doubleday, *Chancellorsville and Gettysburg*, pp. 128-127; O.R., XXVII, pt. 1, 401.

be at the apex of the three converging roads to the south of the town upon which the more widely-scattered Union army was approaching Gettysburg. Additional hours of daylight would have been available for the Confederates, and defeat in detail of the Federal forces would have been quite likely. Possibly the entire result of the battle and campaign would have been different. Hence, it can be seen that Reynold's decision to sacrifice, if necessary, Buford's cavalry division and the First Corps, and even the Eleventh Corps, while taking as heavy a toll as possible of Lee's soldiers, was the wise and soldierly-like move to make.

As Doubleday's First Corps neared the field, Reynolds directed it to leave the Emmitsburg road and double-quick across the fields to the arena of combat. Doubleday's leading division—Wadsworth's—reached McPherson Ridge about 10:00. It numbered around 3,600 effectives. Buford's cavalymen had been compelled by this time to fall back to the rear, or easternmost, elevation of the ridge. The bulk of Brigadier General Lysander Cutler's brigade was put into position on this crest, to the right (north) of the Chambersburg pike, while one of Doubleday's batteries relieved that of Buford on the pike on the westernmost crest of the ridge.²⁰

Both Reynolds and Doubleday saw that McPherson's Grove, situated on the ridge between the pike and the Hagerstown road, was the key position on that part of the field. Reynolds personally led the Iron Brigade of Brigadier General Solomon Meredith into these woods to check the impetuous attack of Brigadier General James J. Archer's Confederate brigade. As the Federal troops rushed into the grove, Reynolds shouted to them, "Forward! men, forward! For God's sake, drive those fellows out of the woods!" At this moment—about 10:15 a.m.—Reynold's head was pierced by a Confederate Minié ball, and he toppled dead to the ground. Doubleday immediately assumed command of the Union forces on the field. He too realized the vital importance of the great road-hub of Gettysburg as well as the strategic value of the Cemetery heights south of the town.²¹

The bulk of Cutler's brigade, thrown forward hurriedly to the right (north) of the pike without time for reconnaissance by Wadsworth, was struck in front and on the right flank by Brigadier General Joseph R. Davis' Confederate brigade. Cutler and Davis each had ap-

²⁰ Beecham, *Gettysburg*, p. 61; Scott, *Battles at Gettysburg*, pp. 139-140, 156; Fox, *New York at Gettysburg*, III, 1145; O.R., XXVII, pt. 1, 261.

²¹ Doubleday, *Chancellorsville and Gettysburg*, pp. 130-131, 134; Fox, *New York at Gettysburg*, I, 11; Samuel P. Bates, *The Battle of Gettysburg* (Philadelphia, 1875), p. 63; Hall, *Sixth New York Cavalry*, p. 141; John Richard Boyle, *Soldiers True: The Story of the One Hundred and Eleventh Regiment Pennsylvania Veteran Volunteers* (New York, 1903), p. 115.

proximately 2,000 men present. Having the advantage of position and surprise, Davis, in a sharp combat, forced Cutler's men from the field to a point behind Seminary Ridge, where they were regrouped near the railroad cut. Part of the Federal artillery battery was also compelled to retire, with heavy loss. As an example of the severity of the fight here, the 147th New York regiment lost 301 out of 380 men engaged. Then, moving into the shelter of the cut at the easternmost crest of McPherson Ridge, Davis' brigade soon saw that it was in a deathtrap: three other regiments of Wadsworth's division attacked the Southerners head-on from the south as well as flanking and enfilading them from the eastern end of the cut. Some 350 Confederates were obliged to surrender and those not shot down were fortunate to escape out the western end of the cut. The three regiments of Cutler which had been forced back behind Seminary Ridge soon came forward again and assumed their original position on the easternmost crest of McPherson Ridge. At the time of Davis' debacle—about 11:00—a momentary lull occurred on this portion of the field. So shattered was this gray brigade that Heth hesitated to bring it into action again that day.²²

In this first infantry clash of the battle, the Confederates "found out that their sudden attacks *en masse* were more dangerous and difficult of execution along the open country of Pennsylvania, than among the thickly wooded settlements of Virginia, where they did not stand in dread of slanting fires."²³ In fact, the First Day's Battle of Gettysburg illustrates better than most Civil War combats the employment of the tactical flank attack, with its corresponding enfilading fire. On the first day's clash, both sides strove to use this maneuver, and the side which succeeded in outflanking its foe won the joust in that section of the field.

While Cutler's brigade was engaged north of the pike, Wadsworth's other unit—Meredith's Iron Brigade—was encountering Archer's Confederate brigade in McPherson's Grove, Reynolds falling just as the two lines collided. The irresistible Union charge took Archer in front and on his right (south) flank, and drove him back across Willoughby Run. Several hundred Southern prisoners, including Archer himself

²² Nicholson, *Pennsylvania at Gettysburg*, I, 343-344; O.R., XXVII, pt. 2, 649; Davis Brigade Government tablet, on the Gettysburg Battlefield; Doubleday, *Chancellorsville and Gettysburg*, pp. 128-129; Stine, *Army of the Potomac*, pp. 461-462; Fox, *New York at Gettysburg*, III, 1003; Paris, *The Civil War*, III, 555; Rufus R. Dawes, *Service with the Sixth Wisconsin Volunteers* (Marietta Ohio, 1890), pp. 165, 168; O.R., XXVII, pt. 1, 282, 287; Cecil Battine, *The Crisis of the Confederacy: A History of Gettysburg and the Wilderness* (London, 1905), p. 189; W. C. Storrick, *Gettysburg: The Place, The Battles, The Outcome* (Harrisburg, 1932), p. 21.

²³ Nicholson, *Pennsylvania at Gettysburg*, I, 491.

(the first general officer captured since Lee took command of the army), were rounded up by the Iron Brigade. Meredith himself was wounded. Near 11:15 a lull took place in the combat between Doubleday and Heth. Doubleday expected that Meade would ride to the front himself to ascertain what was transpiring, but the Federal commander preferred to spend the entire day at army headquarters at Taneytown, only leaving for the battlefield late that night.²⁴

Doubleday's remaining two divisions—those of Rowley and Brigadier General John C. Robinson—arrived on the field, accompanied by four artillery batteries, soon after 11 o'clock. These two divisions together numbered approximately 5,900 men. Robinson's division was held in reserve for a time at the Seminary, where some of his men erected small barricades. Rowley's division was split: Colonel Roy Stone's Bucktail brigade, with a cry of "We have come to stay!" went into position about 11:30 on the westernmost crest of McPherson Ridge, connecting with Meredith's right near the grove, and with its own right on the Chambersburg pike; while the brigade of Colonel Chapman Biddle was ordered to deploy at about the same time on Meredith's left-rear, on the easternmost crest of the ridge, with its left near the Hagerstown road. Despite the presence of some of Buford's troopers, Biddle's left was in the air, but Doubleday simply did not have enough troops to safeguard it.²⁵

Heavy Confederate reinforcements were also coming onto the field. At about noon, the large division of Major General Robert E. Rodes reached the vicinity of Oak Hill, to the north of Doubleday. Rodes's five brigades, aggregating some 8,125 effectives, were supported by four artillery batteries. Rodes's timely arrival at Oak Hill—at a moment when Doubleday had thus far triumphed over Heth—was at first unperceived by the Federals, and immediately created a critical menace on the right flank of Doubleday's line. With the later arrival of Howard's Eleventh Corps on the plain north of town, "Rodes formed a block to the welding of the two Federal corps." The fortuitous Confederate concentration was to see, later in the day, still another gray force arrive on the field at a critical moment, and again directly on the Union right flank.²⁶

²⁴ O.R., XXVII, pt. 1, 265-267, 273; pt. 2, 607, 638, 646; O. B. Curtis, *History of the Twenty-Fourth Michigan* (Detroit, 1891), pp. 156-157, 166; *Confederate Veteran*, VIII (1901), 535-537; Doubleday, *Chancellorsville and Gettysburg*, pp. 133-134.

²⁵ Paris, *The Civil War*, III, 555; William W. Strong, *History of the 121st Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers* (Philadelphia, 1893), p. 44; Doubleday, *Chancellorsville and Gettysburg*, pp. 132, 136; *Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War* (Washington, 1863), I, 307; O.R., XXVII, pt. 1, 315, 329.

²⁶ E. P. Alexander, *Military Memoirs of a Confederate* (New York, 1907), p. 383; John D. Vautier, *History of the 88th Pennsylvania Volunteers* (Philadelphia,

Howard himself reached the battlefield at approximately 11:15, and being the senior Federal officer present, he succeeded Doubleday in command of the whole field, the latter retaining command of the First Corps west of town. Howard immediately set up his headquarters on East Cemetery Hill, across the Baltimore pike from the Citizens' Evergreen Cemetery, just beyond the southern edge of town. He then went to the top of the Fahnestock building, at Middle and Baltimore Streets, to survey the situation. While observing the lines of battle from there, Howard probably saw the temporary retrograde movement of several regiments of Cutler's brigade, and prematurely reported to Meade that the entire First Corps was crumbling. This hasty and ill-considered action by Howard was unjustified. It led to Doubleday's being removed from command of the First Corps by Meade, who assigned Major General John Newton to that post on July 2, despite the truly efficient and dexterous management of the corps by Doubleday on July 1—handling that was quite superior to that of Howard himself. But Howard did see the splendid defensive position of the Cemetery heights south of Gettysburg, and determined to make every effort to hold them until the remainder of the scattered Army of the Potomac could arrive to render them impregnable. Howard thus continued to pursue the policy already begun earlier in the day by Buford, Reynolds, and Doubleday, and received the official thanks of Congress for making this decision.²⁷

At 12:30 the bulk of the Eleventh Corps, now under Schurz, arrived on the field. A number of regiments covered the last few miles to town on the double-quick, and were considerably fatigued and exhausted from the heat and exertion before ever entering combat. The division of Brigadier General Adolph von Steinwehr and supporting artillery were posted by Howard in reserve on Cemetery Hill, Howard's decision to maintain a reserve force on Cemetery Hill as a rallying point in the event that his forces west and north of the town should be overwhelmed proved one of foresight and sagacity.²⁸

Upon the arrival of Schulz's two divisions, numbering together some 6,000 effectives, and commanded by Brigadier Generals Francis C. Barlow and Alexander Schimmelfennig, Howard ordered them to move through Gettysburg, accompanied by three batteries, to the

1894), pp. 122-123; the Carter, Fry, Page, and Reese Batteries Government tablets, on the Gettysburg Battlefield; Swinton, *Army of the Potomac*, p. 332; Francis Marshal, *The Battle of Gettysburg* (New York, 1914), p. 118.

²⁷ O.R., XXVII, pt. 1, 247; Vautier, *88th Pennsylvania*, p. 124; *B. & L.*, III, 278-287; Storrick, *Gettysburg*, p. 23; Scott, *Battles at Gettysburg*, p. 158.

²⁸ Boyle, *One Hundred and Eleventh Pennsylvania*, p. 115; Young, *Battle of Gettysburg*, p. 192; Nicholson, *Pennsylvania at Gettysburg*, I, 438; O.R., XXVII, pt. 1, 721, 727; Doubleday, *Chancellorsville and Gettysburg*, p. 138; Beecham, *Gettysburg*, p. 75.

plain north of town. There they were to connect with Doubleday's right (under Robinson) on Oak Ridge, and to guard against the expected arrival of Major General Jubal A. Early's Confederate division from Heidlersburg. However, while this design appeared feasible when ordered, it was actually impracticable, owing to the fact that Rodes's large Confederate division had already moved into position at Oak Hill and from woods and hills were not visible to Schurz down on the plain north of town.²⁹

The deployment of Schurz's two small divisions on the flat ground about three-quarters of a mile north of Gettysburg was completed by approximately 2 o'clock in the afternoon. Schurz's line, facing northward, extended from Barlow's Knoll on the right near the Harrisburg pike, across the Carlisle road to the Mummasburg road on the left. Barlow's division was on the right and Schimmelfennig's on the left. It would have been better had Barlow's aggressiveness not forced Schurz's line forward from the Almshouse—a better defensive position than the more advanced one at Barlow's Knoll, since Early could turn the more forward position. The three batteries accompanying Schurz quickly became engaged in a torrid artillery duel with Rodes's batteries on Oak Hill. Schurz requested that Howard send him one of Von Steinwehr's two brigades, which had been posted on Cemetery Hill in reserve, this brigade to be placed near the railroad depot in supporting distance of Schurz, and covering his right-rear. Soon Schurz was engaged in front near the Carlisle road with Brigadier General George Doles's Confederate brigade of Rodes's division.³⁰

The Eleventh Corps regiments, in a position "without shelter of any kind," were soon subjected to a destructive fire from three enemy batteries on Oak Hill. Both flanks were in the air, Schurz being unable to connect with Robinson's right, which was a good quarter of a mile forward and to the left on Oak Ridge. The Union line was too long to be held by the relatively small number of men available to Schurz. Critics of the Eleventh Corps often fail to realize the insuperable disadvantages under which it fought on the first day at Gettysburg, or else are otherwise prejudiced against this hard-luck corps, composed in part of troops of German descent. Now, just as Schurz was coming to grips with Doles in front, the fate of the day was de-

²⁹ Carl Schurz, *The Reminiscences of Carl Schurz* (New York, 1908), III, 8; B. & L., III, 278; Paris, *The Civil War*, III, 559; Vautier, *88th Pennsylvania*, p. 126.

³⁰ O.R., XXVII, pt. 1, 727; Schurz, *Reminiscences*, III, 9; Bachelder's Map; the Von Gilsa, Ames, Wilkeson, and Dilger Government tablets, on the Gettysburg Battlefield; John S. Applegate, *Reminiscences and Letters of George Arrowsmith* (Red Bank, N.J., 1893), pp. 211-212; Vautier, *88th Pennsylvania*, p. 126; Doubleday, *Chancellorsville and Gettysburg*, p. 142.

cided by the sudden appearance on the field a little before 3:00 of Early's division of some 6,300 effectives. This division's four batteries went into position near the Harrisburg road and enfiladed Schurz's entire line at easy range. Then Early's infantry poured in directly on Barlow's right flank.³¹

The Federals were being hammered also by the merciless fire of Old Jube's batteries, as well as by Rodes's guns on Oak Hill, when Early's full assault began. Doles continued to exert pressure on Schurz's front. No troops ever arrayed for battle could have withstood for long such engulfing fire and assault. Barlow was severely wounded and captured. The whole Eleventh Corps line was forced back at about 3:45 p.m. to the Almshouse position, some 500 yards to the rear, near the edge of town. The hoped-for Union stand there was doomed by the relentless advance of two of Early's brigades around Schurz's right flank, at the same time that the brigades of Gordon and Doles renewed the attack in front. The brigade of Colonel Charles R. Coster was sent forward by Howard from Cemetery Hill to assist Schurz's threatened right, and took position in the northeastern outskirts of the town, beyond the railroad station, just north of Stevens Run. A battery accompanied Coster, but went into action well to his left, on the Carlisle road at the edge of town. However, assaulted in front and flank both Coster and the battery were overwhelmed, and, after a brief and gallant stand, were forced back. The action of this small unit, however, helped Schurz to extricate most of his command from its hard-pressed position at the Almshouse line. Near 4:00 the Federals retreated in a disorganized state through the streets of Gettysburg toward the haven on Cemetery Hill, suffering the loss of hundreds of prisoners captured by the Confederates in the town.³²

It has been seen that, on Doubleday's right wing at Oak Ridge, two brigades of Robinson's division—some 3,000 Union effectives—had arrived at the Seminary at about 11:00 that morning. The threat from Rode's Confederate division on Oak Hill caused Baxter's brigade to be ordered at about 12:30 p.m. to move along the northern extension of Seminary Ridge—known there as Oak Ridge—north of the Chambersburg pike and the railroad to thwart Rode's menace to the right flank and rear of Doubleday's men then facing westward on McPherson Ridge. Robinson's other brigade—Brigadier General Gab-

³¹ Vanderslice, *Gettysburg*, pp. 88, 132; Robert Stiles, *Four Years Under Marse Robert* (New York, 1094), p. 209; Wise, *Long Arm of Lee*, II, 620; the Carrington, Garber, Green, and Tanner Batteries Government tablets, on the Gettysburg Battlefield; Vautier, *88 Pennsylvania*, p. 128.

³² O.R., XXVII, pt. 1, 729; pt. 3, 317, 445, 468, 484, 495, 554, 638-639; Stine, *Army of the Potomac*, p. 479; Marshal, *Gettysburg*, p. 123; Fox *New York at Gettysburg*, I, 22; II, 918; III, 1051, 1054-1055; Schurz, *Reminiscences*, III, 10; Bates, *Battle of Gettysburg*, p. 78.

riel R. Paul's—was sent from the Seminary sometime later to Oak Ridge to succor Baxter when the latter became heavily engaged with Rodes.³³

Shortly before 2:00, Baxter's brigade was in position on Oak Ridge just south of the Mummasburg road. Well to his left was Cutler's brigade, which had been compelled by Rodes's guns on Oak Hill to fall back from McPherson Ridge to a position on Oak Ridge just north of the railroad. By this time, Rodes had completed the deployment of his brigades for the attack. During the previous lull in the battle, Heth, seeing Rodes moving into attacking position, asked Lee, who had just arrived near the field, if he (Heth) might resume his attack on Doubleday from the west. Lee replied, "No; I am not prepared to bring on a general engagement today; Longstreet is not up." Heth, however, seeing that Robinson's division in his front at the Seminary was moving northward to confront Rodes, repeated his request to Lee for permission to attack. This time the Confederate leader nodded in assent.³⁴

Rodes opened his assault by throwing Colonel Edward A. O'Neal's brigade southward against Baxter's men, then astraddle Oak Ridge and facing northward along the Mummasburg road. Baxter repulsed this thrust, then changed front to the west, and, from behind a stone wall, decimated the ranks of Rodes's second attacking brigade—that of Brigadier General Alfred Iverson. The fact that these two Confederate brigades did not attack Baxter simultaneously probably saved the Federals from defeat at that time. Five hundred Southern dead and maimed marked the position which Iverson's attacking force had occupied on a line as straight as a dress parade. "Iverson's line," wrote an eye-witness, "was indicated by the ghastly row of dead and wounded men, whose blood trailed the course of their line with a crimson stain clearly discernible for several days after the battle, until the rain washed the gory record away." Baxter took advantage of Iverson's repulse to counterattack this gray unit, and, by 2:45, had succeeded in capturing almost 1,000 men.³⁵

Rodes now moved the brigade of Brigadier General Stephen D. Ramseur into position to relieve that of Iverson. Baxter's brigade, its ammunition almost exhausted, remained for a time with the bayonet;

³³ Vautier, *88th Pennsylvania*, p. 123; Fox *New York at Gettysburg*, II, 752.

³⁴ O.R., XXVII, pt. 1, 307; Nicholson, *Pennsylvania at Gettysburg*, I, 27, 345; B. & L., III, 279; S.H.S.P., IV (1878), 158.

³⁵ Benjamin F. Cook, *History of the Twelfth Massachusetts Volunteers* (Boston, 1882), p. 100; George A. Hussey, *History of the . . . Eighty-Third N.Y. Volunteers* (New York, 1889), pp. 270-271; Nicholson, *Pennsylvania at Gettysburg*, II, 492, 908; O.R., XXVII, pt. 2, 579; Isaac Hall, *History of the Ninety-Seventh Regiment New York Volunteers* (Utica, 1890), p. 136; Paris, *The Civil War*, III, 563; Stine, *Army of the Potomac*, p. 473; the Paul Brigade Government tablet, on the Gettysburg Battlefield.

but, with Paul now in position a trifle to the left and rear, Baxter moved off to the left. Both of Robinson's depleted brigades then repelled a second strike by O'Neal. Paul was shot in the face and severely wounded, the ball carrying away both his eyes. Yet, in his first attack against Paul from north and west, Ramseur was hurled back with loss. Soon Paul began running low on ammunition. Augmented by fresh regiments, Ramseur then launched another powerful attack from the same directions. At 4:15 Robinson was obliged to order Paul's battered brigade to withdraw from its dangerous and long-held position, the Federal extrication succeeding because of a suicide stand made by the Sixteenth Main at the point where the Mummasburg road crosses Oak Ridge. The spirited defense made by Robinson was of inestimable value to Doubleday.³⁶

While O'Neal, Iverson, and Ramseur were attacking Robinson at Oak Ridge, another of Rodes's brigades—Brigadier General Junius Daniel's—moved southward from Oak Hill against the right flank of Stone's Bucktail brigade, in position on the western crest of McPherson Ridge, facing both westward and northward, to the south of the railroad. As they did, the Confederates received a sharp enfilading fire from Cutler's brigade, on Oak Ridge near the cut. Nonetheless, Daniel pressed on toward the railroad cut in McPherson Ridge. But he was repulsed by Stone—who was himself wounded—in his first attempts to fight his way across the cut. Reinforced, Daniel finally succeeding in capturing the cut and forcing Stone's men back across to the southern edge of the pike. While Stone was being severely pressed by Daniel from the north, he was also now being assailed from the west by troops of Heth's division, backed up by the fresh division of Major General William D. Pender. With the aid of some of Hill's troops from the west, Daniel finally captured the area around McPherson's barn, and Stone was impelled to fall back slowly and grudgingly toward Seminary Ridge.³⁷

In the meantime, powerful Union reinforcements were beginning to move toward Gettysburg, although they were still some distance away. At 3:15 Sickles informed Meade and Howard that he was moving his Third Corps toward Gettysburg at once. Twenty minutes later, Howard received word from Slocum that the Twelfth Corps was also on

³⁶ Bachelder's Map; Vanderslice, *Gettysburg*, pp. 84, 92; Cook, *Twelfth Massachusetts*, p. 101; Fox, *New York at Gettysburg*, I, 17, II, 723-724, 756; O.R., XXVII, pt. 2, 554, 587; pt. 3, 290, 295, 299; Nicholson, *Pennsylvania at Gettysburg*, I, 566; Vautier, *88th Pennsylvania*, pp. 143-144; A. R. Small, *The Sixteenth Maine Regiment* (Portland, 1886), p. 118.

³⁷ O.R., XXVII, pt. 2, 566, 572; the Daniel Brigade Government tablet, on the Gettysburg Battlefield; Chamberlin, *One Hundred and Fiftieth Pennsylvania*, pp. 116-117; Vanderslice, *Gettysburg*, p. 99.

the way to the field.³⁸ If Doubleday and Howard could hold on a little longer and keep the desperate Confederates away from the Cemetery heights south of Gettysburg, two strong corps of the Army of the Potomac would soon arrive and make secure those elevations. Although Early's and part of Rodes's divisions were in pursuit of the Eleventh Corps, Doubleday was still firmly contesting every foot of ground to the west of town in the vicinity of the Chambersburg pike.

Doubleday's stand, however, was handicapped by the fact that the numerous Southern batteries had achieved a superiority over the fewer Union guns. Sometime earlier in the afternoon—perhaps about 2:30—Heth had thrown forward his two fresh brigades of Brigadier General J. J. Pettigrew and Colonel J. M. Brockenbrough against Meredith's Iron Brigade in McPherson's Grove and against Biddle's brigade in the open fields to Meredith's left and rear. The fighting, especially in the grove, became ferocious. The 24th Michigan lost 363 of its 496 men; the 151st Pennsylvania lost 337 men out of 467; and the 26th North Carolina suffered over 585 casualties out of 800 engaged—the heaviest loss in the Confederate army during the battle. In his renewed assaults, however, Heth was initially thrown back. But finally, assisted by Daniel, and by Davis' remnants, Brockenbrough compelled Stone and Meredith to retire slowly toward Seminary Ridge. Biddle, too, after a sturdy resistance, was outflanked on his left by Pettigrew, and was obliged to begin a withdrawal to the east. To clinch his success, Hill at 3:45 threw Pender's fresh division into the fray.³⁹

Doubleday's infantry and artillery units were now in position facing westward on Seminary Ridge on both sides of the main Seminary building between the Chambersburg pike and Hagerstown road. Pender attacked this line with three brigades—Brigadier General James H. Lane's on his right (south), where the Confederates overlapped Doubleday's left flank by a quarter of a mile; Colonel Abner Perrin's in the center; and Brigadier General Alfred M. Scales's on the Confederate left near the pike. Lane, however, was held in check by Buford's mounted cavalry, posted on Doubleday's left flank.⁴⁰

Pender launched his final all-out attack on Doubleday at Seminary Ridge shortly after 4 o'clock. In the movement against the Federal

³⁸ O.R., XXVII, pt. 3, 463-465.

³⁹ Nicholson, *Pennsylvania at Gettysburg*, II, 769, 908; the Brockenbrough Brigade Government tablet, on the Gettysburg Battlefield; O.R., XXVII, pt. 2, 637, 642-643; Vautier, *88th Pennsylvania*, pp. 125, 129-130; Scott, *Battles at Gettysburg*, p. 205; Paris, *The Civil War*, III, 563; Strong, *121st Pennsylvania*, pp. 46, 48, 113, 121.

⁴⁰ Vautier, *88th Pennsylvania*, p. 130; Stine, *Army of the Potomac*, pp. 480-481; O.R., XXVII, pt. 2, 657, 665; B. & L., III, 285.

right, Scales's attacking formations were pulverized by a murderous fire from a Union battery to the north of the pike. To the south of the Seminary, on Doubleday's left, Biddle initially repelled Perrin with staggering losses, but was eventually driven from the ridge by the persistent Confederate assaults. It was Perrin's lodgment here that caused the final retreat of Doubleday from the ridge. It was nearly 4:30 when the First Corps was at last compelled to terminate its magnificent stand west of Gettysburg, where it had held firm since midmorning, and to seek escape through the streets of the town to Cemetery Hill, where one of Von Steinwehr's brigades and some guns were posted as a reserve on which to rally. Rear-guard fighting in Gettysburg enabled the bulk of Doubleday's troops to extricate themselves, although many blueclad soldiers—mostly Schurz's men—were captured in the streets. Doubleday's defense against heavy odds, along with the resistance of the Eleventh Corps, had kept the Confederates from seizing the vital and strategic Cemetery heights south of Gettysburg until the advancing but disunited corps of Meade's army could arrive on the field to bolster the two shattered corps which had been fighting since the morning hours.⁴¹

At approximately 5:00 the bulk of the retreating Federal forces of the First and Eleventh Corps were rallied and placed in position on Cemetery Hill. The danger of a Confederate assault on the hill was greatest in the period just after the Union remnants had reached the crest. However, the natural confusion existing among the Southerners was a deterring factor. They simply could not reorganize quickly enough to launch an all-out onslaught against Cemetery Hill before the Third and Twelfth Corps could arrive. Moreover, to many Confederates the unexpected tenacity and fighting qualities of the Union forces west and north of the town were the finest they had encountered during the course of the war. About 18,000 Federal troops had been pitted against approximately 28,000 Southerners, and the Northerners had yielded only to sheer weight of numbers. The Confederate generals were hesitant to attack the determined blue soldiers again, especially when the latter were posted on such a defensible eminence as Cemetery Hill. The Southerners had been doing the attacking on this blistering hot day, and, to use Lee's words, were too "weakened and exhausted" to carry "the strong position which the enemy had assumed."⁴²

⁴¹ O.R., XXVII, pt. 1, 307; pt. 2, 658, 661-662, 670; the Stewart Battery Government tablet, on the Gettysburg Battlefield; Doubleday, *Chancellorsville and Gettysburg*, pp. 147-150; Nicholson, *Pennsylvania at Gettysburg*, I, 493; Beecham, *Gettysburg*, pp. 93-94; Chamberlin, *One Hundred and Fiftieth Pennsylvania*, p. 126.

⁴² Ashurst, *Remarks*, pp. 6-7, 17-20; Fox *New York at Gettysburg*, I, 16; II, 754;

Just as the retreating Union troops reached Cemetery Hill, the dashing and inspiring Major General Winfield S. Hancock of the Second Corps rode up at Meade's request to assume command of the field and to determine whether the Army of the Potomac should continue the fight at Gettysburg. Although Howard challenged Hancock's right to assume command—stating that he (Howard) was the senior officer present—both generals worked strenuously to rally the Federal soldiers and render the position defensible. Wadsworth's remnants were ordered to the right to Culp's Hill to secure that important bastion. The Twelfth Corps began arriving at Gettysburg at approximately 5:00 p.m., and the Third Corps reached the field thirty minutes later. By nightfall the Second Corps was in the vicinity of the Round Tops. Slocum came up and assumed command of the field at 6:30 p.m., while Meade himself arrived from Taneytown at 1:00 on the morning of the 2nd. The army commander proceeded immediately to inspect his lines by moonlight, and he resolved to stand firm on the second day and compel Lee to fight on his terms.⁴³

The fighting on the First Day at Gettysburg was over. If technically a Confederate victory, the gray legions had been prevented from occupying the vital Cemetery heights, and had suffered irreparable losses among many of the units which could be called upon by Lee to assail the Union lines on the second and third days' battles. The clash on July 1, 1863, had been one of the most desperate of the war. Some 9,000 Union and 8,000 Confederate casualties had been inflicted.⁴⁴

For the men in the ranks, however, only sleep was essential. As General Abner Doubleday—amongst the living, the hero of the First Day's Battle, along with Buford, Reynolds, and Early—accurately recorded: "We lay on our arms that night among the tombs of the Cemetery, so suggestive of the shortness of life and the nothingness of fame; but the men were little disposed to moralize on themes like these and were much too exhausted to think of anything but much needed rest."⁴⁵

Chamberlin, *One Hundred and Fiftieth Pennsylvania*, p. 129; B. & L., III, 288-289; A. J. L. Fremantle, *Three Months in the Southern States* (New York, 1864), p. 254; Marshal, *Battle of Gettysburg*, pp. 125-130; Storrick, *Gettysburg*, p. 24; Schurz, *Reminiscences*, III, 9; O.R., XXVII, pt. 1, 704; pt. 2, 317.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pt. 1, 366, 368, 530, 696, 705, 825; pt. 3, 461; Scott, *Battles at Gettysburg*, pp. 81, 219, 223-224; Doubleday, *Chancellorsville and Gettysburg*, pp. 150-151; Beecham, *Gettysburg*, pp. 151-152; Fox, *New York at Gettysburg*, I, 30-31; George G. Meade, *The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade* (New York, 1913), I, 62-63; William H. Powell, *The Fifth Army Corps* (New York, 1896), p. 512.

⁴⁴ See Warren W. Hassler, Jr., "The First Day's Battle at Gettysburg: A Strategic and Tactical Study" (Unpublished master's thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1951), pp. 195-196.

⁴⁵ Doubleday, *Chancellorsville and Gettysburg*, p. 155.

THE BATTLE OF ALLATOONA

Fred E. Brown

AFTER RETREATING SOUTHWARD ACROSS the Etowah River on May 20, 1864, General Joseph E. Johnston halted the Army of Tennessee near Allatoona Pass, where the Western & Atlantic Railroad ran through a deep narrow cut.¹ Here, in this natural stronghold of the rugged Allatoona hills, was an ideal position in which to await attack by the pursuing Union forces of Major General William T. Sherman. But Sherman knew that the pass at Allatoona was strong and would be hard to force. He resolved not to attempt it. As a young lieutenant some twenty years before, he had ridden horseback through this section of North Georgia and his keen eyes and retentive memory had noted well the topography of the country. Therefore, instead of attacking, he decided to turn the Confederate position by moving from Kingston to Marietta via Dallas, which would force Johnston to give up Allatoona.² Johnston countered this move with an advance in force toward New Hope Church, which gave its name to the battle fought there on May 25.

Then followed a series of maneuvers by both armies in which the Federal entrenchments were rapidly extended eastward toward the railroad, in the direction of Allatoona, while the Confederates endeavored to keep in front of them.³ Envelopment of the Allatoona area by Sherman's army compelled Johnston to evacuate his position at the

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¹ S. G. French, *Two Wars: An Autobiography* (Nashville, 1901), p. 198. The Western & Atlantic Railroad spanned the 130 miles between Atlanta and Chattanooga. A spur line connected Rome with the main line at Kingston.

² U.S. War Dept., comp., *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Washington, 1880-1901), Series I, XXXVIII, pt. 1, 22, 60. Hereafter cited as O.R., with all references being to Series I. See also W. T. Sherman, *Memoirs of Gen. W. T. Sherman* (New York, 1891), II, 42-43.

³ Joseph E. Johnston, *Narrative of Military Operations* (New York, 1874), p. 334.

Pass, and on June 1 it was occupied by Federal cavalry.⁴ A garrison was placed at Allatoona, and on June 6 Sherman rode in on an inspection trip, "found it all that was expected, and gave orders for its fortification and preparation as a 'secondary base.'" The next day he wired Major General Henry W. Halleck at Washington: "I have been to Allatoona Pass, and I find it admirable for our purposes. . . . It now becomes as useful to us as it was to the enemy, being easily defended from either direction."⁵ Thus the real object of Sherman's move to Dallas was accomplished. He now controlled the railroad all the way to Big Shanty, in sight of Kennesaw Mountain. In summarizing these events in his memoirs, Sherman wrote that "with the drawn battle of New Hope Church, and our occupation of the natural fortress of Allatoona, terminated the month of May, and the first stage of the [Atlanta] campaign."⁶

Sherman's orders for the fortification of Allatoona were explicit. In a special field order dated June 6, he instructed that two or more good, strong, earth redoubts be located at the eastern extremity of the pass. "All soldiers loafing about pretending to seek their regiments and all skulkers or men sent by corps commanders or provost-marshal to work as a penalty" were ordered to Allatoona for the purpose of working on the fortifications.⁷

On June 27 Colonel George C. Rogers, overseeing the defense of Allatoona, reported "that the works at this place are, as far as I have received instructions from corps engineers, nearly completed. We are felling timber and making some rifle-pits that I deem very necessary for our protection . . ."⁸ Sherman's report to Halleck on July 14 expressed his satisfaction with the progress made up to that time, and in a letter to General John E. Smith on the same day, Sherman confided: "I regard Allatoona of the first importance in our future plans. It is a second Chattanooga; its front and rear are susceptible of easy defense and its flanks are strong."⁹

Sherman's apprehension for the pass became obvious in the middle of August, when he warned General Smith to "look well to the security of the Etowah bridge and Allatoona. . . . In an emergency like this, you can call on the force at Rome." In another message he stated: "The stores in Allatoona are so valuable that I don't want to risk them too much."¹⁰ At the same time he ordered Lieutenant Colonel John E.

⁴ O.R., XXXVIII, pt. 4, 362-363, 367, 379, 385.

⁵ Sherman, *Memoirs*, II 50; O.R., XXXVIII, pt. 4, 428.

⁶ Sherman, *Memoirs*, II, 49.

⁷ O.R., XXXVIII, pt. 4, 427; pt. 1, 196; pt. 3, 559.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 624.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pt. 5, 137, 141.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 501, 540.

Tourtellotte, commanding at Allatoona, to "defend that place and those stores at all costs," and he added with some redundancy, "the bridge, the stores, and the Allatoona depot must be held, cost what it may."¹¹ Then, as a clincher, in his Special Field Orders No. 57, Sherman stated categorically, "The depots at the bridge, at Allatoona, and Marietta will be held against any attack."¹²

On July 17, after the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain, and as the Federal forces were pressing the Confederates before Atlanta, Sherman's respected antagonist, General Joe Johnston, was relieved of command and replaced by General John B. Hood, who was to fight and lose the conclusive battles demanded by President Davis. For nearly a month after the fall of the Gate City on September 2, both sides remained comparatively inactive while Hood consolidated his army and Sherman engineered the exodus of the people of Atlanta.¹³

On September 29 Hood's army began a plan of campaign already revealed to the enemy in the public speeches of Mr. Davis; essentially it was a move "to turn the enemy's right flank and attempt to destroy his communications and force him to retire from Atlanta."¹⁴ The first step of "Hood's Tennessee Campaign" was to transfer the Confederate army north of the Chattahoochee River with a view to operating against the railroad in Sherman's rear.

After an "undisturbed passage" across the Chattahoochee on September 28, Hood telegraphed General Braxton Bragg on October 2: "To-night my right will be at Powder Springs with my left on Lost Mountain. This will, I think, force the enemy to move on me or to move south."¹⁵ In this prediction he was correct. Sherman had already advised General Smith at Cartersville that Hood had recrossed the river with his army, and Sherman warned that Hood might "attempt to make a lodgment on our [rail]road." If Smith should see signs of such a threat he was to "hold securely the Allatoona Pass and Etowah bridge," while Sherman would move against the enemy with his whole force the moment he should learn of it.¹⁶ On the same day, October 1, Sherman alerted Brigadier General John M. Corse, division commander at Rome, to the possibility of Hood moving on the rail-

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 542-543. On Tourtellotte, see Francis B. Heitman, *Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army from Its Organization, September 29, 1789, to March 2, 1903* (Washington, 1903), I, 966. Hereafter cited as Heitman, *Historical Register*.

¹² *O.R.*, XXXVIII, pt. 1, 169.

¹³ See Sherman, *Memoirs*, II, 110-113; J. B. Hood, *Advance and Retreat* (New Orleans, 1880), pp. 229-231.

¹⁴ *O.R.*, XXXVIII, pt. 1, 27; XXXIX, pt. 1, 801; Sherman, *Memoirs*, II, 141-142.

¹⁵ *O.R.*, XXXIX, pt. 3, 782.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 8.

road below Allatoona.¹⁷ His contingent orders were: "If you hear of him this side of Allatoona, leave a small force to guard the bridge across [the] Oostenaula [River] and join your forces to General John E. Smith's and act against Hood from Allatoona."¹⁸ Two days later Sherman ordered Colonel Tourtellotte at Allatoona to maintain "the utmost vigilance there. If he [Hood] goes for Allatoona I want him delayed only long enough for me to reach his rear. . . . If he moves up toward Allatoona I will surely come in force."¹⁹

Leaving one corps in Atlanta, about 65,000 Federal troops on October 3-4 crossed the Chattahoochee and moved toward Marietta. Reports that heavy masses of Confederate infantry, artillery, and cavalry had been seen from Kennesaw Mountain were interpreted by Sherman to mean that Allatoona was their objective point, and on October 4 he signaled Corse to hurry back to the assistance of the garrison at Allatoona, and to burn the provisions rather than lose them.²⁰

According to one historian, this order was flagged from Kennesaw Mountain to Allatoona, telegraphed to Kingston and (the telegraph line to the west being cut) sent by locomotive to General Corse at Rome. "This is perhaps the only instance during the war," he wrote, "in which optical signaling, electricity, and steam united in the conveyance of an important order."²¹

On August 18, when near Atlanta, Sherman had foreseen the possible need for visual signaling to his rear and had informed Major General Oliver O. Howard that it would be prudent to provide for "signal telegraph back as far as Allatoona." He instructed that "a station on the hill at Allatoona in connection with General [George H.] Thomas' station on Kennesaw" be installed. Howard promised that his chief signal officer would "have an office opened at Altoona at once."²²

On October 3, under Hood's orders, Lieutenant General A. P. Stew-

¹⁷ For the life and career of John Murray Corse, for whom there is no full-length biography, see William Salter, "Major-General John M. Corse," *Annals of Iowa* (Third Series), II (1895-1896), 1-19, 105-145, 278-304; Heitman, *Historical Register*, I, 328; James Grant Wilson and John Fiske, eds. *Appletons' Cyclopaedia of American Biography* (New York, 1887-1889), I, 747; *National Cyclopaedia of American Biography* (New York, 1897), IV, 297.


¹⁸ O.R., XXXIX, pt. 3, 8.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 53.


²⁰ Sherman, *Memoirs*, II, 146; O.R., XXXIX, pt. 3, 75. The reason for this message being sent over Vandiver's name, instead of Sherman's is not clear; its point of origin is uncertain, as well as methods used in relaying it from point to point. There is little doubt, however, that it was flagged from Kennesaw Mountain to Allatoona.

²¹ William R. Plum, *The Military Telegraph During the Civil War* . . . (Chicago, 1882), II, 232.

²² O.R., XXXVIII, pt. 5, 585.



Allatoona, Georgia



Allatoona Pass, looking north. Most of the action in the battle took place around the eminence to the left.

art marched his corps from near Lost Mountain to strike the railroad at Big Shanty.²³ Brigadier General Frank C. Armstrong's cavalry joined Stewart at Lost Mountain to cover the work of destruction. The Federal garrisons at Big Shanty, Moon's Station and Acworth were captured and some 600 prisoners taken. Stewart reported that "by 3 p.m. of the 4th the railroad was effectually torn up, the ties burned and rails bent for a distance of ten or twelve miles."²⁴

The records make it abundantly clear that Allatoona was uppermost in Sherman's thoughts from the moment he received intelligence of Hood's new plans. The dispatches he sent on the fourth clearly reveal his increasing anxiety.²⁵

In a lengthy report to General Samuel Cooper, February 15, 1865, Hood made the following statement: "Hearing that the enemy had a quantity of stores at Allatoona, I determined, if possible, to destroy the bridge over the Etowah river, and directed Lieutenant-General [A. P.] Stewart to send a division also to Allatoona, instructing the officer in command to destroy the railroad there and take possession of the place if, in his judgment, when he reached there, he deemed it practicable."²⁶ Yet, in Hood's memoirs this statement was paraphrased and revised to claim knowledge of the garrison posted at Allatoona.²⁷

Stewart's orders from Hood were delegated to Major General Samuel G. French, who recorded in his diary that he received his instructions on October 4, "at noon, when filling up the railroad cuts at Big Shanty, . . . [and] about this time some one living near by told us that the enemy had fortifications at Allatoona, well garrisoned and commissary stores there."²⁸ Although it is hardly conceivable that Hood was unaware of the strategic importance of Allatoona Pass, neither of his two orders to Stewart indicate knowledge of either the garrison or the provisions stored there. He made no mention of "two or three regiments" guarding "large supplies" or "a quantity of stores," or a "garrison" to be captured. Later, when he claimed to have had

²³ O.R., XXXIX, pt. 3, 783. Stewart had been appointed lieutenant general, on June 23, 1864, "to assume command of Polk's Corps." *Ibid.*, pt. 4, 787.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, XXXIX, pt. 1, 812.

²⁵ The sequence, exact dates, and time of dispatch are impossible to determine. All are dated on the fourth, and arranged here in the sequence in which they appeared in the O.R. Some may have originated on the third and been delayed by broken telegraph lines, fog, or other causes. See *ibid.*, pt. 3, 66-68, 71, 75, 78.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pt. 1, 802; Hood, *Advance and Retreat*, p. 326.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 257. In the "Journal of Brig. Gen. Francis A. Shoup, C.S. Army, Chief of Staff," is this statement of October 4: "Major-General French was moving on Allatoona at 4 p.m. this evening, where the enemy have a large supply of provisions guarded by two or three regiments." O.R., XXXIX, pt. 1, 806. Unless this was a delayed entry (as seems probable), there was no reason for withholding the information from French.

²⁸ French, *Two Wars*, p. 225. See also O.R., XXXIX, pt. 1, 814-815.

such intelligence, he gave no reason for having withheld it from Stewart and French.²⁹ The conclusion must be, therefore, that Hood was second guessing and wishfully thinking when he claimed to have been informed of the situation at Allatoona prior to issuing his orders to Stewart on October 4. Hood omitted these controversial orders from both his official report and his memoirs. However, French quoted them in his own recollections.³⁰

As General French stated: "Not satisfied with the details of the foregoing order, General Hood sent another, more minute in detail about the bridge."³¹ But Hood's ignorance of the situation at Allatoona was just as apparent in the second dispatch, in which he felt that the enemy could not "disturb" the Confederates before the next day. He also ordered General Stewart to destroy the bridge by having volunteers place and ignite "light wood and other combustible material" on the span.³²

In a letter written after the war to his former adjutant, Major David Sanders, French commented caustically: "These two orders were the only instructions given by General Hood. Analyze and construe them as you will and you cannot find one word to sustain the assertion of General Hood [in his memoirs], that he ordered me to move to Allatoona, 'capture the garrison if practicable and gain possession of the supplies.'"³³

Even after learning that the Federal positions at Allatoona were garrisoned and well fortified, Stewart apparently saw no danger in sending only one small division to make the assault. There is no evidence that he considered sending either of his other divisions, commanded by Generals W. W. Loring and E. C. Walthall. Both were closer to Allatoona than French's division, and one had twice its strength.³⁴ French's division at this time consisted of three brigades; the first (still known as Ector's), commanded by Brigadier William H. Young,³⁵ was composed of the 29th and 39th North Carolina Infan-

²⁹ One of Hood's biographers wrote that Hood "often was careless about details," which may be the explanation. John P. Dyer, *The Gallant Hood* (Indianapolis, 1950), p. 26.

³⁰ O.R., XXXIX, pt. 1, 814.

³¹ *Southern Historical Society Papers*, X (1882), 403. Hereafter cited as S.H.S.P. This letter dated May 30, 1881, to Major D. W. Sanders, seems first to have been published in the *Louisville Courier-Journal*, June 12, 1882, not June 11, the date usually given.

³² O.R., XXXIX, pt. 1, 814.

³³ S.H.S.P., X (1882), 403.

³⁴ According to French, "Loring could have reached Allatoona by 11 a.m. on the 4th, and the others soon after. The battle would have been fought on the 4th, and before the arrival of Corse at midnight." French, *Two Wars*, pp. 271-272.

³⁵ On Young, see Clement A. Evans, ed., *Confederate Military History* (Atlanta, 1899), XI, 266-267; *Confederate Veteran*, X (1902), 31.

try, the 9th Texas Infantry, and the 10th, 14th and 32d Texas Cavalry (dismounted); the second, commanded by General Francis M. Cockrell,³⁶ was the first Missouri brigade, composed of eight small regiments consolidated into four, the 1st and 4th Infantry, 2d and 6th Infantry, 3d and 5th Infantry, and the 1st and 3d Cavalry (dismounted); and the third, commanded by General Claudius W. Sears,³⁷ was composed of the 4th, 35th, 36th, 39th, and 46th Mississippi Infantry regiments and the 7th Mississippi Infantry battalion. In addition, there were three four-gun batteries (one of which was added at French's request to increase his strength at Allatoona), all commanded by Major John D. Myrick. French put his entire force at 3,276 officers and men, exclusive of the borrowed battery.³⁸

For reasons unknown French did not leave Big Shanty until 3:00 p.m., three hours after receiving his orders.³⁹ After another delay at Acworth the Confederates would eventually reach Allatoona, but too late and with too little since Stewart moved back to rejoin Hood's main army instead of leading the attack with his entire command.⁴⁰ With 12 pieces of artillery the division arrived at Acworth about sunset, and was detained until 11:00 p.m. awaiting the arrival of rations.⁴¹ In the meantime, and unknown to French, Corse left Rome between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m. with reinforcements. After a delay of five hours at Acworth, French could hardly reach Allatoona in time to attack before Corse had been given adequate time to inspect the fortifications, to make disposition of his forces, and to plan his defense.

Since the Confederates knew nothing of the roads, the terrain about Allatoona or the Federal fortifications there, it was important to find

³⁶ On Cockrell, see *Appletons' Cyclopaedia of American Biography*, I, 673; *National Cyclopaedia of American Biography*, III, 277; *Who's Who in America* (1899-1900), p. 140.

³⁷ On Sears, see Karlem Riess, "Claudius Wistar Sears, Soldier and Educator," *Journal of Mississippi History*, XI (1949), 128-137; Heitman, *Historical Register*, I, 871.

³⁸ French, *Two Wars*, p. 244.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 225. French quoted from his diary under date of October 4: "... I left Big Shanty with my division at 3 p.m. for Acworth." W. P. Chambers (of Sears's brigade), in "My Journal," *Publications of the Mississippi Historical Society*, Centenary Series, V (1925), 339, wrote: "We remained in the vicinity of the depot at Big Shanty till about 1 o'clock P.M. when we moved in the direction of Acworth, which place we reached about dark." With more than 3,000 men strung out along the rough, narrow, country road, the division was apparently stretched all the way from Big Shanty to Acworth before sundown.

⁴⁰ Stewart was following orders which he knew had been written without the important intelligence he had acquired at Acworth—intelligence that might have justified a change in plans.

⁴¹ O.R., XXXIX, pt. 1, 815; French, *Two Wars*, p. 225. The writer was unable to determine the source of these rations or the immediate circumstances causing their delay in reaching French's troops.

a guide. An 18-year-old cavalryman named Thomas Moore, who had been raised in the vicinity of Allatoona, volunteered his services to French. He claimed to know the roads and to have seen the fortifications.⁴² From two young ladies who had visited in Allatoona that day, French obtained the name of the commander of the garrison and its probable strength. Captain James R. Taylor, of Colonel Richard A. Pinson's 1st Mississippi Cavalry, soon reported to French with 25 men. He was directed to send 15 men under a trusted officer to strike the railroad near the Etowah bridge and to take up rails and hide them so as to prevent trains from reaching Allatoona with reinforcements. He was also to prevent any trains that might be there from escaping.⁴³

The march was resumed at 11:00 p.m. over bad roads and in thick darkness. French had learned at Acworth of a strongly guarded blockhouse at the bridge over Allatoona Creek about halfway between Acworth and Allatoona. After crossing the creek he left Colonel Thomas N. Adaire with the 4th Mississippi and one piece of artillery near the blockhouse with orders to capture the garrison and destroy the bridge. This blockhouse was occupied by three companies of the 18th Wisconsin Infantry—four officers and eighty men—under command of a Captain McIntyre. Colonel Adaire demanded the surrender of the garrison and, when McIntyre refused, opened the attack at 1:00 a.m. The blockhouse defenders held out until after the Confederate withdrawal from Allatoona.⁴⁴

At 3:00 a.m. the Confederates finally arrived before Allatoona. They could see nothing but one or two twinkling lights on the opposite heights, and could hear nothing except the occasional interchange of shots between their advanced guard and the Federal pickets. The artillery was placed on the hills south and east of the railroad, a position recommended by the youthful guide.⁴⁵ The 39th North Carolina and 32d Texas were left as a supporting force under command of Colonel Julius A. Andrews. French then proceeded with the remainder of his

⁴² J. M. Brown, *The Battle of Allatoona* (Atlanta, 1890), p. 1.

⁴³ Brown, *The Battle of Allatoona*, p. 2. In his report French censured "the cavalry officer who was sent to cut the railroad and failed to perform that duty. . . . Had he taken up the rails—and there was nothing to prevent it—re-enforcements could not have been thrown in the works, and the result would have been different." *O.R.*, XXXIX, pt. 1, pp. 815, 819-820.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 815, 817-818. The route from Allatoona to New Hope Church did not require recrossing Allatoona Creek at this point.

⁴⁵ "The guide named an elevation, on which the house of ex-Gov. McDaniel's father was afterwards built and now [1890] stands, and there the guns were left . . . in a position to sweep through the deep railroad cut, and where [they] would be effective on the main forts." Brown, *The Battle of Allatoona*, p. 2. See also William Ludlow, "The Battle of Allatoona, October 5, 1864," in *War Papers Read before the Commandery of the State of Michigan* . . . (Detroit, 1893), I. 23. Hereafter cited as Ludlow, *War Papers*.

command to gain the heights crowned by the Federal works, but without roads or paths it was like the blind leading the blind. After crossing the railroad and floundering around in the dark for an hour, the graycoats wound up directly in front of the works, rather than on the main ridge. When a second effort to reach the ridge failed, French ordered a halt until daylight, at which time the march was resumed. Finally, by 7:30, the head of the column reached the high ground about 600 yards west of the fortifications, which were then seen for the first time by the Confederates.⁴⁶

These were two forts, or redoubts, on the high ridge—one on each side of the railroad cut. The stores were collected in warehouses at the base of the hill within the village of Allatoona, on the south side and east of the railroad. Tourtellotte was apprehensive that the Confederates would make a night attack and, to prevent surprise, he strengthened the guard at the warehouses and barricaded the roads to the south. He also made preparations to fire a building for the purpose of illuminating the village and warehouses so that his men could see, even in darkness, any approach of the enemy. In the event of a night attack, he hoped to hold the Confederates until daylight, when he would have full advantage of his superior position. His anxiety was, of course, relieved when John M. Corse arrived during the night with reinforcements.⁴⁷

The message that had set Corse in motion toward Allatoona reached him around noon on October 4, at about the same time Stewart handed Hood's orders to French.⁴⁸ A train was sent down from Kingston to move the relieving force to Allatoona but, as usual, there was railroad trouble. The twenty cars finally reached Rome about 7:00 p.m. and were loaded with a part of Colonel Richard Rowett's brigade and a small detachment of 12th Illinois Infantry. With 165,000 rounds of ammunition the troops started for Allatoona at 8:30 and arrived there at 1:00 on the morning of October 5.⁴⁹

This segment of Rowett's brigade consisted of eight companies each from the 39th Iowa and the 50th Illinois, nine companies from the 7th Illinois, and two companies of the 57th Illinois: a total of 1,100 officers and men. When unloaded at Allatoona, the train was sent back with orders to return with the rest of the brigade and as many other units as could be carried. More railroad trouble, however, delayed the ar-

⁴⁶ O.R., XXXIX, pt. 1, 815-816. This was not French's first trip to Allatoona. He came in from the north when Johnston's army fell back to Allatoona in May, 1864.

⁴⁷ O.R., XXXIX, pt. 1, 748. The firing of a building in or near the village would undoubtedly have been of equal value to French.

⁴⁸ Ludlow, *War Papers*, p. 14.

⁴⁹ O.R., XXXIX, pt. 1, 762.

rival of additional reinforcements until after the battle. Assuming command of the combined forces, and accompanied by Colonel Tourtellotte, General Corse inspected the ground and made such disposition of the troops as he thought necessary to hold the place until daylight. At this time he learned that the garrison consisted of the 4th Minnesota, the 93rd Illinois, seven companies of the 18th Wisconsin, and the 12th Wisconsin Battery of light artillery. There were also 15 men of the 5th Ohio Cavalry; in all, nearly 1,000 officers and men. The battery consisted of four Rodman rifled cannon (10-pounders), and two 12-pound brass howitzers, with the guns equally divided between the two forts. The entire Federal force, not counting the men in the blockhouse two miles to the southwest, now consisted of about 2,000 officers and men.⁵⁰

When the Confederate vanguard crossed Allatoona Creek and drove the Federal outposts back upon their reserves around 2:00 a.m., Tourtellotte sent word to Colonel Charles H. Jackson to deploy his 18th Wisconsin and to hold the enemy who were approaching on both the Acworth and Dallas roads. Before dawn, as Confederates pressed strongly from the South, he found it necessary to throw a battalion of the 7th Illinois out in support. The 4th Minnesota was placed in the fortifications on the east side of the railroad, five companies of the 93d Illinois in the fortifications on the west side, and another five companies were sent out to hold a commanding position on the road leading to Pumpkin Vine Creek. But Jackson soon found himself outflanked and retired into the fortifications under cover of a strong line of skirmishers.

By 6:00 a.m. the Federal dispositions were as follows: the 7th Illinois and 39th Iowa were in line of battle facing west, on a spur that covered the redoubt immediately on the hill over the cut, west of the railroad; the 93d Illinois had one battalion in reserve and the other in line of skirmishers moving along the ridge in a westerly direction feeling for the enemy who were endeavoring to push a force around the Union right flank; the 4th Minnesota, 12th and 50th Illinois were in the works on the hill east of the railroad cut; and the rest of the command were strung out on skirmish and outpost duty.⁵¹

French's dispositions for the assault were made by directing Sears's brigade to the north side (or rear) of the works, Cockrell's brigade

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 762-763. Corse placed the garrison at 890 and his relieving force at 1,054, a total of 1,944 men. French questioned these figures and advanced what appears to be sound reasoning for revising them upward to include officers and the artillerymen. He arrived at a garrison force of "about 1,000 officers and men" and a relieving force of "1,137 officers and men," to aggregate 2,137 troops. French, *Two Wars*, pp. 243-244.

⁵¹ O.R., XXXIX, pt. 1, 748-749, 763.

to rest with its center on the ridge, while Young's brigade was formed in rear of Cockrell. The plan was for Sears to commence the assault on the rear end, when musketry was heard, Cockrell was to move down the ridge—supported by Young—and carry the works by a flank attack. So rugged and abrupt were the hills that the troops could not be got into position until 9:00 a.m.⁵² In the meantime, the battle had opened at daylight when the Confederate artillery opened fire on the Federal forts.

After consultation with his brigade commanders, and still ignorant of Corse's arrival with reinforcements, French sent in a demand for surrender of the garrison.⁵³ A piece of cloth white enough to be recognized as a flag of truce could not be found until a Negro servant "produced a white handkerchief, bearing the name stenciled thereon, 'A. Coward,' which had belonged to a Colonel Coward."⁵⁴ The message was carried under this flag by French's adjutant, Major D. W. Sanders, accompanied by another staff officer, Lieutenant E. T. Freeman, and an escort of 16 men of the 29th North Carolina. They went in on the Cartersville road from the west and delivered the message to Lieutenant William C. Kinney of the 93d Illinois, who was on picket duty at a point on the advanced line. Major Sanders requested that the message be taken to the officer in command and, after waiting past the time allowed, "it appearing quite evident that no reply would be sent, the flag of truce was declared at an end."⁵⁵ Years later an officer of the 5th Missouri remembered that when the flag of truce returned one of the boys asked: "Is it surrender or fight, Major?" "Fight," was the laconic reply.⁵⁶

In his preliminary report written only two days after the battle, Corse referred to General French's summons to surrender. His second report quoted both messages in full, but failed to mention that his negative reply was not delivered to the Confederates.⁵⁷ Although the wording of both reports implied that the reply was delivered, neither then nor later did he or any other responsible writer claim to have seen

⁵² *Ibid.*, 813, 816. In both of his reports French wrote that his troops could not be got "in position until about 9 a.m.," but it may have been earlier.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 763. F. Y. Hedley, in *Marching Through Georgia* (Chicago, 1884), p. 221, added "8:15 A.M." to the date line but stated that the message came in "about eight o'clock."

⁵⁴ E. F. Noel, "Life and Services of David Ward Sanders," *Publications of the Mississippi Historical Society*, XI (1910), 335.

⁵⁵ D. W. Sanders, "Hood's Tennessee Campaign," *Southern Bivouac*, III (1884-1885), 149. See also Harvey M. Trimble, *History of the Ninety-third Regiment, Illinois Volunteer Infantry* (Chicago, 1898), p. 110. Hereafter cited as Trimble, 93rd Illinois.

⁵⁶ R. S. Bevier, *History of the First and Second Missouri Brigades, 1861-1865* (St. Louis, 1879), p. 244. Hereafter cited as Bevier, *Missouri Brigades*.

⁵⁷ O.R., XXXIX, pt. 1, 760, 763.

it placed in Confederate hands. On the other hand, no mention was made of any other disposition of the written message. At any rate, the so-called reply got into the records, despite the fact that neither Major Sanders nor General French ever saw it (except in printed versions and purported facsimiles).

In rehashing the subject nearly seventeen years later, French wrote to Sanders: "You returned to me without an answer, as you have stated in your article, and I never did receive any; yet history will record a reply that never was sent, because it reads very pretty."⁵⁸

When Major Sanders returned to General French, the order was immediately given for Cockrell's Missourians to advance on the right, with Young's Texans in support in the center. These forces were concentrated upon the ridge and its northern slope where there was but little room in which to deploy to either the right or the left because of the fallen timber and the narrowness of the ridge itself, which "hardly admitted of a company front."⁵⁹ With three companies of skirmishers thrown out in advance, the attacking force went up through the woods, passed over a tangle of abatis, and pressed forward under a severe and combined fire of artillery and musketry. "There for an hour, under this searching fire," French wrote, "they worked to make a way through the abatis."⁶⁰ After driving in the Federal skirmishers and cleaning out the secondary line of rifle-pits, the Confederates encountered the forces in the works near the fork of the Pumpkin Vine and Cartersville roads. Originally consisting of the 7th Illinois and 39th Iowa (about 600 officers and men under Colonel Richard Rowett), this line had been reinforced by a battalion of the 93d Illinois under Major James M. Fisher. Here the Confederates were temporarily checked until they could find means to extend their front, connect with Sears's brigade on their left, and outflank Rowett's entrenched line.⁶¹

On the south side no major offensive was undertaken by the Con-

⁵⁸ S.H.S.P., X (1882), 406. D. W. Sanders, in *Southern Bivouac*, III (1884-1885), 149, added: "The reply, as published in the Memoirs of General Sherman, was not sent, and it is a mistake to undertake to perpetuate it as a historical fact. General Corse, who was in command of the garrison, is alive [December, 1884], and it is safe to say, that he will not state that his reply was sent and delivered."

⁵⁹ French, *Two Wars*, p. 249.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 251.

⁶¹ Brown, *The Battle of Allatoona*, p. 7. Alonzo L. Brown, in *History of the Fourth Regiment of Minnesota Infantry Volunteers During the Great Rebellion 1861-1865* (St. Paul, 1892), pp. 308-309, showed these works to be only about 200 yards west of the fort. Work hereafter cited as Brown, *4th Minnesota*. Major Joseph M. Griffiths, 39th Iowa, correctly described the location as being "at the forks of a road 300 yards from the fort." *O.R.*, XXXIX, pt. 1, 785.



Maj. Gen. John M. Corse, a 31-year-old resident of Burlington, Iowa, directed the Federal defense of Allatoona Pass.

federate infantry. However, during the assault on the north and west, Colonel David Coleman of the 39th North Carolina took forty men and advanced as skirmishers through the woods on their right. Cheering and firing as they ran, they drove the Federal vanguard into the shelter of their works on the summit of the hill east of the railroad. From a position near the railroad, sheltered by it and the adjoining ground, this handful of North Carolina mountaineers maintained a constant fire on the enemy throughout the battle.⁶²

After refusing to surrender, Corse directed Rowett to hold the ridge west of the fort, and he ordered Tourtellotte to hold the east fort "to the last." He then took two companies of the 93d Illinois down a spur parallel to the railroad, and disposed them so as to hold the north side of the cut as long as possible. Three companies of this regiment, which had been driven in from the west end of the ridge, were distributed in the ditch on the south side of the fort. The remaining battalion of the 93d, under Major Fisher, lay between the west fort and Rowett's line (and, as previously noted, later moved up to reinforce Rowett). The action immediately following is graphically described by General Corse in his official report:

The storm broke in all its fury on the Thirty-ninth Iowa and Seventh Illinois. Young's brigade . . . had gained the west end of the ridge and moved with great impetuosity along its crest until they struck Rowett's command, where they received a severe check, but undaunted they came again and again. Rowett, reinforced by the Ninety-third Illinois and aided by the gallant [Lieutenant Colonel James] Redfield, encouraged me to hope we were all safe here, when I observed a brigade of the enemy, under command of General Sears, moving from the north, its left extending across the railroad. I rushed to the two companies of the Ninety-third Illinois, which were on the brink of the cut running north from the redoubt and parallel with the railroad, they having been re-enforced by the retreating pickets, and urged them to hold on to the spur, but it was of no avail. The enemy's line of battle swept us back like so much chaff and struck the Thirty-ninth Iowa in flank, and broke him so bad as to enable me to get a staff officer over the cut, with orders to bring the Fiftieth Illinois over to re-enforce Rowett, who had lost very heavily. However, before the regiment sent for could arrive, Sears and Young both rallied and made their assaults in front and on the flank with so much vigor and in such force as to break Rowett's line, and had not the Thirty-ninth Iowa fought with the desperation it did, I never would have been able to have brought a man back into the redoubt.⁶³

The spectacle of the Confederate charge was vividly described by

⁶² *Ibid.*, 821-822. Brown, *The Battle of Allatoona*, pp. 16, 18, pointed out that both the 39th North Carolina and the 32nd Texas were inactive except for this small detachment. The Federal skirmishers referred to were a part of the 18th Wisconsin.

⁶³ O.R., XXXIX, pt. 1, 764.

a member of the 93d Illinois Infantry: "Solid shot and shells, grape and canister from the double-shotted canon, and a hailstorm of bullets were rapidly and accurately poured into the ranks of the Confederates as they recklessly advanced. . . . And yet, notwithstanding their fearful losses at every step, they still advanced, faster and faster, until their whole force, west of the railroad cut, burst into an impetuous charge. The spectacle was sublime."⁶⁴

The bayonet was the principal weapon used by the Missourians as the Federals stood their ground.⁶⁵ The color bearer of the 2nd Missouri was shot down, but the fallen colors were immediately raised and planted upon the works. Then followed a desperate struggle for the flag of the 39th Iowa, while the Confederates seized the colors and the Federals clutched the staff. The flag was torn away in the *melee* and afterwards carried off by Sergeant John M. Ragland, who was duly promoted to the rank of lieutenant.⁶⁶ Captain Charles A. Cameron of the 39th Iowa reported: "The enemy . . . charging us on the double-quick passed the works, and turning upon our men in the rifle pits, killed, wounded, or made prisoner every man remaining but nine."⁶⁷

The 7th Illinois and the remnants of the 39th Iowa fell back into the fort. The 39th had gone into battle with 294 officers and men and sustained losses of 170, of whom 92 were killed or wounded. The 7th Illinois lost 141 officers and men out of a total of about 300.⁶⁸ A Union captain, speaking a quarter of a century later, felt that "such a sight probably was never before presented to the eye of heaven." Then, after saying there was no language in which to describe it, he proceeded to do so:

The trench was crowded with the dead, blue and homespun, Yank and Johnny, inextricably mingled in their last ditch. Our heroes, ordered to hold the place to the last, with supreme fidelity, had died at their posts. As the rebel line ran over them, they struck up with their bayonets as the foe struck down, and rolling together in the embrace of death, we found them in some cases mutually transfixed.⁶⁹

The 12th and 50th Illinois and three companies of the 18th Wiscon-

⁶⁴ Trimble, *93rd Illinois*, p. 113.

⁶⁵ Both Northern and Southern writers referred to the use of bayonets and clubbed muskets here. However, Colonel Abram Harris, 14th Texas, said his regiment used "the butts of our guns and rocks, as we did not have any bayonets." *O.R.*, XXXIX, pt. 1, 823.

⁶⁶ Bevier, *Missouri Brigades*, p. 245.

⁶⁷ *O.R.*, XXXIX, pt. 1, 787. Major J. M. Griffiths, 39th Iowa, reported that the Confederates made two unsuccessful charges before overrunning the Federal line on the third. *Ibid.*, 785.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 764, 766. The report of Lieutenant Colonel Hector Perrin in *ibid.*, 777-778, placed the 7th Illinois at 291 muskets and 8 musicians, but does not mention officers.

⁶⁹ Ludlow, *War Papers*, pp. 35-36.

sin had come over a high and crude foot-bridge from the east side of the railroad in response to Corse's request to Tourtellotte for help. Except for a few men in and around the warehouses, only the 4th Minnesota and four companies of the 18th Wisconsin remained on the east side of the railroad. By 11:00 a.m. the Union forces on the west side were concentrated behind the walls of the fort and in the trenches around its base.

The Confederates were now forming a solid column not more than a hundred yards west of the fort, preparatory to launching a frontal attack. A 10-pounder, "double-shotted with grape and canister," was about to be fired from the fort when an officer sprang to the lanyard, caught and held it. Major Fisher, with his battalion of 93d Illinois, suddenly appeared immediately in front of the gun, on their way back from the outer line. The firing of the gun was delayed while men standing in the embrasure over the cannon and on the parapet, aided by others in the trench, literally pulled and pushed them into the fort. To the Union men who held their fire in the face of the Confederate advance, every minute seemed an eternity of waiting. Those near the embrasure, in shouts that rose above the din of battle, urged those in front of the gun to clear the way. Except for the Confederate formation on the Cartersville road, the world seemed to stand still. Suddenly, the canon-charge struck at the feet of the front rank, cutting a broad swath from the front to the rear of the Confederate column. The road was red with blood and covered with the dead, the dying, and the wounded. The two sides of the column melted into the head of the ravine on one side and down the slope of the ridge on the other.⁷⁰

In the meantime, and after some delay, Sears had succeeded in getting his Mississippians in position with the 35th and 39th regiments on the east side of the railroad and the 36th and 46th regiments and 7th battalion on the west, all facing south. Although he was successful in striking the right flank of the 39th Iowa, that portion of his line immediately west of the railroad was subjected to the fire from the ditch in front of the fort, and to an enfilading fire from the works on the opposite side of the cut. It was even worse on the east side where, after driving in Tourtellotte's skirmishers, the Confederates had to climb a steep ridge under the galling fire of nearly 800 men. One of the 10-pounder Rodmans was pulled forward by hand from the fort and, from an advanced and exposed position, nine Wisconsin cannoneers served the piece until all were cut down.⁷¹ Small detachments of both the 35th and 39th Mississippi pushed forward to a deep

⁷⁰ Trimble, *93rd Illinois*, pp. 114-115.

⁷¹ Brown, *4th Minnesota*, pp. 312, 314.

gulch near the railroad, where they soon found themselves entrapped. They were unable to climb the steep bluff in their front, wrote one participant, yet, "to retreat would have been sure death to most of them. Hence, they remained there and surrendered at the end of the battle."⁷² It was here that the colors of both regiments were captured, along with 80 officers and men. Tourtellotte was probably correct in claiming that Sears's line never extended beyond the road running down the hill to the north between the railroad and the east fort, although small squads may have advanced further. Tourtellotte wrote later that this detachment of Confederates was caught in a fire from three sides.⁷³

According to Tourtellotte's evaluation of the Union position, the eastern fort was the key to the defense, since it dominated the western fort and enfiladed the entrenchments extending from the east fort to the railroad. This appraisal was supported by Corse, who stated: "Not only did they repulse the assaults made upon them, but rendered me valuable aid in protecting my north front from the repeated attacks made by Sears's brigade."⁷⁴

When the last of the Federal forces on the west side had taken refuge in the fort, the embrasures were closed again with cotton bales. Inside, every available spot from which a gun could be fired was occupied. For four hours, beginning at 11:00 a.m., "every Union soldier was his own commander. . . . There was not even a lull in the musketry firing from the beginning to the end of it." By noon the Confederates had made at least four separate charges on the fort from the west. Each time, as they came up within a hundred yards, "the Union forces in the fort and rifle-pits rose up and poured a sheet of flame and lead, and grape and canister from double-shotted cannon, full into their faces."⁷⁵ Again and again, with their lines riddled and their columns broken, the graycoats returned to the protection of the ravine. Corse reported that the 12th Wisconsin Artillery "was so ably managed and so gallantly fought as to render it impossible for a column to live within 100 yards of the works."⁷⁶ He then added a rather amazing statement: "Officers labored constantly to stimulate the men to exertion, and most all that were killed or wounded in the fort met this fate while trying to get the men to expose themselves above the parapet, and nobly setting them the example."⁷⁷ When the artillery ammunition became exhausted, Private Edwin R. Fullington, a member of the

⁷² Trimble, *93rd Illinois*, p. 117.

⁷³ Salter, *Annals of Iowa* (Third Series), II (1895-1896), 286, 288.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 285; *O.R.*, XXXIX, pt. 1, 765.

⁷⁵ Trimble, *93rd Illinois*, p. 116.

⁷⁶ *O.R.*, XXXIX, pt. 1, 765.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

battery, crossed the footbridge to the east side three times in succession and brought ammunition for the guns.⁷⁸

After classifying the fort "as bloody as a slaughter pen," William Ludlow wrote in 1891: "It is true that there were men in that Redoubt ready to surrender or to do anything else in order to get out of it alive. Happily these were few, and most of them lay prone, close under the parapet, 'playing dead,' with the combatants and wounded standing and sitting upon them."⁷⁹ About 1:00 p.m. General Corse was knocked out for some thirty or forty minutes when a spent rifle ball struck him in the face, but he soon was back in action. Again he urged his officers and men to renewed exertion assuring them that Sherman was on the way with reinforcements.⁸⁰

After noon no further all-out assault was attempted on either fort, but the Confederates continued to maintain the battle from every house and hillside in the area. Even stumps had men behind them, and, wrote one bluecoat, "from a distance not exceeding one hundred yards on the west side, and not much greater on the north and south sides, they kept the air, over the forts and rifle pits, literally full of bullets all the time."⁸¹

During the battle Tourtellotte kept a wary eye on the store houses, guarded by sharpshooters from overlooking rifle-pits. Confederate infantry did not attack in force on that side, partly because the ground was open and partly because of their own artillery on the hill to the south. According to Tourtellotte, "small parties of the enemy dashed across the dirt road . . . towards the store-houses but they died on the way, and none of them ever reached the store-houses."⁸² On the other hand, French claimed that the depot of stores was in his possession, "and would have been destroyed during the fight, had it been deemed desirable to have done so then; but no one doubted the place would be taken." He explained that, when leaving, he directed that they be burned, but only three matches could be found and not one of them would ignite.⁸³ J. M. Brown wrote that after the Federal fire was silenced the depots of stores were in Confederate possession and could "without doubt" have been destroyed, but the order was not given because French did not know of their existence until after he had withdrawn his forces from the Allatoona front.⁸⁴ Why the warehouses were not destroyed is not known. Time was rapidly running

⁷⁸ Brown, *4th Minnesota*, pp. 311-312.

⁷⁹ Ludlow, *War Papers*, pp. 32-33.

⁸⁰ O.R., XXXIX, pt. 1, 765.

⁸¹ Trimble, *93rd Illinois*, pp. 117-118.

⁸² Salter, *Annals of Iowa* (Third Series), II (1895-1896), 284-285.

⁸³ *Annals of the Army of Tennessee*, I (1878), 315-316.

⁸⁴ Brown, *The Battle of Allatoona*, p. 7.

out, and French apparently did not give the matter his personal and conclusive attention.

In his second official report, dated November 5, French expounded at length on the reasons for his failure to make "the final attack" and "force a surrender." During the morning he had received two notes from General Armstrong, warning him of the movements of the enemy—both infantry and cavalry—who were rapidly advancing northward toward Acworth with the obvious intention of cutting off the Confederate retreat from Allatoona. "Here, then," wrote French, "was Sherman's whole army close behind me and the advance of his infantry moving on Acworth, which changed the whole condition of affairs." It would take two hours for his men to bring up ammunition from wagons a mile away and distribute it before the final assault could be made. The enemy was already dangerously near the road over which his division was to march to New Hope. Seeing no way to overcome these difficulties, he decided to withdraw, "however depressing the idea of not capturing the place after so many had fallen, and when in all probability we could force a surrender before night." Because of the dense woods and rugged terrain, litters could not be used to carry the wounded to the road where the ambulances waited. Those that had to be left were carried to the springs near the ridge, where surgeons saw to their wounds. The Confederate troops were then reformed and at 3:30 commenced the move toward New Hope. Colonel Andrews remained in position on the south front until 5:00 p.m., when he moved in on the rear of the division. Colonel Adaire had burned the railroad bridge over Allatoona Creek, but had not succeeded in destroying the blockhouse or in capturing its garrison. This was accomplished under an increased artillery fire. With this Federal surrender the Battle of Allatoona ended.⁸⁵

Casualties were high on both sides, but cannot be accurately stated; even the official reports give conflicting figures. Three days after the battle French reported 122 killed, 443 wounded, and 234 missing for a total of 799. He repeated these figures without revision in his second report, written a month after the fight. Corse, however, reported on October 27 the burial of 231 "rebel dead" and the capture of 411 prisoners. In the same report he gave his own losses as 142 killed, 352 wounded and 212 missing, a total of 706.⁸⁶

French was painfully aware of his failure. Although virtually whipped to a standstill, the Federals were still ensconced behind the

⁸⁵ *O.R.*, XXXIX, pt. 1, 817-818.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 766, 813, 818. Brown, in *4th Minnesota*, p. 323, wrote: "We kept finding dead rebels in the woods until October 22d., on which date we buried the last one."

walls of their forts. The supplies at Allatoona, the railroad north, and the Etowah bridge, were all intact. While Stewart rested with his other two divisions at New Hope following a leisurely march from Acworth, French's riddled and exhausted brigades sloshed along through rain and mud in the darkness to rejoin them.

Much has been written both in criticism and in justification of French's early withdrawal from Allatoona. Was the danger to his isolated command real or imaginary? Armstrong's orders were to keep French advised of any movement of the enemy that might endanger the safety of his command, and he did his best to carry out the assignment. Perhaps his scouts saw the Federal cavalry of General Kenner Garrard, advancing in the general direction of Allatoona. At any rate, Garrard took credit for the Confederate about-face by stating: "It was afterward ascertained from the rebels that the action of the division on this day [October 5] caused the enemy to fall back from Allatoona."⁸⁷ Sherman's unsupported but oft-repeated version, written three months later, may reflect for him a rare lapse of memory: "I directed the Twenty-third Corps, Brigadier-General [Jacob] Cox commanding, to move rapidly from the base of Kenesaw, due west, aiming to reach the road from Allatoona to Dallas, threatening the rear of the forces attacking Allatoona."⁸⁸

General Cox, however, disclaimed for his command the credit for causing the Confederate withdrawal. He wrote that "on October 5th, the Twenty-third Corps was marching from Pace's Ferry to Marietta," and he quoted from Sherman's Special Field Orders No. 85 to show that he was ordered out on the Burnt Hickory road toward Allatoona on the 6th—not on the 5th.⁸⁹

Had French brought up a fresh supply of ammunition and renewed the attack during the afternoon, he might have taken the forts, burned the warehouses, and made prisoners (at least temporarily) of Corse and his entire command. But what then? Could he have rejoined Stewart and Hood's army before being cut off? He might have, with luck. Yet it is fair to say that on the basis of the information received from Armstrong, he would have been foolhardy to risk the loss of his command in such a way.⁹⁰

⁸⁷ O.R., XXXIX, pt. 3, 726.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, pt. 1, 581. On October 7 Sherman wrote: "This army, though unseen to the garrison, was co-operating by moving toward the road by which the enemy could alone escape, but unfortunately was delayed by the rain and mud, but this fact hastened the retreat of the enemy." *Ibid.*, 772.

⁸⁹ Jacob D. Cox, *Atlanta* (New York, 1882), pp. 231, 254.

⁹⁰ T. R. Hay went so far as to state that "French, in order to avoid certain capture was compelled to cease his attacks and withdraw." *Hood's Tennessee Campaign* (New York, 1929), p. 44.

Partisan writers of the North, in stories published before the turn of the century, nearly all assumed that the rations at Allatoona were essential to a successful "march to the sea." Alonzo L. Brown, wrote later that Sherman "probably saw the error he had made in leaving the supplies for his army so poorly defended, for if the rebels should capture them his great campaign might come to a disastrous termination."⁹¹ Harvey M. Trimble, a member of the 93rd Illinois, added: "If the enemy should capture or destroy all these rations and cattle, the great Atlanta campaign might even yet result disastrously. And more than that, the campaign across Georgia, the 'March to the Sea' might never be executed and its great results achieved."⁹² John Q. Adams, Federal Signal Officer at Allatoona, showed rare restraint for a Union eyewitness when he said, "One is not justified in saying such results [the loss of Allatoona] would have prevented the march to the sea, and no one can prophesy to what extent future plans and movements would have been interfered with." Even Adams, however, could not refrain from adding that "the 'fort' was held, everything was saved [and] the march to the sea came off on time."⁹³

Brevet Major George W. Nichols, writing in 1865, referred to the battle as "a contest of vast importance, though it has not been as prominently before the public as other battles of smaller consequence," and then went so far as to say that it "was the decisive point of the campaign in pursuit of Hood."⁹⁴ J. Willard Brown, in his history of the United States Signal Corps, referred to a speech made by General Corse in 1893 and attributed to him what must stand as the greatest exaggeration of all: "Then occurred the dramatic incident,—the sending of the fateful words over the heads of the hostile host from Kennesaw to Allatoona. This act, Gen. Corse said, contributed more to the final termination of the struggle between the North and the South than any other thing."⁹⁵

Partisan writers of the South had little to say on the battle. General French, as may be expected, was not silent on this point, and stated with emphasis that "the one million rations of bread in Allatoona were not a factor in Sherman's march to Savannah. . . . On the march

⁹¹ Brown, *4th Minnesota*, p. 306.

⁹² Trimble, *93rd Illinois*, p. 101. In addition to the million or more rations stored at Allatoona, 9,000 head of cattle were being held by the Federals across the Etowah River, five miles north.

⁹³ "Hold the Fort!" *War Sketches and Incidents as Related by the Companions of the Iowa Commandery, Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States* (Des Moines, 1898), p. 172.

⁹⁴ G. W. Nichols, *The Story of the Great March, from the Diary of a Staff Officer* (New York, 1865), pp. 29-30.

⁹⁵ J. Willard Brown, *The Signal Corps, U.S.A., in the War of the Rebellion* (Boston, 1896), p. 194.

the most difficult problem Sherman had to solve was *what to do with his super-abundant rations*.⁹⁶ Although General Hood acknowledged that "our soldiers fought with great courage," neither in his official reports nor in his memoirs did he say anything favorable on French's behalf. On the contrary, he wrote that Corse won his "admiration by his gallant resistance, and not without reason the Federal commander complimented this officer, through a general order, for his handsome conduct in the defence of Allatoona."⁹⁷

General Ulysses S. Grant had not yet endorsed Sherman's unorthodox proposal to abandon his line of supply, march away from Hood's army, and "make Georgia howl" all the way to the coast. Not until November 2 did he give his blessing to the operation that would make the Federal supply line no longer necessary. By that time Hood was far from Atlanta and Sherman had convinced Grant that it would be useless to follow him. Furthermore, he stated, General George H. Thomas could handle him. In the meantime, however, it was important that the railroad be kept open to the north. A Confederate victory at Allatoona might well have forced Sherman into a pursuit of Hood, in lieu of a leisurely march to the coast. Here, then, may rest the appraisal of Allatoona's importance; not for the supplies stored there, but for the effect its loss would have had on Grant's consideration of Sherman's pet project.⁹⁸

Philip Paul Bliss, an evangelistic singer associated with Dwight L. Moody and Ira D. Sankey, was inspired by these events to write the gospel hymn, "Hold the Fort." General French, in his autobiography, referred to the song as being sung "wherever the cross is seen and Christianity prevails." without notice of the fact that he (French) is portrayed in the second verse as "Satan leading on."⁹⁹ The first line of the chorus, "'Hold the fort, for I am coming,'" attributed to Jesus in the story-line of the song, has been often quoted as Sherman's message to Corse. Yet the words are a paraphrasing of two reassuring messages sent from the Kennesaw Mountain to Allatoona on October 4. When General Sherman first heard of the song, he wrote his informant: "I do not think I used the words—'Hold the Fort'; that however was the duty of the garrison and they did it nobly—manfully."¹⁰⁰

⁹⁶ French, *Two Wars*, p. 276.

⁹⁷ Hood, *Advance and Retreat*, p. 257.

⁹⁸ Lloyd Lewis, in *Sherman, Fighting Prophet* (New York, 1932), p. 426, wrote that "the moral effect of Allatoona's loss would strengthen Grant's argument that he should forget the seaward march and devote himself wholly to Hood." Viewed in this light, the fall of Allatoona might have changed the immediate course of the war—if not its final outcome.

⁹⁹ French, *Two Wars*, p. 262.

¹⁰⁰ W. T. Sherman to William E. Dodge, June 22, 1875, MS. in possession of the writer.

THE CONTINUING WAR

by James I. Robertson, Jr.

AS THE CENTENNIAL YEARS draw near, an increasing amount of work in Civil War history is being done in the field of regional studies. Robert H. Jones of Kent State University has contracted with Oklahoma for a volume to be entitled *The Civil War in the Northwest*. The Historical Society of Delaware plans to publish shortly Harold B. Hancock's doctoral dissertation, "The Political History of Delaware during the Civil War." This month the Ohioana Library in Columbus will release a 1961 calendar yearbook under the heading *Ohio in the Civil War*. Full-page illustrations will accompany short treatises on such well-known Buckeyes as Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, McPherson, the Fighting McCooks, and Vandalia. The 128-page book will sell for \$1.50.

Tentatively scheduled for fall publication by the University of South Carolina Press is a history of wartime Augusta, Georgia. The author, Mrs. Florence Fleming Corley, is a recent M.A. graduate of Emory University. Laurels for the best local work to date must go to the dynamic Virginia Civil War Commission for *A Register of Military Events in Virginia, 1861-1865*. Compiled by N. E. Warriner, this 79-page handbook provides rapid reference to each of the several hundred engagements fought in the Old Dominion. The list is broken down by years and arranged alphabetically by city and county. As a further aid for students, after each entry are page citations in the *Official Records* for that particular skirmish or battle. This valuable work is priced at only one dollar and may be purchased by mail from the Commission at 914 Capitol Street, Richmond, 19. The Commission also will shortly publish an illustrated tour book to facilitate visits by buffs to the many battlefields within Virginia.

Charles L. Dufour, whose biography of Roberdeau Wheat (*Gentle Tiger*) recounted the short but courageous career of a gallant Louisianian, has completed a new book on the 1862 New Orleans campaign. . . . Col. Harold Simpson, the affable founder of the Waco CWRT, has begun work on a history of Hood's Texas Brigade. . . . On the heels of Oklahoma's recent and impressive release, *The Singing Six-*

ties, Columbia University Press has issued Irwin Silber's *Songs of the Civil War*. The scores, histories, and lyrics of more than 125 wartime favorites are included. For audio history, RCA Victor has pressed a new Bluebird album entitled "Stories and Songs of the Civil War." The noted actor Ralph Bellamy is narrator in this unique package.

A well-known Iowa publishing house is seriously investigating the feasibility of reissuing *Harper's Weekly* and *Frank Leslie's Illustrated Weekly* for the entire war years. Subscriptions would be sold only on an annual basis. An explanatory sheet by some well-known historian would accompany each issue. . . . Philip Van Doren Stern is laboring diligently on three forthcoming books—all to be published by Doubleday. Two are pictorial studies of Lee and the Confederate navy; the third is a volume on naval warfare which Mr. Stern states will in no way conflict with the work already underway by V. C. Jones in the same field. Mr. Jones is currently writing the second of three proposed volumes. . . . Copies of J. T. Dorris' popular and intriguing study, *Pardon and Amnesty under Lincoln and Johnson*, may still be obtained from the author at Eastern Kentucky State College, Richmond, Ky.

The Third Annual Civil War Conference will be held at Gettysburg College in November. Norman A. Graebner is general chairman of this year's meeting, the theme of which will be "Politics in a Dividing Nation: 1860." Professors Donald Fehrenbacher, Kenneth P. Stampp, Robert Johannsen, and Avery Craven will present papers, and the University of Illinois Press plans to publish the addresses in a single volume.

McCowat-Mercer Press will soon issue a new edition of Robert Selph Henry's "*First with the Most*" *Forrest*, which Dr. Henry considers the best of all his many and noted works. . . . Dr. Raymond E. Myers, Dean of the University of Louisville's Dental School, has completed his research for a biography of General Felix Zollicoffer, the first Confederate officer of note to be killed in the Western theater. . . . David Sparks of the University of Maryland has finished his eagerly awaited biography of Henry W. Halleck. . . . To answer the growing public demand, Houghton Mifflin may republish the Ben Ames Williams edition of Mary Chesnut's *A Diary from Dixie*. Available copies of the present edition are going like hotcakes at a late breakfast. . . .

Indiana's October releases in the Civil War Centennial Series will be a new edition of James Longstreet's *From Manassas to Appomattox*, prepared by this writer, and Jubal Early's equally provocative *Autobiographical Sketch*, edited by Frank E. Vandiver. . . . Under the auspices of The Eugene F. Saxton Memorial Trust, Kendall E. Bailes

has taken a year's leave from Dartmouth to complete his biography of James Lane. This Kansas politician and general has long been in need of intensive study and evaluation. . . . W. Y. Thompson has been on leave from Louisiana Polytechnic Institute in quest of data for a proposed biography of Georgia's fiery Robert Toombs. . . . Also spending the summer in research was Sidney J. Romero of Northeast Louisiana College. Dr. Romero's interest is the Confederate chaplaincy.

The Connecticut State Library is distributing a unique pamphlet, *Lincoln in Hartford*, by J. Doyle DeWitt, a member of the Connecticut Civil War Centennial Commission. Well-illustrated and nicely written, the work treats of Lincoln's activities during a visit to Hartford in 1859—for reasons far from political. Lincolmites may secure copies by contacting Mrs. Hilma L. Talcott, Technical Processes Division, Connecticut State Library, Hartford 15.

One of Putnam's late spring releases was *The Haskell Memoirs: The Personal Narrative of a Confederate Officer*. These unusual reminiscences by a South Carolina colonel have long been quoted for the negative approach to Jackson's famous nickname, and this edition marks the first time that they have been transferred from typescript into print. The University of Chattanooga team of Gilbert E. Govan and James Livingood edited and annotated these stimulating reflections. . . . The University of Texas Press will shortly publish the war diary of Benjamin F. McIntyre of the 19th Iowa Infantry. First a sergeant and then a lieutenant, McIntyre served in the Western armies and possessed a keen and observing eye. Miss Nannie M. Tilley, now historian for the R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, has added introduction and notes to the journal. (Miss Tilley will shortly contribute an article to this journal on the effect of civil war on the tobacco trade.)

Last month Doubleday released *My Father, General Lee*, a new edition of the widely-used *Recollections and Letters of R. E. Lee*. . . . Scribner's has tabbed for fall publication a one-volume edition of Carl Shurz's three-volume autobiography. Allan Nevins has written an introduction for the reissue; Wayne Andrews did the condensation. . . . The entire April, 1960, issue of the *Iowa Journal of History* contains the war letters of Dr. Seneca B. Thrall, Surgeon of the 13th Iowa Infantry. Dr. Thrall saw action in the campaigns of Corinth, Vicksburg, and Atlanta. His letters are as much regimental summaries as they are personal feelings, and his observations are far from the usual run-of-the-mill soldiers' correspondence. Copies of this number (75 cents each) may be ordered from the State Historical Society of Iowa in Iowa City.

Family collections of Civil War tales and witticisms seem to be

gaining in popularity. Following the humorous monologue by J. Bryan, III, *The Sword and I*, a McGraw-Hill spring release, the University of Chicago Press has published Louis Brownlow's *The Anatomy of the Anecdote*. An Ozarks native and newspaperman, Mr. Brownlow has collected a volume full of unrelated stories and linked them together with a running and witty narrative.

In the field of fiction, two new works make fall appearances. Doubleday has issued a new novel by Noel B. Gerson: *The Yankee from Tennessee*, which is a study of Andrew Johnson in fictional trappings. Janet Stevenson's new work, *The Ardent Years*, a Viking release, recounts with imagination the eighteen years that Fanny Kemble spent in America before the outbreak of war. Students of the period will remember Miss Kemble as the author of *A Journal of Plantation Life*.

Civil War works are appearing in increasing regularity in paperback form. Putnam has issued Wood and Edmond's *Military History of the Civil War* in its Capricorn series. Book Sales, Inc., of New York, has published a four-volume *Southern History of the Civil War*, which, in reality, is a reprint edition of the four wartime histories written by famous Richmond newspaper editor, Edward A. Pollard. Three new paperbacks in Doubleday's Dolphin Books series treat at least in part on the war. One is Bruce Catton's *Mr. Lincoln's Army*; another is *Battles That Changed History*, by the late Fletcher Pratt; and the third is the unforgettable propagandistic tract by Harriet Beecher Stowe, *Uncle Tom's Cabin*.

Looking for gifts for the younger generations? If so, the following new releases in children's books would make appropriate and meaningful gifts: L. Y. de Grummond and Lynn De G. Delanne, *Jeff Davis: Confederate Boy* (Bobbs-Merrill); Christopher Webb, *Mark Toyman's Inheritance* (Funk & Wagnalls); H. J. Heagney, *Chaplain in Gray: Abram Ryan* (Kenedy); Henry S. Commager, *The Great Emancipation* (Bobbs-Merrill); Jacqueline M. McNicol, *Elizabeth for Lincoln* (Longmans); T. N. Dupuy, *The First Book of Civil War Land Battles* (Franklin Watts); Natalia B. Belting, *Indy and Mr. Lincoln* (Holt); and Manly Wade Wellman, *Final Adventures of the Iron Scouts* (Ives Washburn).

Richard Harwell has finished notes and introduction for a new edition of J. D. Billings' *Hard Tack and Coffee* that will be this year's Lakeside Classic. Longmans, who published Mr. Harwell's well-received *The Union Reader* and *The Confederate Reader*, will issue a one-volume edition of these two works under the title *The War They Fought*. . . Dr. Bob Womack of Middle Tennessee State College has completed an interesting manuscript on the soldiers of the Army of Tennessee. . . The Pioneer Press of Little Rock is completing produc-

tion work on a folio volume of the forty Kurz and Allison prints of Civil War battles. On the back of each full-size print will be a narrative of the engagement in question written by one of several historians who are assisting with the project.

Number 5 of the "Houghton Mifflin Research Series" is *Richmond in Time of War*, by William J. Kimball of Mary Baldwin College. The author, using over two hundred documents and books, has broken down life in the capital by individual years. The result is a valuable study rich in bibliography as well as narrative. . . . The Valley Register of Middletown, Md., has recently published a study of the Sharpsburg Campaign, *September Echoes*, by John W. Schlidt. Copies (\$3.00 each) may be ordered from the printer. . . . In November Knopf will release *Walt Whitman's Civil War*, a collection of the noted poet's writings on the war period.

Tulane's Charles P. Roland has written a political and economic history of the C.S.A. which Chicago released this month as a volume in its "The Chicago History of American Civilization" series, *The Confederacy* is the title. . . . Allan Nevins' second volume on *The War for the Union* is in production by Scribner's. . . . Because of continued sales, Bobbs-Merrill has found it necessary to print a third edition of Henry Steele Commager's volume, *The Blue and the Gray*. . . . Next month Simon and Schuster will issue a documentary history by Earl Schenck Miers and Paul M. Angle under the heading *Tragic Years: 1861-1865*.

For a volume of the unusual events of the war period, read Burke Davis' newest contribution, *The Incredible Civil War*, which Rinehart has tentatively scheduled for October publication. . . . The first volume of V. C. Jones's trilogy, *The Civil War at Sea*, will be issued by Holt in November. . . . Next month Hawthorn Books will publish *The Compact History of the Civil War* by R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy. Line drawings and maps supplement this over-all look at the political events and military campaigns.

What will undoubtedly become a major contribution to American biography makes its appearance this fall in the form of David Donald's *Charles Sumner and the Coming of the Civil War*, a Knopf release. Dr. Donald, now at Princeton, is at work on a second volume that will carry the career of the fiery Massachusetts senator through Reconstruction days. . . . Frank E. Vandiver has followed his well-received *Mighty Stonewall* with a new book for McGraw-Hill *Juba's Raid*. This is an account of the 1864 campaign by Early on Washington.

Oxford is devoting major advertising to Hirst D. Milhollen's new pictorial, *Horsemen Blue and Gray*, slated for release within two

months. Over 275 drawings and illustrations relative to cavalry operations have been incorporated. . . . Doubleday will issue the eagerly awaited *American Heritage Picture Book of the Civil War*. Bruce Catton compiled what should be one of the year's best-sellers. . . . Another pictorial on the way is the *Centennial Album of the Civil War*, a Yoseloff publication edited by Marvin H. Pakula. This work of 100 portraits and 20 color plates will be on book shelves next month.

Lincoln for the Ages, edited by Ralph Newman, is scheduled for October release by Doubleday. . . . Harvard University Press has just issued Willard L. King's *Lincoln's Manager, David Davis*. This biography treats of the man credited not only with obtaining the Republican nomination for the Illinois attorney in 1860 but also for instilling in Lincoln many of his views on slavery.

A new novel by Frances Parkinson Keyes, *The Chess Players*, is set in wartime New Orleans. Farrar will publish the work in November. . . . Dodd, Mead has just issued a fictional story by Loula Grace Erdman entitled *Many a Voyage*. Spanning both the war and postwar periods, this novel centers around Fanny Ross, wife of the Kansas senator whose vote thwarted the impeachment of Andrew Johnson.

NOTES AND QUERIES

Edited by Boyd B. Stutler

517 Main Street

Charleston, West Virginia

THIS DEPARTMENT IS DESIGNED as an open forum for researchers into Civil War themes and for readers of *Civil War History* in general. It is open for questions on and discussions of phases of the Great Conflict and its personnel. Also, we welcome notes on newly discovered, little known, or other sidelights of the war. Contributions are invited: address Notes and Queries Editor.

QUERIES

No. 68—What Do You Know about General George Pickett?

The life of George Pickett is one of the many inexplicable oddities that came out of the Civil War. Mention that great American conflict to a man in the street and his first reaction is likely to be *Gettysburg*. Ask him then what first comes to his mind about Gettysburg and he will probably answer, *Pickett's Charge*. Go a step further and inquire what he knows about Pickett, the person, and you will draw a blank stare.

How is it that the man is almost unknown whose name is intimately linked with the most famous charge of the most famous battle of the most dramatic conflict ever fought on this continent? Dr. Douglas Freeman could only say, evasively, "He was a good soldier." Other historians have treated him with disdain, some with calumny; most handle him with the cautious kindness deserved by an unresearched subject. For one who has spent nine years collecting scraps of information with which to piece together a biography of this man, there is unlimited frustration and precious little to go on.

What we do know about George Pickett can be sketched in broad strokes: Born into the yeoman class amidst the dying splendor of James River plantations, he received a gentleman's upbringing. He attended West Point, graduating anchor-man in the class of 1846, and immediately plunged into the gallant activities that brevetted him

Captain during the Mexican War. Thereafter he served unhappily on the dust-dry, boring Texas frontier for some nine years without further promotion. Then he was transferred to the Ninth Infantry and shipped off to the Pacific Northwest; while there he achieved a measure of elusive, personal glory by supposedly standing off a British fleet with a platoon of regulars in the generally misunderstood San Juan affair. In 1861 he resigned to return to Virginia and the Confederate States.

As a brigadier, he was seriously wounded at Gaines' Mill, but he returned the following October as major general, commanding what was considered to be the finest division in the Army of Northern Virginia—Pickett's Division; however, it was relatively untried in battle. At Gettysburg he firmly grasped what fate could have made the grandest of all possible opportunities for everlasting renown, and came out of it not only with a shattered division but also with near disastrous ruin to his military and personal reputation. Why this happened no one knew better than George Pickett.

After this highwater mark for himself and the Confederacy, Pickett rode steadily downhill. He was passed over for succession to Longstreet's stars, and was present but hardly accounted for at the final denouement at Five Forks. Having been the central figure at the height and depth of Confederate military fortunes, he faded from the scene, a broken man.

This is the skeleton of his story and it sounds uninspiring—but with the flesh of astounding detail added to the bones, his life was exciting, fulsome, and highly adventurous. The mystery lies in why there is so very little documentary evidence of his life and activities. To be sure he pops in and out of the *Official Records*; two books have been written about him (both unfortunately by his overly romantic wife), and the writer has collected transcribed copies of some 200 pieces of his correspondence, all of which is routine, and none of which is particularly revealing. His grandsons have assisted mightily in the search for more bits of information, but to little avail.

A part of the answer to this abnormal void lies in the word *fire*. In 1864 his ancestral home was demolished—a deed attributed to a spiteful Ben Butler. Phil Sheridan's men managed to burn his headquarters wagon at Five Forks. Soon after the war ended he lost almost everything he owned when the Spottswood Hotel in Richmond burned down. Finally his wife, the ingenuous LaSalle Corbell Pickett, says she labored for thirteen years preparing a biography of his interesting life, only to have her manuscript and source materials burned up in a fire in Washington, D.C.

Is it logical to ask: If all this happened with such utter finality, why pursue the matter further? However, there are two excellent reasons: One is that as late as 1925, his grandsons remember, Mrs. Pickett still possessed a trunkful of the General's papers, all of which she freely gave away in small lots to friends *and total strangers*. There is, of course, no record as to who they were. Another, and perhaps even more important reason, is that she insisted that she possessed a copy of Pickett's battle report to General Lee following the debacle at Gettysburg. In it he undoubtedly put his finger all too closely on what actually went wrong on that unhappy July 3—and that is unquestionably why Lee asked him to destroy it *for the sake of the morale of the Confederate Army*. We can assume, certainly, that Pickett honorably complied to the extent of doing away with the original report.

Whether she had this report or only said she did to keep the spotlight on her well-developed ego, there is no way of telling. However, in nine years of careful cross-triangulation research, this writer has yet to prove that LaSalle Corbell Pickett was untruthful about anything else. Somewhere, probably in some private collection, this report may be extant, and it would seem that a hundred years later it should not do too much harm to bring it to light.

It must be clearly understood that I am not in the business of collecting autograph manuscripts, but only for the information they may contain about the man Pickett. As a man and soldier, George Pickett was just a fellow who wound up on the losing side. From that standpoint he is relatively unimportant in the historical scheme of things. But he touched base with so many important people and events, and left a trail so enigmatic that, if followed out, could supply answers to questions of greater historic value. It seems a valid undertaking to try to find the answers.

There are a host of unanswered questions. For those who like to get their teeth into problems like this, here are two examples: Can anyone tell me under what circumstances his first wife died in 1851 in Eastern Texas, at or near Fort Gates, about nine months after their marriage? She was Sally Minge, of Weyanoke Plantation and Petersburg, Virginia. Can any one come up with a shred of evidence that the boy George Pickett ever personally met the young lawyer, Abraham Lincoln, in Illinois during the years 1840-1842? He was appointed to West Point by Lincoln's law partner, John Todd Stuart, but what part, if any, did Lincoln play? We only know that in later years Lincoln and Andrew Johnston, Pickett's uncle, were friends of a sort. I will deeply appreciate contributions to the intelligence that will help round out the biography of this little known but highly interesting man.

R. E. Stivers

No. 69—Life and Career of General Louis Blenker:

I am searching for information about the life and career of General Louis Blenker, USV, other than the reports and references published in the *Official Records*. Particularly desired are details regarding his life not available in published sources, especially those relating to his life in New York State before and after his campaign in Virginia, and during his march from McClellan to Banks in 1862.

Query: Can any reader supply information on this man, or phases of his career?

Prentice G. Morgan, Lt. Col., USA

No. 70—Payment for Emancipated Slaves:

It is well known that the Emancipation Proclamation did not free the slaves owned by masters in the border states who were loyal to the Union.

Query: Were these slave owners ever compensated by any governmental authority for the eventual loss of their property?

James Barnett

No. 71—Records of Virginia Confederate Cavalry Leaders:

In the course of compiling a history of the organization and operations of the Virginia Confederate cavalry I have run into many blind spots in tracing units and commanders through the war. Information about the following officers and units is particularly desired:

1. Colonel Alexander Spottswood Vandeventer, 50th Virginia Regiment, upon his exchange in 1864 returned to his home in Lee County, Virginia, and obtained permission from General John C. Breckinridge to raise a squadron of boys to act as scouts. He is reported to have recruited 150 well-mounted men and apparently assumed military command of Lee County. A letter from Breckinridge's Assistant Adjutant General, November 21, 1864, to Breckinridge mentions Vandeventer as being ordered to clear the county of roaming squads separated from their commands, and to act against deserters and bushwhackers. I find only one reference to his command as the 30th Battalion, Virginia Cavalry, although the National Archives records show no such unit.

Query: Can anyone supply information about this outfit and Colcnel Vandeventer's activities?

2. Lt. Colonel David S. Hounshell, who was the last commander of the Department of West Virginia and East Tennessee, as well as the District of Greenbrier and Monroe, seems to have raised a force of some 400 men in Abb's Valley and in McDowell County, now in West Virginia, prior to August, 1862. He is mentioned as a colonel at that time, although I cannot find or identify his command. In 1864 he

scouted a Union raiding column near Wytheville. In April, 1865, he surrendered about 400 men at Lewisburg, West Virginia. In January, 1864, his officers petitioned the Confederate War Department to revoke his commission. Beyond that, there is nothing; National Archives records are silent.

Query: Will some one tell me more about this officer prior to, during, and after the war, as well as the officers in his command?

3. The 64th Virginia Mounted Infantry became a cavalry unit on September 1, 1863. A few days later, on the 9th, a large part of the regiment was captured at Cumberland Gap. Records in the National Archives are scant as to regimental and company officers. In 1865 the regiment was a part of Colonel Henry Giltner's brigade of Kentucky Cavalry.

Query: Does any one have a history of this regiment or additional information about its officers and company organization?

Samuel H. Miller

NOTES

General Averell's Wartime Papers Found:

The wartime papers of Major General William W. Averell, Union cavalry commander, were recovered in 1958 when a Civil War hobbyist found a trunk filled with papers stored in an old barn near Bath, New York. The discoverer, Roderick Browne, of Chula Vista, California, has arranged the papers in order and has placed them in the library of San Diego (California) State College on indefinite loan.

The collection contains several hundred documents, including personal letters, battlefield notes written to and from Averell, War Department orders, telegrams received while in combat, personal journals, copies of Averell's letters to other officers, and court martial records. Dr. William Hanchett, assistant professor of history at San Diego State and a Civil War specialist, said the documents contain many take-off points for new research and will be extremely helpful to candidates for master's degrees at San Diego State and to approved undergraduate history majors.

Noted as a courageous Indian fighter in ante-bellum days, General Averell participated in major battles from Bull Run through Sheridan's campaign in the Shenandoah Valley. In 1862, when not yet 30, he was made a Brigadier General, U.S. Volunteers, and in 1865 he was brevetted Major General, U.S. Army. He retired in 1865 to begin a successful business career.

General Averell was assistant inspector general at the Soldiers' Home at Bath, New York, from 1888 to 1898. It is believed his papers were left there when he completed his tour of duty. He died in 1900.

Land Purchase at Harpers Ferry Given Approval:

Congressional approval has been given to a measure authorizing the purchase of additional land for the Harpers Ferry National Monument. The bill permits buying the old Storer College site and buildings by purchase and the acquisition of a bit of land in the lower town through an exchange of lands. This bit of the lower level was the site of the old Federal arsenal and John Brown's Fort and adjoins the main section of the National Monuments. The Fort and arsenal site would be acquired by trading federally-owned park lands of about equal value near Cumberland, Maryland, which is described in the bill as no longer needed by the government.

The bill authorizes an appropriation of \$300,000 for the purchase of the Storer College property and for the acquisition of about seven acres of privately-owned lands to consolidate federal holdings in that section of the Monument. The Storer College campus is on high ground above the town of Harpers Ferry, site of the encampment of both Federal and Confederate troops during the Civil War. The college for Negroes was established in 1867 on land originally acquired by the government for an encampment of U.S. troops, and later used as a residential section for the officers of the armory and arsenal. The Storer administrative building, now known as Anthony Hall, was the residence of the superintendent of the government works and, during the war years, both President Lincoln and General Robert E. Lee were housed there when on visits to Harpers Ferry. The college was closed in 1955 after integration took place in West Virginia and state support was withdrawn.

The Department of the Interior will make use of the modern college plant for a needed eastern training school for Rangers and other National Park Service personnel. The college property is owned by the Northern Baptist Convention; the proceeds of the sale will go to Virginia Union University at Richmond, Virginia, and to Alderson-Broadbush College in Philippi, West Virginia, on equal shares.

In establishment of the National Monument—opened to the public in 1956—West Virginia has given about 469 acres, and Maryland has added some 800 acres of Maryland Heights, across the Potomac facing Harpers Ferry. The Loudon Heights side, in Virginia, has yet to be acquired. Visitor attendance has steadily increased with each year—in 1959 more than 600,000 visitors were recorded at this newest of the eastern Civil War sites.

To Restore Ohio's Civil War Battle Flags:

Arrangement for restoration and permanent preservation of the battle flags of Ohio's 230 Civil War fighting units was one of the first

projects set on foot by the Ohio Civil War Centennial Commission. Furlled on their staffs, the flags are housed in glass cases in the rotunda of the capitol. The process of restoration is an expensive one, but funds are being sought for that purpose.

Civil War Centennial Program Takes Shape:

The five-year series of observances and commemorations marking the chief events of the Civil War years will be officially opened on January 7, 8, 9, 1961, at Charleston, South Carolina, to commemorate the first actual hostile "incident" that led to the break of the war three months later. It was on January 9, 1861, that Citadel cadets fired on the *Star of the West* and prevented the ship from supplying the Federal garrison in Fort Sumter with provisions, ammunition and equipment. Ceremonies elsewhere during the month will mark the centenary of secession conventions in Jackson, Mississippi, and Montgomery, Alabama, on January 9 and 11, and on January 26 the signing of Louisiana's secession ordinance at Baton Rouge. Again in Montgomery in February another elaborate ceremony will be held to commemorate the meeting of the Confederate constitutional convention and the inauguration of Jefferson Davis as President of the Confederate States.

These were preliminary steps—the first event of the war itself which will be observed is the attack on Fort Sumter, which will be re-enacted at Charleston, South Carolina, on April 12th. Other major events of national interest scheduled for 1961 are the re-enactment of the battle of Lexington, Missouri, on May 18th, and the five-day observance of the first land battle of the war at Philippi, West Virginia, May 29-June 3, with a re-enactment of the battle in the morning of June 3, the actual centenary. Most elaborate of the 1961 planned affairs is the observance and re-enactment of the first battle of Bull Run at Manassas, Virginia, on July 21-22, in which there will be some representation from each of the twenty-two states whose soldier sons were engaged in the battle of a century ago.

At the third annual assembly of the National Centennial Commission in St. Louis, May 5 and 6, plans were advanced for local as well as national observances. It was pointed out that commemorative programs of one sort or another, ranging from religious ceremonies to school exercises and the erection of historic markers, already are projected in nearly every part of the nation. This assembly was attended by delegates from 121 organizations, and by representatives from 36 State Civil War Centennial Commissions.

Special attention was called at the assembly to the careful grass-roots planning now under way by state commissions and local committees in such areas as the New England states, and in Louisiana,

Missouri, South Carolina, and Virginia. The battle spectacles, particularly, are aimed at drawing large throngs, and this made the travel potential and care for influx of tourists and visitors a major theme at the assembly. The National Park Service has several projects under way to prepare for the anticipated crowds. At Gettysburg, which is expected to draw heavily, a new visitor and information center is under construction. New exhibits are being prepared at Fort Sumter, and at Harpers Ferry the work of restoring the prewar buildings within the National Monument areas is proceeding as rapidly as possible. Other major projects are being carried out at battle sites and National Park centers—though Antietam will not have its observance until September, 1962, the Maryland Civil War Centennial Commission was one of the first to activate plans and programs for a major observance. New land is being acquired, and preparation is being made to care for a presently estimated 150,000 visitors to view the battle reenactment.

Killed in Battle at Cold Harbor:

Civil War letters and diaries are legion. Poor is the manuscript collection which cannot boast of at least one such item. Occasionally there appears among these letters one which is unique, and such is the case at the University of Oregon Library, which recently acquired the wartime letters of David Watt Hutchinson to his family.

Hutchinson served in Company H, 122nd Ohio Volunteer Infantry, and from January 9, 1863, through April 3, 1864, he corresponded regularly with his sister and brother-in-law, Elizabeth and Robert Theaker. The letters run in the usual routine; he described his activities during the battles, patrols, and foraging expeditions in which he engaged, and also discussed home-town affairs and much of the usual chit-chat of family letters.

On June 3, 1864, David Watt Hutchinson was killed in the battle of Cold Harbor. The last letter to his family was sent by his comrades, bearing no salutation or signature, as a simple effort to console the bereaved family. One can only wonder how many other families received similar letters, and the sincerity of this letter makes it worthy of publication:

Killed in the battle of Cold Harbor on fryday morning June 3rd. 1864 David W. Hutchinson son of Mrs. Mary Hutchinson Adams (illegible) Guernsey Co. O. Aged 24 years & 2 months. David enlisted in September 1862 in Co. H 122 Regt O.V.S. and since that time has been exposed to many of the hardships that accompany a soldiers life. Yet he passed through it all without a murmur. He was willing to suffer evry thing for his country. But in the bloody battle of the 3rd. when hundreds were falling beneath the deadly fire which the enemy were pouring upon the 6th Corps he fell

pierced through the head by a musket ball. His body was lifted by his companions and laid beneath the ground as decently as could be expected on the field of battle. He has left many friends to mourn his early fall, but may they dry up their tears with the consoling thought that they may one day meet him in "that land of pure delight" where the deafening sound of artillery and the clash of the glittering steel shall never be heard.

[Contributed by Ralph W. Hansen, University of Oregon]

Lost Confederate Graves in Baltimore Cemetery:

In the extreme southwest corner of the Loudon Park National Cemetery on Frederick Avenue, Baltimore, Maryland, stands a rough-hewn stone monument erected to a handful of Confederate soldiers who died while prisoners of war and whose individual graves can not now be identified. From this monument one can look across a rutted ravine to a series of shady knolls in the civilian section of Loudon Park. Atop one of these knolls are buried some 700 men who wore the uniform of the Confederacy. Among those who rest there are Major General Charles W. Field, Brigadier General Bradley T. Johnson, Colonel Harry Gilmor, Colonel James R. Herbert, and Major Thomas G. Rhett. On each Confederate Memorial Day these men are remembered with flowers, services, and military honors. Their comrades across the slopes have their own shade, and their own honors.

The stone bears a bronze plate which reads:

Erected by the United States
To mark the burial place of
Twenty-nine Confederate Soldiers
Who died at Fort McHenry, Maryland
While Prisoners of war
And whose remains were there buried
But subsequently removed to this section
Where individual graves
Cannot now be identified.
Anderson, M. D., Sgt. C, 20 N.C.
Baker, T. H., Pvt. K, 24 N.C.
Brown, Harvey, Mus'n, C, 51 Va.
Burroughs, H. G., Pvt. C, 7 S.C. Cav.
Call, Lewis, H., Pvt., E, 53 Va.
Campbell, T. K., 1 Lt., B, 2 Ga. Battn.
Christian, P. B., Pvt., A, 38 Ga.
Crowder, Asberry D., Pvt. F, 21 Ga.
Davis, J., Lt., I, 1 Md. Cav.
Dowell, George, Lt., A, White's Battn.
England, Wm. W., 2 Lt., E, 25 N.C.
Enzor, Marion D., Sgt., C, 20 N.C.
Frazier, Hugh, Pvt., H, 6 Ala.
Garrett, Thomas L., Pvt., F, 66 N.C.
Good, Spencer, Pvt., I, 45 Va.
Howell, George W., Pvt., F, 1 Ga. Cav.
Kreeger, Frederick, Pvt., B, 18 Ga. Battn.

McKay, C. L., QM Sgt. 12 Ga. Cav.
Miller, Wm. P., Pvt. F, 1 Va. Cav.
Robeson, Albert, Pvt., H, 2 N.C. Arty.
Smith, George D., 1 Lt., B, 18 Ga. Battn.
Tupper, Frederick, 2 Lt., A, 18 Ga. Battn.
Wade, E. C., Sgt., B, 18 Ga. Battn.
Washington, James W., Pvt., B, 12 Va.
Wier, John P., Pvt., A, 47 Ark. Cav.
Wiggins, Baker, Pvt., B, 1 S.C. Rifles
Womble, H. J., Pvt., I, 3 N.C. Cav.
Wright, Samuel A., Pvt., C, 2 Ky. Cav.

[Contributed by Samuel H. Miller, Catonsville, Maryland]


Most of these units are readily identified. The 51st Virginia was General Gabriel C. Wharton's regiment and served with his brigade in the battles against Hunter in the Shenandoah Valley, and under General Jubal Early during 1864 and 1865. The 7th South Carolina Cavalry was in Martin Gary's brigade, spending most of the war in southeastern Virginia. Gary's brigade was almost the last organized brigade out of Richmond in April, 1865. The 1st South Carolina Rifles, the 12th Virginia, and the 2nd Georgia Battalion were attached to the 3rd Corps, General A. P. Hill, Army of Northern Virginia. The 38th Georgia, the 21st Georgia, the 20th North Carolina, and the 6th Alabama were all in the renowned 2nd Corps, Army of Northern Virginia. The 53rd Virginia was a part of Armistead's Brigade, Pickett's Division, when they charged into immortality at Gettysburg.

The 2nd Kentucky Cavalry was raider John H. Morgan's own regiment. The 47th Arkansas Cavalry does not appear in the *Official Records* as such, and if the White's Battalion listed on the tablet is Lige White's famous Comanches, their muster roll does not show a Lieutenant George Dowell. The 1st Maryland Cavalry Battalion made an enviable record during the war, but it did not have a Company I, nor a Lieutenant J. Davis. The 1st Virginia Cavalry was Jeb Stuart's first command, and later Fitzhugh Lee was its colonel. William P. Miller was a private in Company F, the Jefferson troop, and on the muster roll is shown to have died at Point Lookout, Maryland.

The 18th Georgia Battalion, in 1864, was in the District of Georgia under General Raleigh E. Colston. Second Lieutenant Frederick Tupper was on the General's staff in January, 1864, as acting brigade ordnance officer, detached from his battalion. The 12th Georgia Cavalry was part of Hampton's, then Butler's, cavalry.

What stories lie buried here? What hopes, what dreams, what plans that went awry in the execution? Where were they captured, when did they die? What families grieved and never knew where son, brother, husband, or lover was buried? Veteran or recruit, full of years or beard-

less youth, hero or straggler, they lie at rest, their graves marked only by a single stone, but within hailing distance of their comrades on the shady slopes beyond the ravine.



BOOK REVIEWS

Stonewall Jackson. By Lenoir Chambers. (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1959. Two volumes. Pp. x and 597, ix and 536. \$20.00.)

SINCE HIS UNTIMELY DEATH in the spring of 1863, a considerable number of biographies of Stonewall Jackson have been published. Books about the man have been written by his wife, by soldiers who served with him during the war, by the British soldier-historian G. F. R. Henderson, by the poet Allen Tate, and more recently by newspaperman Burke Davis and Professor Frank Vandiver. To this already large collection can now be added the two-volume, eleven-hundred-page contribution of Lenoir Chambers, editor of the *Norfolk Virginian-Pilot*. It is, in the opinion of this reviewer, a distinguished addition.

There are two aspects of this study that make it a work of real significance. In the first place, it is the best written and by far the most thorough analysis that I have ever read of Jackson the military man. It traces in minute detail the various battles and campaigns that catapulted this little-known character into prominence, from his first assignment at Harpers Ferry through the Federal rout at Chancellorsville where the general was accidentally shot by his own men. And though the author quite properly concludes that Jackson was an unusually gifted commander, the tenor of the book is not that of unqualified hero-worship. As to Jackson's uncharacteristic slowness during the Seven Days, Mr. Chambers argues that the general, because of exhaustion and sickness, was simply not himself. No such excuses, however, are offered to explain away his mistakes at Cedar Run or at Fredericksburg. There is much information about Jackson and his not always pleasant dealings with other high-ranking Confederate officers, about his handling of his staff, and about his relationship with Lee. Of this latter, Mr. Chambers succinctly claims that "integrity met integrity."

In addition to its value as a military study, the work has added significance because the author has succeeded in separating the man from the legend. In "humanizing" his subject, however, Mr. Chambers has confirmed my worst suspicions about Jackson's personality. He was an eccentric, a religious fanatic, and at times, a hypochondriac. He was a tactless, narrow-minded prude who could be as prim as an old maid school-teacher. How else explain a man who could return his nephew's letters with corrections made in spelling and grammar, who could assign his sister to "unending misery" unless she mended her ways (i.e., accepted

his own set of values), who could take his wife to task for calling their newborn babe "cherub," or who could disrupt an army post by publicly charging his commanding officer with unauthorized hanky-panky involving a servant girl? Not until I had read this book did I fully realize just how unattractive a person Stonewall really was.

Mr. Chambers necessarily covers a good bit of familiar ground. The story of the industrious orphan boy who plodded his way through West Point, of the promising young junior officer in the Mexican War, of the pedestrian professor at the Virginia Military Institute, and of the spectacularly successful Confederate commander is one that is already generally known. It is the author's contention that the thirty-nine years of Jackson's life divide naturally into two periods: the first thirty-seven and the last two. He believes that the character traits which made for greatness in the field were already fully developed when that officer marched away to war in 1861.

The maps are excellent; they make it relatively easy to follow the author's narrative. A mild complaint might be lodged against the decision to place all the notes in the back of the second volume, though this is admittedly a minor criticism of a major work.

OTIS A. SINGLETARY

The University of Texas

Kate: The Journal of a Confederate Nurse. Edited by Richard Barksdale Harwell. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1959. Pp. xx, 321. \$6.00.)

COPIES OF KATE CUMMING'S DIARY published in 1866 have come to rest primarily in various rare book collections, known only to serious students of the Civil War. However, Richard Harwell's edition of this work, *Kate: The Journal of a Confederate Nurse*, brings the informative, meticulously kept record to all who have an interest in the period. It is an eyewitness account of the war, and more particularly, of the inner workings of the hospital service, as described by a discerning, intelligent woman who gave three years of her life to nursing the sick and wounded.

The Scottish-born, Alabama-bred Kate Cumming was, as Mr. Harwell so aptly characterizes her, "a lady." Indeed, she was in so many ways a typical Victorian lady, despite the fact that she dared to enter a heretofore masculine profession, that of an army nurse. She was in her late twenties or early thirties (there is some doubt as to her exact age, which may make her typical of her sex) when she decided to offer her services to the Confederacy over the protests of her family. In April, 1862, she reported for duty in Okolona, Mississippi, in time to nurse the Shiloh casualties, and from that time until the end of the war she served in hospitals attached to the Army of Tennessee in Mississippi, Tennessee, and Georgia. Wherever the hospitals moved, Miss Cumming moved with them, proving herself more adjustable to the nomadic life than did many of her colleagues, male or female. Her days were filled with problems and heart-rending experiences, but seldom did she complain, for they were but a part of the job she had

undertaken to do. Daily irritations, privations, hardships, and inconveniences did not overwhelm and defeat Kate Cumming as they did many of her contemporaries.

Miss Cumming was not an effervescent person, and her diary does not abound with sparkling chit-chat which characterizes many similar accounts. Hers is not filled with idle gossip and trivialities, or with petty and malicious comments. Rather, it is the record of a serious-minded woman who kept busy attending to the tasks assigned her. When she inserted a current rumor in the record, it was briefly stated and usually dismissed with an air of indifference. She was determined and dedicated, and much of the time she was stolid and stoical to an almost annoying degree, but she was also efficient, business-like, selfless, and courageous. She graciously rendered any service she thought necessary, and she could be cook or confidante, seamstress or supervisor, fugitive or forager as circumstances demanded. Amid it all, she seldom gave vent to her emotions, but the one thing that did arouse Kate Cumming's anger to the point that it gushed from her pen was any criticism, direct or implied, of the women who had chosen to become army nurses. On hearing this, she would record unrestrained, scorching rebuttals.

Unlike most unmarried women diarists of the period, Kate gave no indication of romantic interest in any man, although she evidenced a wholesome respect for many, and she was obviously fascinated by General John Morgan, whom she delighted in describing as "ubiquitous." Rarely did she criticize those with whom she came in contact, and never was she caustic, although she verged on it when telling of General P. G. T. Beauregard's having commandeered the ladies' car and baggage car for the use of himself and his staff, thus inconveniencing Miss Cumming and the other lady passengers. It should be added that she did not hold grudges and later references in the diary, as well as those in *Gleanings from the Southland*, showed a profound respect for the General. It was far more characteristic of Miss Cumming to defend any person under attack rather than to criticize, and she frequently showed impatience with those who were prone to voice opinions and offer suggestions as to how military and civil affairs should be handled. While graciously accepting advice and orders, she was unwilling to meddle in affairs outside her sphere. The reader must be impressed with Kate Cumming's strength of purpose and character, as well as with her calmness and serenity of spirit, for she adamantly refused to break under strain. And, one is also apt to feel that she must have been something of an enigma to those who worked with her, but certainly there can be no doubt that she was a "lady."

Richard Harwell has done a creditable job of editing, and he has wisely omitted much of the extraneous material found in the original edition, including hundreds of lines of poetry quoted by the diarist, and dozens of lines of philosophical reflections in which she so frequently indulged herself. In so doing, the narrative has in no way suffered; rather it has become a smoother, more readable account. Too, the editor has enhanced its value by supplying the names of individuals whom Miss Cumming identified only by initials, and he has also corrected the spelling in the

original edition, so indicating when this has been done. The introduction is well written and informative, the footnotes are in good order, and the index of personal and place names is acceptable despite a few errors and omissions.

In his preface Mr. Harwell states, "... the length of the narrative has required that explanatory notes be kept to a minimum." While conceding that this is a decision for the editor and his publisher, this reviewer regrets that such notes have been confined to the bare minimum. Miss Cumming's diary is a versatile parade of names of both famous and unknown persons, as well as a catalogue of allusions to events, feuds, and controversies. Being the sort of person she was, she did not go into any lengthy discussion or explanation of what was so familiar at the time. Here the editor had the challenge to identify briefly and explain these so that one not well-versed in the history of the war might better comprehend what is being said. Certainly Surgeon-General Samuel Preston Moore merits identification in a work of this kind. The reviewer understands the difficulties involved in deciding where to draw the line, but she believes that the book would have been greatly improved had it been drawn beyond where it has been. The only other omission that is of major significance is a map or maps to indicate the location of Miss Cumming's assignments and the path of her journeys.

Errors are few and in most cases are mere oversights. The title of Phoebe Yates Pember's volume should read *A Southern Woman's Story* (p. v), but it is correctly cited elsewhere. Several misspellings or typographical errors were noted. In the index, "Gen. Brown" would seem to be General John Calvin Brown, "Sen. Clement Comer Clay" should be Senator Clement Claiborne Clay, and "Gen. Philip Dole Roddy" should be General Philip Dale Roddey. Despite these and other minor errors and omissions, Mr. Harwell is to be congratulated on his many corrections and additions to the original edition of this valuable Civil War diary.

MARY ELIZABETH MASSEY

Winthrop College

Red River Campaign: Politics and Cotton in the Civil War. By Ludwell H. Johnson. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1958. Pp. 317. \$5.00.)

VERY FEW OF THE HUNDREDS of Civil War books published during the last two or three years have contributed anything of significance to the understanding of that four-year period of national tragedy. Professor Johnson's *Red River Campaign: Politics and Cotton in the Civil War* is one of the worthwhile few. He has chosen an almost virgin field of study—the Trans-Mississippi West. The story of that ill-fated Federal campaign, which took place in Louisiana and Arkansas in the spring of 1864, is here explored fully for the first time. The basic strategy of the Red River Campaign is simple. Union General Nathaniel P. Banks and Admiral David D. Porter with some 30,000 troops and 60 ships were to advance up the Red River while General Frederick Steele's force of over 10,000 men was to move southward from Little Rock, Arkansas.

The first major objective of both forces was Shreveport (near the junction of Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas), the heart of a rich cotton empire and the headquarters of Confederate General E. Kirby Smith. The ultimate goal was Texas.

The author has handled the Louisiana phase of this two-pronged campaign with considerable skill. Porter's problems with the gunboats in the shallow waters of the Red make fascinating reading. The story of Banks's difficulties with the civilian cotton speculators, his defeat by Confederate General Richard Taylor at Sabine Crossroads, and his subsequent retreat and abandonment of the expedition is concise, clear, and colorful. An excellent set of maps has been furnished.

Perhaps the most important contribution of Professor Johnson's book can be found in the first two chapters. It is here that he provides a most interesting example of how military operations during the Civil War were often "intimately interwoven with political, economic, and ideological factors which frequently determined the time and place of a Union offensive." He reveals in sharp detail the desires and opinions of the press, the public and the Lincoln government regarding an invasion of cotton rich east Texas, as well as the motivation of the officers themselves, such as General Banks's aspirations toward the 1864 presidential nomination. There can be little doubt that the cotton-hungry New England textile industry had great influence in setting the Red River campaign in motion. Even General Grant, who wanted to use Banks's troops in an expedition against Mobile, bowed to the pressure.

In the opinion of this reviewer, Professor Johnson's weakest chapter is the one devoted to Steele's advance in Arkansas. In compressing this forty-day campaign (sometimes called the Camden Expedition) into one chapter, he has lost some of the color and clarity demonstrated in his handling of Banks's efforts in Louisiana. Only one rather general campaign map is provided for the entire operation. The complete lack of battle maps make the engagements of Elkins' Ferry, Prairie d'Ane, Poison Springs, Marks' Mills, and Jenkins' Ferry difficult to follow. Some military historians may disagree with Professor Johnson's interpretation of why Steele moved against Camden on the Ouachita River and when he made his decision to do so. There is reason to believe that the fortified town of Camden was one of Steele's original objectives (as indicated in a letter to Grant on 18 March 1864—written before the expedition got underway), yet the author seems to imply that the Federal commander made his decision to turn southeast to that town only after reaching the Prairie d'Ane. According to at least one close student of this campaign, the Federal march on Prairie d'Ane and Washington was nothing more than a clever ruse to pull Confederate General Sterling Price out of his Camden stronghold. Many Arkansans will be startled to find Federal Colonel Powell Clayton (later a "carpetbagger" governor of Arkansas) listed as "Clayton Powell" on page 177. The name is used correctly earlier in the chapter (page 171). This discrepancy may be a proofreader's error; however, both names are listed in the index.

Despite the above mentioned criticisms, *Red River Campaign: Politics and Cotton in the Civil War* is a very worthwhile book. It should be of real interest

to those interested in economic and political history as well as those interested in the military operations of the war.

JAMES J. HUDSON

University of Arkansas.

Grant Moves South. By Bruce Catton. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company. Pp. xi, 564. \$6.50.)

DURING THE YEARS Lloyd Lewis was working on his *Sherman: Fighting Prophet* (1932), he said that references to Grant kept stealing his attention from the man who would march through Georgia. Lewis hoped to write Grant's biography and at that early time began collecting data on him. He was working then for the *Chicago Daily News* and he used to say that he could hear the guns of Shiloh above the clicking typewriters. As a journalist Lloyd Lewis rose rapidly, but all the while the insistent boom of the guns kept constantly roaring in his ears. Finally, after becoming managing editor, he resigned and for the next five years he worked almost exclusively on Grant. In 1950 he died suddenly, as a soldier should. No lingering illness.

The first volume of Lloyd Lewis' projected biography, *Captain Sam Grant*, was published posthumously. His notes for succeeding volumes filled a steel cabinet and several large boxes, all tightly packed. His publishers, Little, Brown and Company, and his widow, Kathryn, sought someone to continue the proposed biography—a difficult task, for Lloyd Lewis was one of those rare historians who wrote with authority and great artistic skill. They finally selected Bruce Catton, another great artist in history. *Grant Moves South* began where Lloyd Lewis left Grant at the time he took command of the 21st Illinois Infantry in 1861. It leaves him at the close of the Vicksburg campaign in 1863.

Catton's interpretation of Grant is the same as Lloyd Lewis', but there is an important difference in their methods. Lloyd Lewis always maintained that the only acceptable picture of a man at any specific time in his life must be taken from contemporary descriptions, not from memoirs written after the man became famous. Catton draws on both contemporary and later sources, but he is careful to appraise the reader of this fact.

Bruce Catton's literary style also differs from Lloyd Lewis'. Both men have produced artistic masterpieces in written history, and every historian, try as he may, can reflect only himself. Certainly this is as it should be. Who wants Cézanne to see a French landscape through Millet's eyes, or expects Michelangelo's work to resemble Raphael's?

How much Bruce Catton relied on the data collected by Lloyd Lewis is uncertain. The notes were so voluminous that no man could read them all in less than a year, much less digest them. They surely could suggest important sources. Lloyd Lewis also recorded some interviews with people who have since died, and Bruce Catton indicates that they were the important part of the Lewis notes.

A least a dozen books have been written about Grant in the last thirty

years, including one small volume by Bruce Catton. *Grant Moves South* follows closely the outline of this author's earlier volume and skillfully enlarges each topic. No other work shows such a mastery of the field. A book similar to it is A. L. Conger's *The Rise of U. S. Grant*, published in 1931. Of course Catton uses three times the space allowed Conger to tell the same events, and he takes advantage of these extra pages, breathing life into the narrative. Random sampling of a few chapters discloses a marked variance in the two writers' procedure. Conger, in incident after incident, relies on the *Official Records* for approximately two-thirds of his sources. For the same incidents, two-thirds of Catton's citations are to regimental histories, secondary campaign studies, and personal manuscripts, with only one-third taken from the *Official Records*. This difference in sources may well add the vitamins which make Catton's account so much more lively than Conger's. Incidentally, it is noticeable that both authors agree that "Old Brains" Halleck was not so brainless as many historians picture him.

It is also pertinent to compare the historical method used in *Grant Moves South* with the work of another specialist in the field, Major General J. F. C. Fuller. Again Bruce Catton deserves the top rank. Fuller omits the dusty roads, the humidity, the smell of bayou vegetation which is a part of any campaign along the Western waters. He also seems much too prone to pass snap judgments. With crisp military finality he calls Halleck "witless" and "stupid." The two writers' appraisal of Buell's problems in East Tennessee is another case in point.

Grant Moves South is not a revisionist's picture. Quite the contrary. The Grant who emerges is a familiar character, and this intensely interesting narrative should be a convincing lesson for the school of academicians who believe their work important only if they present a new thesis. Like all good biographies, this volume is also a history of the times. Nowhere can a reader get a better understanding of the Civil War campaigns in the Middle West than in the pages of this book.

JAY MONAGHAN

Santa Barbara, California

Letters of Warren Akin, Confederate Congressman. Edited by Bell I. Wiley. (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1959. Pp. 151. \$3.75.)

THE PAUCITY OF INFORMATION not only as to the actual functioning of the Confederate Congress but also as to the personal lives of the members themselves makes the publication of these letters of a member of the lower house of the Second Confederate Congress of special interest and gives them added significance. Thirty-four of the fifty letters cover the period of the second session of the last Confederate Congress and are addressed to the writer's wife. Although Akin explained to her that "affairs of a public character I can not write and what takes place in secret session," still his true feelings in most matters was expressed when he wrote "I do not think I ought to conceal from you any thing."

Refreshing indeed, in these postwar years when Jefferson Davis has become the whipping boy of the Confederacy, is Akin's estimate of him as "... the best man in the Government for his place. Many want him out of office. Were he removed today, we should be *ruined* in a few months." His estimate of Lee is summed up in the sentence "I wish my children could see him." After perusing the thumbnail sketches of Akin's colleagues, his estimates of the failings of the group as a legislative body, and his fulminations against the number of secret sessions, the reader feels that he has been personally to Richmond during the last months of the Confederacy.

The inclusion of a number of letters from Mrs. Akin to her husband serves to show the obverse of the coin. Had these been interspersed chronologically with those of Akin, they would have given a clearer picture both of the times and of the relationship between this man and wife. Akin's letters, for example, contain minute instructions as to how his wife should conduct his affairs in Georgia and savor somewhat of the dictator. Upon reading Mrs. Akin's letters, however, one discovers that she asked for such detailed instructions.

Enhancing the letters is the beautiful format in which they are presented and the interest-arousing chapter titles which Dr. Wiley has supplied in the form of excerpts from the letters themselves. With its usable index, the publication is a worthy production of one of the university presses of the Old South.

WILLARD E. WIGHT

Georgia Institute of Technology.

Clash of Cavalry: The Battle of Brandy Station. By Fairfax Downey. (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1959. Pp. xv, 238. \$4.95.)

STUDIES OF SINGLE ENGAGEMENTS of the Civil War have interested authors ever since the end of the conflict. In recent years, a number of books dealing with individual battles have appeared. To mention only a few, Gettysburg, Vicksburg, Fredericksburg, Atlanta, all have been competently covered. Now we have a volume on the Battle of Brandy Station on June 9, 1863, the greatest single cavalry clash of the entire war.

Fairfax Downey, the author of this book, is in love with the cavalry. The clash of steel upon steel, the smell of leather and horses, the spirited charge, the esprit de corps of half forgotten units, the bugle calls of days gone by, and the manual of arms with weapons long discarded—these are well covered in this work. Military lore comes naturally to Mr. Downey, a retired lieutenant colonel of the United States army. Writing with verve, he has taken great pains to look into the minutiae of the cavalry service of both armies, and he has assembled much information about the uniforms, equipment, and songs of the horsemen of the 1860's. The drama of the cavalry charge is his main theme.

Military lore and cavalry tradition alone, however, do not constitute history. The significance of a battle cannot be understood properly unless the engagement is seen as an action with historical causes, characteristics, and results which set it apart from other encounters. This applies to major battles such as Gettysburg as well as to comparatively minor ones such as Brandy Station;

and if this cavalry action merits monographic treatment at all, its over-all significance must be emphasized. This, unfortunately, the author has failed to do.

Why is the Battle of Brandy Station important? In this clash between General Alfred Pleasanton's Federal cavalry and General J. E. B. Stuart's Confederate troopers in Virginia, the Union cavalry came into its own. After having been outgeneralled for many months by Stuart and his horsemen, the Federals succeeded in taking their enemies by surprise and in carrying out efficiently a difficult reconnaissance in force. Stuart managed to fight off the attackers so that the battle ended in a draw, but afterwards it had become obvious that Confederate cavalymen could no longer afford to sneer at their enemies. So humiliated was the Confederate commander by the encounter that he is said to have undertaken his disastrous Gettysburg raid in order to redeem his reputation. The Federals, who withdrew in good order, were elated. They had carried out their mission of probing Lee's lines and had proven that Union cavalry could fight as well as Southern troopers.

Although Mr. Downey has made mention of all these points, he has not emphasized them, nor has he dealt with them in detail. He even asserts that the Federal cavalry's gain of self-confidence "bred final victory," but he has not substantiated this thesis. Surely the reader is entitled to a more extended treatment of so crucial a problem!

The immediate consequences of the battle have also been slighted. Did Stuart rally undertake his fateful ride around Hooker's army in order to win back laurels which he deemed lost by the draw in Virginia? Downey asserts that he did, but again the author has not offered any corroborating evidence. Since all authorities agree that Lee was fatally handicapped by Stuart's initial absence at Gettysburg, the most important engagement of the entire war, the problem is crucial. It is a pity that Mr. Downey has seen fit to pay so little attention to it.

There is one other issue which the author has neglected. Did Brandy Station prevent J. E. B. Stuart from undertaking a lengthy raid on June 10? Some Union observers thought so, and although the hypothesis has been fairly well exploded, it would seem to merit some attention in a work of this sort.

Perhaps part of the author's difficulty lies in the organization of the book. Only after devoting seven of seventeen chapters to background material with no intrinsic connection with the battle does he turn to the engagement itself. But because of his interest in the drama of a cavalry fight, he fails to emphasize sufficiently even in the remaining chapters the strategically important factors. Again and again he tends to recur to his main theme: The soldiers' mood, the traditions of the service, and the exhilaration of the cavalry charge.

In assembling his material, Mr. Downey has relied exclusively on readily available printed sources. His extended illustrated appendix deals with such diverse topics as cavalry engagements during the Napoleonic wars, cavalry songs and tactics, sabre exercises, tables of organization, and a few official reports of the action at Brandy Station. Only the last two of these seem to have a direct bearing on the text.

All in all then, *Clash of Cavalry* is a book for the lover of military lore. Those

who would like to have an authoritative account of the Battle of Brandy Station will have to await another volume.

HANS L. TREFOUSSE

Brooklyn College.

Advance and Retreat. By General John B. Hood. Edited by Richard N. Current. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press—Civil War Centennial Series, 1959. Pp. xii, 376. \$6.00.)

"ADVANCE AND RETREAT" WAS AN UNFORTUNATE BOOK. Written to repair the military reputation of its author, it succeeded only in shattering it completely. As a contribution to history, it merits nothing since it is a maze of contradictions, distortions, and evasions. But those acquainted with the gay, honorable Hood of pre-Chickamauga days, and who can see, in this unwitting revelation, the transformation of an ambitious and promising favorite to a scheming, frustrated failure, it will be interesting autobiography. The fateful bullet at Chickamauga cost Hood more than his leg. Never an intellectual man, and certainly no philosopher, the change from dashing Richmond beau to a cripple on crutches appears to have set up in him an increasing frenzy which led not only to his own undoing but, also, to the ruin of the Army of Tennessee.

The habit patterns established during that transformation are apparent in this book. The simple, forthright Hood had become a genius at dissembling, a master of equivocation. It is kinder to believe that the myriad "errors" in his book were not deliberate falsifications but rather the products of a tortured mind which had persuaded itself that they were true. It would take a far longer book to rationalize them all, and should some competent person assume the task he would be doing a great service to the sadly neglected field of *factual* history.

Earlier, Hood had been a superior lower echelon commander. When others bore the responsibility, he rose rapidly and promised well. But when the burden fell upon him, he avoided the battlefield and placed others in immediate command. To have a scapegoat in case of failure? Consciously, perhaps not. But the evidence points to the dominating influence of a subconscious mind which could not face alone the risks of its own decisions. And so, in his book, Hood could not admit harsh truths. Far better for his reputation had he faced the facts honestly and defended his management with courage and truth.

Although the editor attempted to rationalize disputed matters, he was on unfamiliar ground. He credits Johnston's "decision to strike Sherman at Peachtree Creek" to Hood, takes the popular amateur view as to Sherman's "primary objective," permits Hood to claim credit for the vast fortifications of Atlanta (begun in 1863 and completed under Johnston's direction), and calls Hood "undoubtedly justified in contending that they could not be held, even though he—with a thrice defeated army—held them until Sherman finessed him out of them at Jonesboro seven weeks

later." At Cassville he cites, in Hood's support, only some unsupportable conclusions of others: Dyer's in the case of Wood's brigade which care would have revealed to be an interior brigade which could hardly have "wandered" across three division fronts without someone asking, profanely, where it was going; and Horn's, which is merely a rewrite of Hood's account. And all three of them ignore the fact that Johnston, not Hood, was in command, and that Hood's alleged insistence upon attacking Sherman was merely a subordinate's recommendation—one which would have delighted Sherman had Johnston accepted it.

Comparing Hood's statements with actual events, as shown clearly in the *Records*, one wonders if he wanted Johnston to succeed at Cassville—or anywhere. It appears doubtful, else so eager a fighter would hardly have avoided the chance given him by Johnston to smash Sherman's left. Neither would he have diverted his whole corps to do a regiment's job of investigating the "wandering fragment" which, Dyer, Horn and Hood's unidentifiable "General" Carson (page 104) notwithstanding, Hood admitted in his report (page 334) "turned out to be the enemy's cavalry" with which his skirmishers were already engaged. The facts point to the ugly conclusion that Hood deliberately avoided battle on the morning of the 19th to wreck Johnston's first chance to damage Sherman substantially without risking more than the Confederacy could afford; for to contribute loyally to a victory at Cassville would be defeating his own schemes to discredit his commander and gain for himself the command of the Army of Tennessee. The whole pattern of his book bears it out—a sadly twisted attempt to conceal various truths by a conscience-torn failure whom, tragically enough, nature had endowed originally with the basic attributes of a loyal and honorable man.

Advance and Retreat will interest the casual reader to whom color rather than fact is important. And it should whet the appetite of the more serious to seek out the truth. But beware of the maps between pages 111-112 and opposite page 166. The former fits neither the ground nor the Federal dispositions, and the latter has no connection with the "battles around Atlanta."

ALLEN P. JULIAN

Atlanta Historical Society

A Life For The Confederacy: As Recorded in the Pocket Diaries of Pvt. Robert A. Moore, Co. G, 17th Mississippi Regiment, Confederate Guards, Holly Springs, Mississippi. Edited by James W. Silver. (Jackson, Tennessee: McCowat-Mercer Press, 1959. Pp. 168. \$4.00.)

DURING THE PAST FEW YEARS a number of excellent Civil War diaries and journals have been published. These intrinsically interesting primary accounts are of great value to both the specialist and the layman who desire to learn more about the war through the medium of its basic unit—the common soldier. Taking its place amongst the finest of such works is *A Life For The Confederacy*.

Robert A. Moore left his father's prosperous farm near Holly Springs at the age of 22 to enlist as a private in Company G, 17th Regiment Mississippi Volunteers (Infantry). Shortly after entering the service, he commenced a diary, recording his observations on small pocket-size notebooks. That he undoubtedly had received a superior education can be deduced from the high caliber of his daily entries, his family background, as well as the fact that Holly Springs during this era could boast of no less than four colleges. Moore's diary reveals that he was a mature, pious, patriotic and generally well-rounded individual.

As a shrewd, competent observer and recorder, Moore—through his diary—has enabled the present-day reader to gain a keen insight into everyday life and events in the Confederate army. His candid observations—and experiences—leave little doubt that the common soldier of today has changed very little from his Civil War predecessor. Moore saw action in some of the greatest and bloodiest clashes of the war, (First Manassas, The Seven Days, Sharpsburg, Fredericksburg, Gettysburg) and his remarks and criticisms are of particular interest and value in securing a better understanding of these oft-written battles. Finally on the field of Chickamauga he—as the title of his published diary indicates—gave his life for the Confederacy.

Editor James W. Silver, in his short but sufficiently informative introduction, presents background material about the diary, Moore's family, the personnel of Company G, and a skillfully composed description of the author's character and personality based largely on excerpts from the diary. With the exception of minor changes in punctuation to facilitate readability, the editor has reproduced Moore's account as faithfully as possible. Each of the three notebooks constitutes a separate chapter with day-to-day entries arranged in typical diary form. For purposes of clarity, such as in the case of misspelled words or the missing first names of individuals, the editor has conveniently bracketed the corrected or added items at appropriate points within the text. The abundance of footnotes are invaluable in explaining many of the author's references which would otherwise be unclear, or even incomprehensible. So well has the editor elaborated upon the various aspects and events of the war mentioned in the diary that this highly specialized work can be read with profitable understanding by one who knows little or nothing about the great American conflict. A detailed index, a reproduction of the muster roll of Company G, and numerous photographs and illustrations enhance the value of the volume. If there are any shortcomings to this work, the editor is not at fault.

Unfortunately notebook number three was lost, and Moore's death at Chickamauga naturally prevented his fine account from spanning the entire period of the war. The editor, however, has attempted to make up for these deficiencies by briefly describing the activities of the 17th Mississippi Infantry during the period covered by the lost diary (March 17, 1862, through October 23, 1862) and from the day of the author's death (September 20, 1863) to the war's end.

Dr. Silver is to be commended for his superior job of editing this primary source. *A Life For The Confederacy* is a welcome addition to the published literature of the Civil War.

MARTIN HARDWICK HALL

Louisiana State University in New Orleans.

Vermont General: The Unusual War Experiences of Edward Hastings Ripley (1862-1865). Edited by Otto Eisenschiml. (New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1960. Pp. xii, 340. \$6.00.)

EVERY CIVIL WAR HISTORIAN probably hopes that he will one day encounter, and be asked to edit, such a set of letters as Dr. Eisenschiml here arrays for his readers. These letters are, as Eisenschiml says, "quite out of the ordinary. They will not only become rare source material for students of the Civil War, but will be enjoyed by all readers who appreciate high-grade literary entertainment."

Edward Hastings Ripley, a general at the age of twenty-five, is best known for having led Union forces into Richmond on April 3, 1865, while Confederate officialdom (and hopes) slipped away in full retreat to the west. Fires raged in the city and looters roamed the streets as Ripley, who privately called himself the "Duke of Richmond," assumed command of the situation. The fires were extinguished, looting arrested, and the city saved from complete destruction.

Ripley's story of these events, and that of three years of service preceding, is effectively told in nearly 500 letters to and from him and his parents, brothers, and sisters. The Rutland, Vermont, Ripleys, possessed of banking and marble-quarry means, reflect, as the reader will expect, a fine cultural background.

The reviewer especially appreciates Edward Ripley's first-hand accounts of the surrender of Harpers Ferry in 1862 to Stonewall Jackson, the capture of Fort Harrison (Richmond defenses), September 29, 1864, the repulse at Fort Gilmer shortly after, and the triumphant entry into Richmond at the end.

On the Vermont home front several letters bear significant commentary on behind-the-lines affairs. For example, on June 18, 1863, William Y. W. Ripley, Edward's brother, reported the local organization of "6 or 7 hundred men" to resist the draft and to stone recruiting officers. Other letters deal with the faltering wartime marble business and contests for control of the enterprise. While Edward's headquarters were in North Carolina, he and his brother speculated without success in turpentine patents and production.

Like most people, Edward reveals his prejudices in his familiar letters. Some readers may wonder at the Vermonter's distaste, bordering on contempt, for Federal Negro troops which he refers to as "niggers" (pp. 153, 154, 245, 253, 309). Of all "Secesh" troops Ripley thought most highly of the Texans who, though unreasonably unwashed and lousy, were "a fine

looking set of men." He particularly liked a Texas surgeon who accompanied him in a convoy of rebel prisoners from Camp Douglas, Ill., to City Point, Va., for exchange. North Carolina troops and natives, however, catch his sharpest criticism: They were too cowardly to fight for their principles, and he had learned "to thoroughly despise them, while for the Virginia Rebels, [he had] the respect their bravery and fortitude demands" (pp. 169-170).

In later years Ripley wrote brief accounts of several of the actions in which he participated. At appropriate places among the letters, the editor inserts extracts from these accounts. Included are "The Tragedy of Harpers Ferry," "The Battle of Fort Harrison," and "Final Scenes." This last account, "Final Scenes," a paper presented before the Military Order of the Loyal Legion of New York, is the story of Ripley's capture and occupation of Richmond. In able style the paper casts new light on what was indeed a "highly dramatic historical event." Confronted with rumor of a plot by Confederate agents to kill the President, Ripley personally warned Mr. Lincoln on his visit to Richmond. Although Lincoln heard him out, he shook off the danger, Ripley recalled, with the statement: "I deeply appreciate the feeling which has led you to urge [precautions] on me, but I must go on as I have begun in the course marked out for me, for I cannot bring myself to believe that any human being lives who would do me any harm" (pp. 307-308).

JAMES L. NICHOLS

Stephen F. Austin State College

A. Lincoln: Prairie Lawyer. By John J. Duff. (New York: Rinehart, 1960. Pp. viii, 433. \$7.50.)

THIS IS THE WHOLE STORY of Abraham Lincoln and the law. In the telling John Duff starts back in the formative days in New Salem and follows the man throughout his midwest years. What unfolds is a study of singular worth and one that will unquestionably hold an important place among the classic volumes dealing with the life and times of Abraham Lincoln.

With his very first words the author opens his account of the man and his profession with an image of forceful clarity:

"On a March day in 1837 there fatefully stood before the Clerk of the Illinois Supreme Court a tall, melancholy man of twenty-eight who, with right hand upraised, swore to 'in all things faithfully execute the duties of Attorney and Counsellor at Law.'" Ahead were years of labor and diligence. In Mr. Duff's own excellent words Lincoln, "through his wit, wisdom and understanding of humankind, rather than through any extensive knowledge of abstract legal principles, was to rise to a position of primacy at the Illinois bar." In the readable chapters that follow there unfolds the story of Lawyer Lincoln, the cases he handled, the patience he displayed, and the circumstances he endured traveling the Eighth Judicial Circuit. Following him on his rounds, watching him meet with fellow lawyers and with the

people in and out of trouble, one can understand why the man was destined to be great.

In another accounting of the man an able observer noted that if once one chanced to meet Abraham Lincoln on a crowded street he was sure to notice him. That certainly must have been true of Lincoln arriving at some county seat town and mingling with the people there. There was a "difference" about Abe that people noticed long before he took to the law. Mr. Duff marks these differences in the courtroom. There was Lincoln's kindly disposition to all lawyers, even those he opposed in a case, his reasonable fees—sometimes too reasonable in the view of his brother lawyers—and his sense of humanity that was reflected in countless instances.

A Lincoln student of some endurance gradually recognizes a certain sameness to the "new" books dealing with his life. In too many instances some of the latest books have been nothing more than a compilation of a dozen or more earlier writings. It is with particular joy then that Lincoln students can turn to this definitive study of Lawyer Lincoln. While a number of other books have handled the same topic none has probed so deeply and so effectively. The result is a masterful and rich new portrait of a lawyer who towered in the legal landscape long before he loomed large as a political leader and the President of a war-torn United States.

Not only Lincoln students but anyone who likes the drama of the courtroom and a fine writing style, which John Duff possesses to a marked degree, will enjoy reading this book. And when the reader has finished with it he will wonder, with the author, that Lincoln's "biographers, generally speaking, should not have sensed the law's tremendous influence upon his every act as President." And that the "ability to create the immortal utterance at Gettysburg, the first and second inaugural addresses, and all the wonderfully expressive state papers with which his name is associated—literary masterpieces which will endure for all time—sprang in large part from his training in the law, which gave him the ability to think and write with precision. The knowledge of men and laws which he acquired in the practice of the law was repeatedly applied by him in administering the affairs of the government in the trying years of the nation's great crisis, when delicate legal and Constitutional questions were constantly presenting themselves for consideration."

The chapter notes to this admirable book contain many nuggets of revealing information while the informative index and impressive bibliography testify to the thoroughness and great range of research which preceded its writing. The book also contains some fifty-four photographs ranging from a photograph of Lawyer Lincoln, portraits of his contemporaries, the court houses of the Eighth Judicial Circuit, to many of the legal documents in his hand and the markers which now mark the Old Eight.

During the entire reading of *A. Lincoln: Prairie Lawyer* one is constantly reminded of Ralph Waldo Emerson's letter to Walt Whitman when the latter's *Leaves of Grass* was published. In the tone of Emerson anyone interested in Lincoln or our American heritage can hail John Duff and readily say they "find incomparable things said incomparably well" as well

as "the courage of treatment which so delights us, and which large perception only can inspire" and conclude appropriately with the observation that "... the solid sense of the book is a sober certainty. It has the best merits, namely, of fortifying and encouraging."

ARNOLD GATES

Garden City, New York

Yankee from Sweden: The Dream and the Reality in the Days of John Ericsson. By Ruth White. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1960. Pp. xix, 299. \$4.50.)

THE UNPREDICTABLE AND COMPLEX inventor of the 19th century, Swedish-American John Ericsson, who transformed the war at sea by designing and building the *Monitor*, has long been neglected by biographers. The 1907 account by William Conant Church, the designated heir of the Ericsson Papers (who suppressed materials which did not please him), is a colorless, distorted image by a devoted admirer. Ruth White, who, with her late husband, wrote *Tin Can on a Shingle*, is the second to attempt a full-dress biography of this engineering genius.

John Ericsson's life spanned almost the entire 19th century. The author brings out in fresh detail many of his lesser known but equally pregnant creations and his rugged persistence. After describing his early life in Sweden, she traces his activities in London where he produced the first practical steam fire engine and the first locomotive to run a mile in fifty-three seconds. Emigrating to the United States, Ericsson turned out the first screw-driven warship, the *Princeton*, designed the engines and propellers for tow boats and canal boats, built the *Ericsson*, the *Monitor*, the *Dictator*, and the *Destroyer*, tinkered with numerous other inventions, and dreamed of harnessing the sun's energy. Ruth White's close-up of her subject is interrupted by wide angle shots of the social and political scenes. At best, *Yankee from Sweden* is a descriptive biography.

The author has dutifully inspected the Ericsson manuscript materials in the Library of Congress, the American Swedish Foundation, the New York Public Library, and the New York Historical Society, the William Church Papers in the Library of Congress and the familiar secondary sources. It is regrettable that Mrs. White did not sample the rich manuscript collections of naval officers who were connected with Ericsson's inventions, such as the John Rodgers Papers in the Library of Congress or the Samuel Francis DuPont correspondence in the Longwood Foundation or, more significantly, certain of the record groups in the National Archives which detail the day-to-day building of the *Monitor* and other ships. Such neglect hampers her account of the complicated problems that Ericsson faced in constructing these vessels. This and her failure to analyze critically is partially compensated for by the impact of her sympathetic, vivid pace, except when slowed by too frequent and too lengthy quotations. *Yankee from Sweden* is also handicapped by sweeping generalizations as "Without Ericsson's invention [of

the surface condenser], it is fair to say that sailing ships would have retained their supremacy until the introduction of the diesel engine. . . ." The first iron-hulled warship in the United States was the *Michigan* and not, as Mrs. White maintains, the *Princeton*.

The author's affectionate lens captures a portrait of the "Big Swede" which is a trifle blurred but usually entertaining.

JAMES M. MERRILL

Whittier College

Jefferson Davis: Confederate President. By Hudson Strode. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959. Pp. xvii, 556. \$6.75.)

THE FIRST VOLUME OF PROFESSOR HUDSON STRODE'S projected three-volume study of Jefferson Davis was praised by the Madison Avenue pundits, and now the second volume of this work receives the same treatment. This second book is supposed to cover the life of the President of the Confederacy from his inauguration to January 1, 1864. I dissented in a published review to the praises given the first volume, and I herewith give my reasons for dissenting from the praise given the second volume.

Mr. Strode's book possesses virtues. It is sympathetic with a defeated man who has been unfairly treated by the biographers. To speak favorably of Davis outside the precincts of the United Daughters of the Confederacy is a contribution to the interpretation of an important period of American history. Mr. Strode is an experienced writer who throws his rhetoric around spaciouly enough to win the applause of the cherishers of the Lost Cause. Moreover, to write of Jefferson Davis is a difficult task. Few scholars have produced monographs on phases of the Confederate President's life. The ten volumes of Dunbar Rowland's *Jefferson Davis: Constitutionalist* are mostly concerned with public utterances and do not go behind the scenes. Yankee vandals succeeded in partly destroying the Davis records. He was treated the same as Hitler: a man so despicable that evidences of his life were destroyed.

Mr. Strode's imperfections are numerous. His use of trite metaphors and clichés is cloying. An extensive three-volume work on a much controverted character should have elaborate references to authorities. The author does not bother with footnotes. Except where the obvious is repeated from handbooks, one is at a loss whether or not to believe what Mr. Strode asserts.

This book has other defects more fundamental. It is not a true biography. It is a hit-and-miss history of the Confederacy to which is added whimsical recordings of what an amateur historian has stumbled on in desultory reading, with Jefferson Davis as a bagatelle. All sorts of characters are elaborately discussed—Lincoln, McClellan, Mrs. Davis, Secretary of State Benjamin, and so on without a precise connection of these characters with Davis. We are actually given a better understanding of Lincoln's disagreement with McClellan than we are of Davis' misunderstanding with

Joseph E. Johnston. Oh, the endless meanderings of this so-called biography! Where is the trimming away of irrelevances that one is led to expect of the literary artist Mr. Strode is reputed to be?

This book is not the classic defense Jefferson Davis deserves. All that Mr. Strode effectively proves is that his hero was a saintly man who said his prayers, had gentlemanly manners, and was kind to those he was expected to succor and to those he had the duty of killing in battle. The author seems to think that the one way to vindicate Davis is to have him shed sentimental tears over the ill treatment the enemy gave certain other enemies. Another device of the author is to pour sugar over those Davis loved, such as Albert Sidney Johnston, Judah P. Benjamin, and Mary B. Chesnut, and to be positively vicious to those Davis did not like, such as Joseph E. Johnston, P. G. T. Beauregard, and Henry S. Foote. The author misses entirely the lonesome pinnacle that this Macbeth of the Confederacy carved out for himself. Davis may have been unethical in setting himself against the wave of nationalism that enveloped progressive countries in the nineteenth century. He may have been so deluded that he fell like Shakespeare's heroic villain. But Davis' fall was as grand as that of Macbeth. Indeed, he was the grandest failure in American history. He deserves to be recorded as such.

FRANCIS B. SIMKINS

Longwood College

A John Brown Reader: The Story of John Brown in His Own Words, in the Words of Those Who Knew Him, and in the Poetry and Prose of the Literary Heritage. Edited with Introduction and Commentary by Louis Ruchames. (London, New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1959. Pp. 431. \$7.50.)

THOSE STRANGE EVENTS AT Harpers Ferry of a century ago still puzzle students of the Civil War. What sort of man led a hopeless foray into a cul-de-sac, seeking the contents of a United States arsenal with which to arm an unprepared slave population? Was it the recklessness of insanity that caused Old John Brown to imagine that he could challenge an institution supported by millions? Or, was Old John Brown of the stuff of martyrs? Did he seek to gain national attention by the seizure of national property in the government arsenal at Harpers Ferry? Did he seek by his death to awaken the conscience of mankind to the existence of a hideous evil?

These questions are not easy to answer, and the present anthology does not attempt to present solutions. Instead, it presents a series of Brown letters, other writings, interviews, and his "Provisional Constitution," accounts of Brown by those who knew him, and a substantial selection of poems, speeches, sermons, and writings about Brown. All except one or two selections are highly favorable to John Brown, and the weakness of

the volume for the historian is that the contemporary and later evaluations that were unfavorable to Brown are neglected.

With this limitation in mind, one finds here some understanding of the Old Testament figure of John Brown and of the terrific impact that his sacrifice made upon the poets, writers, and other intellectuals of the North and the Western world. Through the early letters, the fierce eloquence of his speech to the Court in November, 1859, and the sad epitaph which he handed to a guard on the morning of his execution there runs a thread of idealism which helps to explain John Brown and aids in understanding the tremendous appeal that this martyr has had ever since. Stedman, Howells, L. M. Alcott, Wendell Phillips, Melville, Whittier, Emerson, Thoreau, Holmes, Sandburg, and Benet—these are some of the literary figures represented in the literary selections. His soul did indeed go marching on. Brown himself had great contempt for mere "words." His was the propaganda of the deed, even to the ultimate sacrifice. The eloquence of this sacrifice, akin to the martyrs of old, inspired a generation that marched to war—a war that Brown had seen with foreboding on the morning that he approached the scaffold. "I, John Brown," he had written, "am now quite certain that the crimes of this guilty land will never be purged away, but with Blood. I had as I now think vainly flattered myself that without very much bloodshed, it might be done." The lives of over half a million men were spent before the end of the tragedy that Brown sensed had been reached.

RODNEY C. LOEHR

University of Minnesota

The Shaping of a Battle: Gettysburg. By James Stewart Montgomery. (Philadelphia: The Chilton Company, 1959. Pp. xxxi, 259. Folding maps included. \$5.95.)

IN THE CENTENNIAL THROB of Civil War literature much has been written, and in all probability much more will be published. If we divide it roughly into two classes—the first for the general reader who wishes merely to read about the war, its high lights, anecdotes, and human interest stories; the second for the student who wishes to examine the war intelligently and conscientiously—James Stewart Montgomery's *The Shaping of a Battle: Gettysburg* falls clearly into the former. Pieced together from some of the best known and most popular writings, the author has left the source work to others. He adds his opinions on many of the "whys" of Gettysburg, if not with originality, certainly with some military acumen, for he is a soldier having served in two world wars. Quite obviously he knows war and enjoyed his military experiences. In addition to his conclusions at the end of the book, where he points to the modicum of good that comes from war despite its many and manifest evils, the reader can sense his understanding for Bald Dick Ewell's temptation to go forward

with the skirmish line and join in the fun instead of attending to the more serious business of a divisional commander.

In his introduction, Mr. Montgomery anticipates the question which comes to the minds of all those interested in the Civil War—why another book about Gettysburg? His answer is that other writers have viewed the battle from one side or the other, following the fortunes of the Union Army or marching with Lee's men. By his own words, "In this book, I have attempted a picture in the round, to sketch the events taking place on both sides of the flaming battle fronts and to tell something of the plight of peaceful civilians caught between hostile armies and forced in spite of themselves to become actors in the terrible drama of war," he sets forth his purpose. Omitting for the moment his secondary purposes of vindicating Meade in "The Second Battle of Gettysburg" and discussing the "whys" of the battle itself, to which but little space is given at the end of the book, it is fair to say that he has achieved his purpose, although one might argue his definition of a picture in the round. It should be more definitive than sketchy. The reader cannot help looking back on this volume as a series of sketches detailed and connected, to be sure, but, nonetheless, far from definitive. For example, Berdan's Sharpshooters on their famous sortie to the western slope of Seminary Ridge on July 2 are dismissed with an anecdote about a small boy's warning of rebels waiting in the woods. Yet the historian of this unique regiment masses considerable evidence to show that this action was the turning point of the battle because it divulged Longstreet's move to the Union left and delayed him forty precious minutes. Whether or not this is an overstatement, the reconnaissance *in toto* is part of a picture in the round.

The author's technique is one of scene hopping from Lee to Meade to Longstreet to Sickles, *et al.*, with interludes such as resting on July 2 at 4:00 p.m., with the 1st and 11th Massachusetts at Peter Rogers' farm on the Emmitsburg Pike while the fragrance of baking biscuit and roasting mutton floated from the open windows, or the cramped night of July 2 spent by nineteen women, two dogs, and a cat in the vault of the local bank. The picture changes rapidly—now on one side, now on the other—with frequent stops in the middle. Military strategy is worked in while the generals struggle vividly with their problems. The author may well have discovered a vehicle for giving the impression of confusion that obviously is part of a battle. Certainly the book moves along rapidly and covers the high lights of the three days as well as the preliminary period before the battle and the aftermath.

Mr. Montgomery's style has some flair to it. He speaks the minds of the actors in the "tragedy of Gettysburg," as he terms it. Not being documented except rarely, this leads to conjecture, but gives a personal touch. Thus Meade speaks "grimly," Longstreet "glumly turns things over in his mind," and Lee's "manner was as chilly as his words." The descriptive passages are often colorful and catching though brief. The reader cannot fail to be moved by Lee's agonizing meeting with General Imboden on the night of the third. Robbing the work of any literary distinction, how-

ever, are such phrases as, "across the field . . . powdered Stuart and Blackford"; "an officer willing to stick his neck out"; "Pettigrew's men have had it"; and "men walking like zombies," to mention a few.

Readers, be they students or not, are entitled to maps. The famous Bachelder maps of 1876 are supplied with this volume, neatly folded and detached. Though large in size, they are not clearly reproduced, being smudgy, clumsy, and at times hardly readable. In a book that moves so rapidly all over the battlefield in succeeding paragraphs, maps in the text are essential. After the general map of the field facing page one, they are sorely missed. Illustrations which might well heighten the interest of the reader, too, are lacking.

In the closing chapters, the author fulfills his secondary purpose, discussing Meade's critics and the whys of the battle. Meade comes out of this well and the author hopes "the old snapping turtle" will find a biographer who will do for him what Freeman did for Lee. The Longstreet debate is rehearsed without new material, but in fairness and with less conjecture than appears in the chapter dealing with the battle. Ewell's delay on the 1st, Sickles' unauthorized advance on the 2nd, Meade's failure to follow up, are all treated briefly, and in the end the problems are much the same as they were in the beginning. The battle was Lee's worst, as the author points out, and the blame falls on many shoulders; but Lee in his magnanimity will not have it so. His famous words, "It is all my fault," are characteristic, and throughout the book his stature remains undiminished.

There are useful rosters of the armies by corps, division, and brigade, for each day's fighting. The book closes with some interesting briefs on the postwar years in the lives of the leaders.

WILLIAM C. FOWLE

The Hotchkiss School

Daredevils of the Confederate Army. By Oscar A. Kinchen. (Boston: The Christopher Publishing House, 1959. Pp. 171. \$3.00.)

IN OCTOBER, 1864, a band of young Confederate soldiers, led by a gallant Kentucky theology student, Bennett Young, crossed the border from Canada and settled in Vermont. They quickly made themselves known in the community of St. Albans by residing in the better hotels, courting the fine young ladies, and becoming friendly with the townspeople. Incidentally, this group of men had originally escaped into Canada from northern prison camps.

After ingratiating themselves with the citizenry, they looted the local banks of more than \$200,000 in greenbacks and federal bonds. They harangued the officials upon federal atrocities in the south and forced their listeners to swear allegiance to the Confederacy. Then, after terrorizing the townspeople, they began to ride off on stolen horses and tried to burn the town with a substance known as "Greek-Fire."

The chief aim of the St. Albans Raiders was to create such a panic along the northern boundary that vast numbers of federal troops stationed in the Con-

federate area would be removed from the south. As it happened, their plan did not succeed, and the men regained the Canadian border with a band of infuriated northerners on their heels.

The attention of this story is directed toward the raiders rather than upon the raid itself. Documentation of source material makes of this book a thoughtful volume, since primary and secondary works are included. At times, however, the reader finds himself bogged down in many details which may be argued as being necessary for the presentation. Nevertheless, this is a minor complaint as compared with the author's intent and accomplishment.

ARTHUR LERNER

Los Angeles, California.

Vicksburg: A People at War, 1860-1865. By Peter F. Walker. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960. Pp. xvi, 235. \$5.00.)

FOR OVER THREE YEARS the reviewer was the historian at the Vicksburg National Military Park. During this period one of the most frequent questions asked of the park personnel was, "What did the Vicksburg civilians do during the siege?" Since there was a dearth of material available in the files on this important phase of the Vicksburg story, the visitor had to be given an inadequate answer. Research projects were scheduled treating this topic; this project was deferred. Now that Dr. Peter F. Walker's dissertation has been published, this important gap in Civil War historiography has been bridged.

Dr. Walker has consulted and used all the readily available sources in collecting material for his study. The only collections that were not consulted are those in the hands of private individuals. Only in one or two instances would these documents have made much difference. For example, on pages 133-134, the author quotes McNeily, a secondary source, as reporting that the planters of the Vicksburg area had continued to grow cotton, instead of raising corn. Opposed to this statement are the descriptions of the countryside contained in many of the Union soldiers' diaries. These Federal soldiers were impressed by the large corn fields in the Vicksburg area.

The author's interpretations cannot be criticized. Marshaling his evidence, Dr. Walker succinctly analyzes the population of the city in 1860 and its attitude toward secession. At first, the Vicksburgers opposed the policy of the "fire eaters." But with the withdrawal of Mississippi from the Union, the conservatives saw their position first weaken and then collapse. Between January 9 and April 15, according to Dr. Walker's well-founded arguments, four events—the *Silver Wave* episode, the Davis Reception, the riots on South Street, and Lincoln's call for 75,000 volunteers—helped to cut the ground from under the conservatives.

Once the decision for war was made, both the military and the city fathers gave no thought to civil defense until the spring of 1862, when it was too late. From May, 1862, until July 4, 1863, the city was in almost constant

peril. The author shows that "civil defense" was almost non-existent in the Civil War. Within a very short time the "city fathers" had voluntarily abdicated their position to the military. During the times of stress and strain, the author has pictured with bold, clear strokes people from every facet of civilian life—the hero and the coward, the profiteer and the patriot.

The book's title is a little misleading. The author devotes 210 of his 224 pages of text to the period between 1860 and July 4, 1863. As many others who have written of the Civil War in Mississippi, Dr. Walker glosses over the final 22 months of the conflict. During this time, Vicksburg served as a base of operations for a number of powerful Union expeditions which carried the fire and sword to the portions of the state east of the Big Black River. A number of these strikes, such as McPherson's Canton Expedition, Sherman's Meridian Expedition, and Osband's raids, were much more than cotton-gathering forays, which is all that the author mentions. One would like to know how the Vicksburg citizens fared during these troubled months. Either the author should have included this period in his book or changed the title.

The only other criticism that can be leveled at the work is that a number of errors have crept in wherever the author deals with strictly military affairs. For example, on p. 11 it is stated: "At Jackson, the Mississippi Central Railroad and the New Orleans, Jackson, and Great Northern Railroad provided rail links to the north and south." Canton, and not Jackson, was the junction point for these two railroads. Next, the author has Port Gibson connected by a feeder line with the Southern Railroad of Mississippi. At this time, Port Gibson's only rail outlet was with Grand Gulf on the Mississippi River and not the Southern Railroad. On p. 36, it is indicated that Mississippi withdrew from the Union on January 6 instead of the 9th. The author has the right wing of the Army of Tennessee being shattered at Mill Spring in January 1862 (p. 64), although the Army of Tennessee was not constituted until November 20, 1862. General Butler's soldiers did not occupy New Orleans until May 1, seven days later than the date indicated (p. 72) by Dr. Walker. The heavy artillerists that manned the Vicksburg heavy ordnance during Flag Officers Farragut's and Davis' attack on the city had not served the guns at Forts Jackson and St. Philip as charged on p. 80. Contrary to the author's statement on p. 86, Jackson was captured by the Union army four different times. During these occupations, the city suffered much greater damage than Vicksburg, and was referred to as "Chimneyville." Finally, the Confederate ram-fleet was destroyed at the battle of Memphis on June 6 and not at Fort Pillow (p. 89).

Dr. Walker's style is clear-cut, and he has made the reader feel the impact of the shells against the houses and smell the dank cave air. Despite certain errors and a misleading title, he has written an excellent book.

EDWIN C. BEARRS

Vicksburg National Military Park

BOOK NOTES

The Sword over the Mantel: The Civil War and I. By J. Bryan, III. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1960. Pp. 123. \$3.75.)

Written by a former Richmond newspaperman, this little monograph is largely a collection of humorous war stories passed down to the author by his Confederate forebears and family servants—although the first chapter extolls the good time enjoyed in a Confederate club founded by Mr. Bryan and fellow naval officers in the Pacific theater during World War II. In rather rambling fashion the author brings to light anecdotes and experiences as related by his grandfathers and uncles, all of whom seemed to possess a consistently rich humor both during and after the Civil War. One or two recollections of Dr. Douglas Freeman give an interesting insight into the character of that renowned scholar. This book provides highly interesting reading, but it is not recommended for the serious buff who likes his Civil War history undiluted by the water of witticism or the soda of a tall tale.

Hancock the Superb. By Glenn Tucker. (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1960. Pp. 368. \$5.00.)

Readers of the March issue of *Civil War History* received a taste of this appetizing biography of Winfield Scott Hancock, gallant and respected commander of the Army of the Potomac's Second Corps. The daring Pennsylvanian with full mustache, trimmed goatee, and field hat cocked to one side not only was a familiar figure in the Eastern army but, more particularly, weathered the storm of pre-Grant incompetents and emerged from the war as the most trustworthy corps commander in the Federal army. He is primarily remembered for his defense against Early at Williamsburg, for his defense against Pickett at Gettysburg, and for his slam-bang assault against Lee at Spotsylvania that ripped the Confederate lines at The Salient to shreds. His tenacity under Grant in the Wilderness and at Cold Harbor stamped him with marks of merit that directly led to his presidential nomination in 1880. In this first study of Hancock in over seventy years, Mr. Tucker has expertly woven together the exploits of one of the Union's most dependable commanders. He has provided clear maps and several excellent photographs of Hancock. And he has adequately portrayed a man so pugnacious that Confederate opponents admiringly dubbed him "Thunderbolt of the Army of the Potomac."

John Palmer Usher: Lincoln's Secretary of the Interior. By Elmo R. Richardson and Alan W. Farley. (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1960. Pp. vii, 152. \$3.50.)

Of the able men who composed Lincoln's wartime cabinet, John Palmer Usher is surely the least known. This is not difficult to explain, for the duties of the Secretary of the Interior do not seem as profound or encompassing as those of Seward, Stanton, and Welles. Moreover, the Kansan who held this secretaryship was an unpretentious and quietly devoted man who did little to publicize his own efforts. But in vivid fashion this first biography of Usher shows that his labors during the war were numerous and important. His efforts on behalf of the transcontinental railroad are enough in themselves to warrant a pointed study of the man. The authors, in recounting his political career, have given a new perspective to life in Lincoln's official family, just as they have emphasized the political complexities of a nation engulfed in civil war. Well written and highly documented, this volume is an overdue study—and a merited tribute—to one who served faithfully without waving the flag and singing his own praises.

The Battle of Gettysburg: A Guided Tour. By Edward J. Stackpole and Wilbur S. Nye. (Harrisburg, Pa.: The Stackpole Company, 1960. Pp. 96. \$1.00.)

Intended for tourists, this small paperback volume is crammed with data, illustrations, and maps to facilitate an understanding of the three-day battle that many maintain decided the war. The booklet is divided into three sections. Part I is a helpful guide for motorists who wish to traverse the field on their own and without benefit of professional direction. The bulk of the study, Part II, is a detailed narrative of the battle, replete with brigade and battery dispositions. Organization, strength, and losses in the two armies form Part III. For illustrations the authors have relied on such well-known sources as *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*. The maps are clear and concise. Impartial students of the war will quickly see Ewell, A. P. Hill, and Stuart emerge as the real villains of the narrative and the battle, while "Old Peter" Longstreet is a voice of conservatism in a din of radicalism. This booklet will be eagerly digested by those thousands who annually weave their way through the monuments to view Cemetery Ridge from all angles.

Life of John Brown: Centennial of His Execution. By Michael Gold. (New York: Roving Eye Press, 1960. Pp. 60. \$0.75.)

This little pamphlet, written thirty-five years ago, was reissued to commemorate the centennial of John Brown's death. The publishers could

not have chosen a better work to republish on an anniversary. Mr. Gold begins his treatise with the statements: "John Brown's life is a grand, simple epic that should inspire one to heroism . . . I know that he was the greatest man the common people of America have yet produced." With that theme, page after page of eulogy and unconcealed praise pour forth to make Americans ever mindful that the most famous execution of 1859 was a gross miscarriage of justice and a flagrant lapse of sane thinking. Yankees still waving the bloody shirt will be invigorated by this new edition; Southerners, on the other hand, will see a modern companion for *Uncle Tom's Cabin*.

Custer: The Life of General George Armstrong Custer. By Jay Monaghan. (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1959. Pp. 469. \$6.00.)

No student of the Civil War needs an introduction to George Custer, for no participant in that struggle was quite like him. A poor graduate of the West Point Class of 1861, he weathered a slow military start, then jumped from lieutenant to brigadier general in less than a year, and emerged from the four-year conflict with a record that not even Sheridan could match. Possessed of what many considered a charmed life (twenty horses were shot from under him), he was in the midst of every great cavalry action in the East. If his alleged demand of General Longstreet that the Confederate armies be surrendered to him personally at Appomattox was not true, it nevertheless was indicative of his nature, and his subsequent death at the Little Big Horn a decade later stirred up one of the outstanding controversies in American history. Jay Monaghan, author of *Civil War on the Western Border*, has in this new study concentrated on Custer's Civil War activities. He has recaptured the dashing and flamboyant air of Custer and has shaped it into an exciting tale of color and drama that will whet the appetite of any buff. Adequate notes, partial bibliography, and many new photographs supplement a narrative that has successfully recreated a man and his career.

The Haskell Memoirs: The Personal Narrative of a Confederate Officer. Edited by Gilbert E. Govan and James W. Livingood. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1960. Pp. xiv, 176. \$3.95.)

Douglas Southall Freeman first called attention to these unusual memoirs of a South Carolina colonel, and historians have since made good use of the few typescript copies in existence. Now the successful team of Gilbert Govan and Jay Livingood (co-authors also of *A Different Valor: The Story of General Joseph E. Johnston*) have added appendix, notes, and an index to the narrative and made it available for the first time in book form. Henceforth, Haskell—one of seven brothers who served in Confederate armies—will be increasingly quoted, for he was a poignant and

audacious fighter and writer who passed judgment on his superior officers with rare alacrity. His high regard for Johnston, Longstreet, Hood, and A. P. Hill stands in marked contrast to vituperative passages on Early, Jackson, D. H. Hill, and G. W. Smith. Despite the fact that the narrative was written forty years after the war, it is a remarkable document with new and intriguing commentaries, particularly of the Gettysburg and Petersburg campaigns. The memoirs of this staff officer and artillery commander who forfeited an arm at Mechanicsville are a valuable addition to available Confederate primary sources, and expert annotating by the editors but enhances their worth.

A Catalog of the Alfred Whital Stern Collection of Lincolniana in the Library of Congress. Introduction by Arthur G. Burton. (Washington: Library of Congress, 1960. Pp. xi, 498. \$15.00.)

In his many years as a Lincoln student and collector, Alfred W. Stern amassed the largest collection of manuscripts and books on Old Abe ever assembled by a private collector. Before his death he donated over 7,200 items to the Library of Congress; this bibliography is a detailed listing of 5,200 of those gifts. Included in the collection are copies of the Follett, Foster publication of *Political Debates between Hon. Abraham Lincoln and Hon. Stephen A. Douglas*, as well as one of only five known copies of Reuben Vose's tiny biography of Lincoln. Not since the publication seventeen years ago of Jay Monaghan's *Lincoln Bibliography* has a work of such scope and magnitude been published. Titles are arranged alphabetically by author, and Library of Congress reference numbers are given for each entry. A complete index is provided for easy location of names and places. For historians, researchers, and students of our sixteenth president, this guide is an indispensable key to the books, broadsides, music, cartoons, medals, etc., pertinent to the life and career of Lincoln. While bibliographies generally make for dull reading, the vastness of this one will encourage interest and perusal.

Pen and Sword: The Life and Journals of Randal W. McGavock. Compiled and edited by Herschel Gower and Jack Allen. (Nashville: Tennessee Historical Commission, 1959. Pp. 695. \$6.50.)

As part of an extremely varied career (Harvard student, world traveler, Nashville mayor), Randal W. McGavock spent the last two of his thirty-six years as a Confederate soldier. From command of an exclusively Irish company, the "Sons of Erin," he rose rapidly to colonel of the 10th Tennessee Infantry. He was imprisoned after the fall of Fort Donelson, then exchanged five months later for three Federal lieutenants. His martial career was cut short on May 12, 1863, when he was killed while leading his regiment in an assault at Raymond, Mississippi. Although only one

hundred pages of this unusual work treat of McGavock's Civil War activities, they shed new light on, and add much personal feeling to, the war in the West. A valuable insight is presented into the blunders relevant to the fall of Fort Donelson, and the author's daily entries in his journal of life at Fort Warren provide a new approach to that famous prison. Other than the first one hundred pages (a biographical sketch skillfully written by Professor Gower), the book contains the fourteen-year journal which McGavock maintained until six months before his death. Extremely well illustrated and edited, and with a comprehensive index, this book amply illuminates the career of one of Tennessee's most noted sons.

A Confederate Girl's Diary. By Sarah Morgan Dawson. Edited by James I. Robertson, Jr. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1960. Pp. xxxvii, 473. \$7.50.)

This journal of a young Baton Rouge girl was originally published in 1913. The increased demand for copies prompted Indiana University Press to issue a new and annotated edition, prepared by the editor of *Civil War History*. Mrs. Dawson (nee Sarah Fowler) was a young girl of twenty residing with her widowed mother and sisters in Baton Rouge when war came forcibly to their city in the spring of 1862. In vivid and feminine tones she described her observations and emotions to the end of the struggle—her initial fascination with the struggle, her detestation of Yankees, her life as a refugee after the city was evacuated, and her sorrow as the war years passed and two of her brothers were consumed in the conflict. Sarah Dawson's diary is one of only three journals by women treating of the war in Louisiana.

Money, Class, and Party: An Economic Study of Civil War and Reconstruction. By Robert P. Sharkey. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959. Pp. 346. \$5.50.)

Students who adhere to the Charles Beard theory of the Civil War as "The Second American Revolution" may be jolted by this new and much-needed economic study. Dr. Sharkey does not hold to the so-called monolithic interpretation of the war, and he presents a scholarly and well-documented case for his own hypotheses and interpretations. Not in the past score of years has an economic work of such depth and scope come forward, and how bankers, industrialists, and common workingmen came to view greenbacks and the financial standards of the 1860's is a refreshing and stimulating treatment. The book is heavy in statistical data and tabulations; as such, it makes for slow reading. But it is a work very necessary to a full understanding of the intricate problems confronting a disunited nation in time of civil war. While some may disagree with the author's conclusions, Dr. Sharkey is still to be commended for tackling

a large and somewhat dry subject, and for producing a book of deep value to our knowledge of those times.

The South in American History: Second Edition. By William B. Hesseltine and David L. Smiley. (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960. Pp. x, 630. \$8.00.)

First published in 1936 under the title *A History of the South*, this revised study is primarily a college text whose scope spans the years 1607 to the present. It is of importance for Civil War students because three chapters are devoted to the breakup of the Union, five treat of the war years, and three deal with Reconstruction—which together represent over one-fourth of the book. The narrative is clear and concise, yet comprehensive; military campaigns are supplemented by social, political, economic, and diplomatic factors which also had prominent roles in the war. As an over-all picture of the South, its heritage, and its prospects for the future, this excellent study misses few facets. And because it is a history of the South written from a national viewpoint, it has appeal for all Americans interested in sectional history.

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